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URBNl INSURRECTIONS:

A MULTI-DISCIPLINARY

APPROACH TOWARD AN INTEGRATED TYPOLOGY
Abstract
JAMES RUSSELL STEWART
Under the supervision of Dr. Robert M. Dim it
The purpose of this study is to investigate the possibility
and appropriateness of employing a multi-disciplinary approach in
the study of urban insurrections in an effort to construct a typology
which would include all of the elements common to each disorder.
The multi-disciplinary method is necessitated by the biases
which are inherent in any analysis that is restricted to either a
psychological, sociological, or politico-historical treatment of
episodes of collective behavior.

All of the disciplines make major

contributions to any analysis, but it is the contention of this
writer that the disciplines must be integrated before the most
accurate depiction is possible.
Another potential contribution of this dissertation is the
offering of an integrated multi-disciplinary theoretical body of
information to bridge the hiatus which appears to exist between
theories of episodic collective behavior and theories of social
movements.

Urban insurrections have characteristics of both of

these phenomena, yet they also have a uniqueness about them which
is not revealed adequately by an interpretation from the existing
terminals of theoretical explanation.

The dissertation proposes a hypothetical typology (as defined
by Howard Becker and John C. McKinney)l based upon a theoretical
framework composed of the contributions of theorists in psychology,
sociology, and political science.

The typology was subjected to

empirical testing by a comparison to the narratives of three major
race riots which occurred during the last decade.

The narrative

data offered supporting evidence to each of the stages of the
typology.
The sequential stages of an urban insurrection that were
supported include:
1.

A Discrepancy Between the Real and Ideal Cultures

2.

The Identification of Underlying, Causative Factors

3.

The Precipitating Incident

4.

The Rioting Stage

5.

The Reaction of Control Agencies

6.

The Return of Normality

1John c. McKinney, Constructive Typology and Social Theory,
(New York: Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1966).
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Probably no area of human relations is more problematic at
the present time than the majority-minority relationships in the
United States.

In particular, the black-white racial interaction

patterns are especially strained.

Unendurable conditions which have

existed for many decades and the frustrations which they have manifested are culminating in the increased polarization of the races
within this country.

Unresolved differences, untreated social

problems, and failures to rectify intolerable living conditions are
resulting in many forms of protest from the black communities in
all parts of the nation.

This dissertation is concerned with a

special and unique form of that protest--the urban insurrection.
In many respects the relevance of this area of investigation
and the basic ideas which led to the selection of this topic as a
dissertation subject are contained in the following quotation:
The history of America is in large part a story of social
relations between the races. An account of the experiences
shared by blacks and whites, of what they learned to believe
about themselves and each other, of how they came to behave
toward each other, and of the consequences of their beliefs
and behaviors--such an account encompasses the major events
of American history from early exploration of the continent
through the development of a plantation economy, its disruption
by the processes of industrialization, and the massive dis
locations of families and communities as the entire society has
become urbanized. The constant reweaving of the fabric of
American society can be understood largely in black and white
terms.
The place of America in the larger perspective of human
history will be defined principally by what Americans do about

2

the conflict between their behaviors in the realm of race
relations and their beliefs about democracy, equality of
opportunity, and the brotherhood of man.l
The events described in the above passage are not new to the
present generation of sociologists in America.
pressed a similar view in the early 1940's.

Gunnar Myrdal ex

In his classic work,

An American Dilemma, he described what he believed to be the basic
internal dilemma or problem which would confront America in the
decades following World War II.

This situation is created by atti

tude discrepant behavior patterns.

In essence, the American Creed

can not support the discriminatory practices against minority groups
that are presently characteristic of the American society. 2

The net

result of this situation is a shared predicament by Americans who
attempt to reconcile their "ideal" and "real" cultures. 3

A lessening

of this collectivized cognitive dissonance between professed beliefs
and actual behaviors has been attempted by the enactment of legisla
tion which has been designed to bring overt behaviors more in line
with the underlying set of attitudes represented in what has been
termed the "democratic, American ethos. "

Unfortunately, efforts

directed toward this goal have not proven entirely successful.
1

Raymond W. Mack, ed. , Prejudice and Race Relations, (Chicago:
Quadrangle Books, 1970), p. 3.
2Gunnar Myrdal, An American Dilemma, (New York:
Row, 1944).

Harper and

3Robert Bierstedt, The Social Order, 3rd ed. , (New York:
McGraw-Hill Book Co., 1970), pp. 170-171.
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The basic

The present situation is that of a nation divided.

conclusion of the Kerner Commission Report was that the United States
is moving toward the formation of two societies, one black, one

white--separate and unequal. 4

This division is not an inevitable one

nor is it the result of irreversible trends and forces.

If allowed

to continue, however, these conditions could result in the destruction
of the American way of life as it is represented in the basic set of
values of this democracy.

The amelioration of the causes of this

situation will require an unprecedented commitment toward meaningful
social action.

The recommendations embodied in the Kerner Commission

Report embrace three principles:
1. To mount programs on a scale equal to the dimension of
the problem.
2. To aim these programs for high impact in the inu:nediate
future in order to close the gap between promise and performance.
3. To undertake new initiatives and experiments that can
change the system of failure and frustration that now dominates
the ghetto and weakens our society. 5
The conditions in the ghetto are obviously at the center of
the causation of the recent urban insurrections; however, these
conditions have been present for generations and can not serve alone
as the necessary and sufficient explanations for the riots.

In the

past decade, black Americans have undergone several significant
4National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorder, Report,
(New York: Bantam Books, 1968) , p. 1.
S Ibid. , p. 2.
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changes in their collective self-image and in their perceptions o f

the world in which they find themselves. 6

A newly developing pride,

represented in the current "Black is Beautiful" campaign, will not
tolerate the prejudice and discrimination that have been passively
accepted in the past.

Compliance and accommodation are rapidly being

replaced by protest, creative disturbances, and outright rebellion by
many o f the young blacks in this country.

Members of the black

American communities are increas ingly rejecting their present life
s ituation as it has been defined for them by the white majority for
many centuries.
The changes in the black community are best represented by
the existence o f a "generation gap" between young blacks and their
parents.

Many factors can be identified for the "rising expectations"

which characterize the aspirations of young blacks.

Increased edu

cational levels attained by the younger generation lead to markedly
higher expectations for equality in all areas of s ocial life.

Most

important, of course, is equal access to rewards in the form o f
power, prestige, and wealth.

Another factor of equal s ignificance

is the increased importance and strength of social organizations
found within the conf ines of the black community.

The organizations

today are not the fraternal orders and social clubs that used to
dominate the power structure within the urban black neighborhoods.
6Jerome Skolnick, The Politics of Protest, (New York:
Ballantine Books, Inc. , 1969), p. xi.
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The present organizations are more politically aware and concerned
than were their predecessors.

Almost all major organizations whose

programs strive to achieve equality for blacks have local chapters
in each of the large urban centers of this country.

Moreover, each

city has its own local organizations which also serve the same ends.
While these groups use varied tactics and strategies, their goals are
virtually identical--to further the cause of black equality in this
country.

The civil rights movement o f the past two decades has

founded a heritage of leadership within the Negro community which is
redefining its role in the struggle for freedom.

The procedures

which were successfully employed in the past--lobbying for favorable
civil rights legislation, court cases to test the constitutionality
o f discriminatory laws, and peaceful demonstrations and protests-seem to have fallen out of favor with urban blacks in some of the
large American cities.

Con flict would seem to be the best single

descriptive term to depict the new means which are bei_n g employed by
the leadership within the urban ghettos.

The black protest movement

o f the l960's has compelled sociologists to reexamine the nature of
social con flict and its relationship to social change.

In order to

understand the recent strategies adopted it is necessary to develop a
theoretical basis to interpret the positive contributions and func
tions of social conflict.

The best example of this type o f work is.

Lewis easer's The Functions of Social Confli�t. 7

7 Lewis Coser, The Functions of Social Conflict, (New York:
The Free Press, 1956).
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Using previous works of this type as an interpretive guide,
Bracey, Meier, and Rudwick have demonstrated that the black protest
movement has and is employing four different types o f conflict in
their programs. 8
First is legal conflict, which is an attempt to use the court
system to attain redress.
conflict.

Secondly, there is the use of political

This form involves the mobilization of black political

activities (primarily in the form of voting for black or sympathetic
white candidates) to coerce the governmental leaders to act upon the
needs of the black persons in this country .

Nonviolent direct action

is the third type o f conflict and its popularity reached its peak
during the late 1950's and early 1960's.

The most frequent usage o f

this type of conflict took the form of various sit-ins and peaceful
demonstrations.

This method was popularized by Gandhi in India and

was extensively used by Martin Luther King with varying success in
the United States.

The fourth and most recent type to be employed by

blacks in this country is violence .

This form is represented by the

ghetto riots, progr ams for revolution as advocated by black militant
organizations, and isolated attacks upon the personnel o f social
control agencies primarily in the form of sniping of police officers.
While the progession from one type of conflict to another is not a
perfect one it is clear that the present form o f black protest is
8John H. Bracey, August Meier, and Elliott Rudwick, Conflict
and Competition: Studies in the Recent Black Protest Movement,
(Belmont, California: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1970), p. 1.
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The

somewhat more aggressive than that which was used in the past.

recent urban disorders are without question the most aggressive and
destructive form of black protest.

While responsible leaders on both

sides decried the violence which characterized the riots there can be
little doubt in regard to the causative factors behind them.

Urban

insurrections, while not being part of any over-all planned strategy,
certainly have resulted from the same appalling conditions which have
spawned the more legitimate forms of social protest.
The causes of the race riots are many and varied, but the
Kerner Commission Report has identified three basic conditions which

when taken together can explain the reasons for the disturbances. 9

At the base of these conditions is pervasive white racism in the form
of prejudice and discrimination against the black community.

Segre

gation practices have created rigid racial patterns o f residence.
The increased black migration to the central city coupled with the
white exodus to the suburbs have created a growing burden on cities
which are already· su ffering from depleted resources.

The demographic

trends have resulted in the creation of teeming racial ghettos
replete with lack of opportunity, loss of hope, and disruptive social
forces which manifest themselves in the form of high rates of deviant
behavior.

Forces operating within the ghetto have combined to per

petuate and entrap persons within its walls--both physically and
9Kerner Commission Report, op. cit . , pp. 203-204.
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psychologically.

These processes have resulted in the development

o f what Myrdal has termed an "underclass."

This phenomenon repre

sents a group o f persons who are not integrated into the rest o f
It is composed of the unemployed, the underemployed, and

society.

the unemployable persons and families at the bottom o f the social
scale for whom opportunities are becoming more closed while they are

growing plentiful for the rest of the nation. 10

The urban ghetto

dwellers are the most representative of this growing problem in the
United States.

Another recent viewpoint describes this situation

from the standpoint o f the formation of a sub-culture o f poverty whose
values and norms are divergent opposites from those o f the "white
middle class culture" in our society.

Through the process o f social

ization these de featist traditions are transmitted to the next gen
eration and the members find themselves more or less permanently
locked into a cycle o f poverty.
More recently other conditions have begun to catalyze the
abhorrent conditions described in the preceding passages.

Expecta

tions aroused by the victories o f the civil rights movement have led
to frustrations, hostility, and cynicism in the face o f the persistent
gap between promise and performance. 11

The white terrorism tactics

10 celia

s. Heller, ed. , Structured Social Inequality: A
Reader in Comparative Social Stratification, (Toronto: The Macmillan
Company, 1969), p. 107.
11

Kerner Commission Report, op. cit. , pp. 203-204.
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directed against the non-violent protests cf the early

1 960's

have

also creaLed a climate which approves and encourages the use of
violence and disrespect for social control agencies.

Feelings of

alienation are extensive in the black urban communities.

More and

more blacks are tending to view themselves as victims of political
and economic exploitation on the part of the white power structure
The powerlessness syndrome which affects an increasing

in America.

number of blacks is revealing itself in the direction of increased
violence.

Access to legitirr.ate avenues of redre�s are denied and

the resulting situation leads to the conviction that violence is the
only viable method of "rr.oving the system. 1112
Also important in the search for causes of the riots was the
incitement and encouragement of violence by leaders in the black
communities.

Appeals to violence were preached and reinforced

throughout the ghettos by the " •. . inflammatory rhetoric of black
racists and militants." 13

The influence of these persons can not be

accurately measured; however, it is evident that they provided sparks
to an already volatile situation.

The role of the police must also

be included as one of the causative factors responsible for the riots.
The very nature of their job tends to bring them into conflict situ
ations and most riots were sparked by a routine arrest of some black
1 2walt Anderson, ed., The Age of Protest, (Pacific Palisades,
California: Goodyear Publishing Company, Inc. , 1969), p. 3 7.
1 3Kerner Commission Report, op. cit., p. 205.
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suspect.

But more importantly, the police have come to symbolize the

oppression and discrimination used by the white power structure over
blacks.

They are viewed as the white man's enforcer in the ghettos.

Actions of the police in the form of encouraging and, in part, creat
ing a "dual system o f justice" have also acted in an exacerbating
manner to widen the division within this country.
Decades of neglect by socially responsible agencies designed
to correct these injustices coupled with an increasing impatience
among blacks have created the circumstances ,;.vhich precipated the
various race riots that occurred during the late 1960's.

Martin

Luther King, until his assassination the most respected and prestig
ious leader within the Negro community, had the following to say in
reference to the recent urban disorders:
Urban riots must now be recognized as a durable social
phenomena. They may be deplored, but they are here and should
be understood. Urban riots are a special form of violence. . • •.
They are mainly intended to shock the white community. They
are a form of social protest. 14
The violence that occurred on both sides during these incidents,
the damage to property, and the resultant widening of the social
distance between the races combine to label urban insurrections as
one of the major social problems confronting the American society
today.
14
Norval D. Glenn and Charles M . Bonjean, Blacks in the United
States, (San Francisco: Chandler Publishing Company, 1969), p. 5.
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The Report of the National Advisory Commission on Civil
Disor ders has done much to explain conditions which precipitated and
preceded the outbreaks and has also presented a list of recommenda
tions which are designed to eliminate the causes of the riots.

The

report is very detailed and complete; however, it fails to completely
examine and study _the processes that were in operation during the
actual riots.

This dissertation seeks to fill this void.

In addition

to providing a base of knowledge in this area, the objective of the
dissertation will be to provide a new dimension for the analysis of
collective behavior and the sociology of social movements.
Specifically, the dissertation proposes to investigate the
possibility and appropriateness of utilizing a multi-disciplinary
framework for the analysis of urban insurrections.

It is the conten

tion of this writer that earlier models or typologies derived from
the analyses of episodic collective behavior or historical treatments
of full-scale revolutions are inadequate to explain or fully compre
hend the events that occurred in Watts, Detroit , and Newark.
Cursory examination of literature seems to indicate that the
phenomenon under investigation is located between two poles of a
collective behavior--social movement continuum.

One terminal is

represented by "issueless, irrational" behavior of temporary crowds
while the other is best exemplified by long-term political movements.
Present theories of explanation tend to focus on either of the
extremes while leaving a theoretical vacuum in the center.

This

dissertation is designed to offer an integrated typology in this area.

12

Race riots have been researched before and many conclusions
have been reached.

While the Kerner Commission Report is the most

impressive and extensive piece of investigation thus far attempted,
other more recent articles still illustrate the timeliness o f research
in this area.

Among the most recent articles are:

Racial Disturbances:

"The Causes of

A Comparison of Alternative Explanations" by

Seymour Spilerman in the ASR, vol. 35, August, 1970; "The Causes of
Racial Disturbances:

Tests of an Explanation" also by Seymour

Spilerman in the ASR, vol. 36, June, 1971; "Some Implications of
Experimental Social Psychology for the Study of Urban Disorders" by
Russell G. Geen and "Neighborhood Status Mobility and Riot Behavior:
An Analysis of the Detroit Disorders of 1967" by Donald I. Warren in
the Sociological Quarterly, vol. 12, No. 3, Summer, 1971.

While these

investigations answer pertinent questions there remains unanswered
one fundamental question--What were the sequential stages that
characterized the developmental and operational phases o f the race
riots?

Providing an answer to this question will constitute the task

of this dissertation.

CHAPTER II
STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
This research, as is the case with most investigations, rests
upon the assumption that regularities and patterns do exist among
seemingly unique events and that these recurrences are discoverable
In other words, the problem

with the use of scientific methodology.

of this dissertation can be stated thusly--Do discernible sequential
stages exist in urban insurrections and, if so, what are they and
how can they be identified?
The research problems inherent in this dissertation are two
fold in nature.

First, it will be necessary to establish and docu

ment the usage of the constructed typology as a legitimate research
tool in this previously unexplored area.

It is essential that the

tool be sanctioned before the investigation can proceed.

Constructed

and ideal types have, of course, a long and fruitful history of
application in sociological research.

However, before it can be

utilized in the study of urban insurrections it will be necessary
to substantiate its productive application in phenomena that are
similar to the present topic of research and thereby increase the
likelihood of its successful application.

Typologies of revolutions

and collective behavior have been constructed so it appears likely
that adequate precedents do exist, but this will be more fully
developed in the theoretical framework and review of literature
portions of the dissertation.

274300
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The second problem of the study will be the construction,
empirical verification, and revision, if deemed necessary, of a
typology that identifies and establishes regularities and sequences
that are found to occur in the race riots chosen for analysis.

It

could then be possible to generalize from these find ings back to
population which includes all race riots which have occurred in the
recent decade.

It could also be possible to use the typology as a

predictive device in the event that this type of phenomenon occurs
in the future.

These operations, however, will be highly tenuous

and speculative and must be qualified by limitations and restrictions
to be discussed later in the methodology section of the dissertation.
The technique to be employed in the examination of this
phenomenon is probably best described by Kaplan as the "hypothetico
deductive method.111

According to this procedure, the investigator

using careful observations, shrewd guesses, and scientific intuition
arrives at a set of postulates governing the processes involved in a
certain phenomenon.

These postulates take the form of a general

hypothesis from which he deduces a set of observable consequences in
the form of working hypotheses which can be confirmed or disconfirrned
by empirical tes ting.

The actual steps used in the construction of

the typology will be elaborated upon later in the methodology section,
but these are the fundamental processes involved.

The typology will

1Abraham Kaplan, The Conduct of Inquiry: Methodology for
Behavioral Science, (San Francisco: The Chandler Publishing Company,
1964), pp. 9-10.
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rest upon and be firmly supported by the body of theory to be
developed.

Using theory as a base, the typology should represent

an organized image of the phenomenon that will be investigated.

The

typology will not simply be a restatement of specific theories but
also will incorporate important propositions and perspectives dis
covered in the review of literature in related areas.
The constructed type, as a research tool, serves two important
functions:

(1) it gives structure and meaning to raw empirical data;

and (2) it provides empirical referents for verification of the
already existing body of theory.

It functions in the all-important

position of serving as a link between theory and empirical reality.
The constructed typology used in this dissertation will be formulated
from a theoretical framework and, after being subjected to empirical
testing, the results will then be re-integrated back into the body of
theory from which it was derived.

This method of employing the

constructed type is more in line with recent trends which relate it
more closely to the empirical data.

This development came about

largely because of positivists' objections to the impressionistic
approaches that were previously used. 2
The empirical testing of the typology will consist of compar
ing the hypothesized constructed typology to various narratives,
2 Gideon S joberg and Roger Nett, A Methodology for Social
Research, (New York: Harper and Row, 1968), p. 255.

16

accounts, and descriptions o f a selected few case studies o f race
riots.

Originally the writer had hoped to use a randomly chosen

sample from the total population of race riots, but this operation
did not prove feasible because of the paucity of in format ion that
exists about the race riots which were smaller in scope.

Because

of this Watts (1965), Detroit ( 1967), and Newark (1967) were chosen
for intensive analysis.

While there are many shortcomings which

accompany the use o f the "case-study" method, it is particularly
appropriate in instances where little research has been accomplished
before and where the purpose o f the research is mainly descriptive
rather than exper imental.

It is also a fruitful method for stimu-

lating insights and suggesting hypotheses for further research of a
more detailed nature.

3

Another manner of depicting the research techniques o f this
study would be to describe them as "historical-ex post facto".

This

type of investigation is defined as:
That in which the independent variable or variables have al
ready occurred and in which the researcher starts with the
observation of a dependent variable or variables. He then studies
the independent variables in retrospect for their possible re
lations to, and ef fects on, the dependent variable or variables. 4
3
claire Selltiz, Marie Jahoda, Morton Deutsch, and Stuart W.
Cook, Research Methods in Social Relations, rev. ed. , (New York:
Holt, Rinehart, and Winston, 1966), pp. 59-60.

4 Fred N. Kerlinger, Foundations of Behavioral Research:
Educational and Psychological Inquiry, (New York: Holt, Rinehart,
and Winston, Inc. , 1964), p. 360.
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The labels, independent or dependent variables, are not
entirely apropos with regard to the testing o f the typology; however,
the sequential stages of a race riot act as both independent and
dependent variables during the chain o f events occurring in a race
riot.

The main purpose for introducing the ex post facto concept

lies in the shortcomings or weaknesses that accompany this type of
research design.

The major limitations include the inability to

manipulate independent variables, the lack of power to randomize the
sample selected for analysis, and perhaps most importantly, the risk
of improper interpretation. 5

Despite these restrictions it is felt

that the study c an be successfully executed by careful analysis of
the data and also by the fact that this study will have a hypothesis
to serve as a guide in the process of interpretation.
The documentation for the three selected riots will be primar
ily of a secondary-source nature.

Primary sources or first-hand

accounts were shown by the Kerner Commission Report to be characterized
by biases , inaccuracies, and were in many instances mutually contra
dictory.

The secondary sources, while based on primary sources, are

the resu lts o f a si fting, weighing, and comparing of primary sources
to arrive at the most accurate accounts possible.

Admittedly, a

certain amount o f information will be lost, but it is believed that
the objectivity o f the secondary-source material will more than
compensate for this loss.
5 rbid. , p. 3 7 1.
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Prime sources of information utilized during this stage of
the investigation will be the various governmental commission reports .
In addition , journal arti cles , newspaper stories, and recent books
will also be used extensi vely .

The working hypothesis will then be

evaluated in terms of these sources and necessary revisions will be
undertaken to insure the typology' s compatibility with reality.
In summary , the major internal research problems con fronting
this writer will be the j ustification of both the area of investiga
tion and the methodology that will be employed.

CHAPTER III
THEORETICAL FRA1'1EWORK AND REVIEW OF LITERATURE
This chapter w ill summarize the contributions and findings of
theorists who, by v irtue of their writings, have achieved some
prominence in the field of collective behavior.

Both similarities

and differences will be noted in an effort to trace the development
of alternate philosophies o f interpretation o f crowd behavior.
Particular attention will be directed toward contrasting opinions of
the w riters in their descriptions of crowds, and causative factors
involved in episodes of collective behavior.

By concentrating on

these three foci, the "evolution" of thought in this field becomes
very evident.
Collective behavior theorists can be categorized into three
distinct schools o f thought--the classical, the conventional, and a
third group, more recent in origin, that will be re ferred to as the
new perspectives school for lack of a better term.

In addition to

these three stages there can also be identified certain individuals
who occupied a transitional position between the different schools.
The w ritings o f Robert Park, for example, marked a definite change
from the traditional theoretical position o f the classical school of
thought and heav ily inf luenced the foundation of the next school,
the conventional.

Likewise, the Kerner Commission Report set the

stage for a new dimension o f analysis that superseded the scope of
the new perspectives school.
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The classical school of thought dominated all academic inter
pretations of collective behavior until well into the 1920 ' s.

Almost

without exception the early theorists from Plato to Le Bon focused
upon the psychological implications of crowd behavior.

The early

collective behavior theories had their roots in the antidemocratic

traditions of European academicians. 1

Largely concentrating on the

"irrational " and "evil " aspects o f the crowd, their work was heavily
tainted with a conservative bias and tended to discredit c rowd
behavior by depicting it as animalistic and primitive.
The conventional school consisted largely of an American
modification of the classical school ' s findings and interpretations.
These changes, however, only modified but did not eliminate the bias
inherent in the classical school.

Their attempts to systematize the

field of collective behavior have often confounded rather than
clarified.

Furthermore, the conceptual organization is based upon

"undemonstrated assertions about the exaggerated character of unin
stitutionalized beliefs and behaviors. . . " of the participants.

2

This school was the p revailing theoretical framework in collective
behavior from the 1930 ' s until the publication of the Kerner
Corro.nission Report in the later portion of the 1960's.
1 Jerome Skolnick and Elliott Currie, "A C ritical Note on
Conceptions of Collective Behavior, " The Annals of the American
Academy of Political and Social Science , vol. 391 (September, 19 7 0 ) ,
p. 3 4.
2

Ibid .
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The new perspectives school owes a great debt to the Kerner
Commission Report.

It was the first maj or document that attempted to

objectively analyze the actions o f both the agencies of social control
and the participants in the riots.

It has a tendency to legitimize

some of the actions of the rioters and lays some of the blame for the
intensity o f the disorders on the shoulders o f the police.

Using

this document as a benchmark the recent theorists have added the
important dimension o f a political interpretation.

They conclude

that the political overtones surrounding an urban disorder must neces
sarily be included in any form of investigation.

Indeed some consider

it the most important because of the distorted findings that result
when the political circumstances are excluded from the analysis.
The general body of the text that follows will be an elabora
tion on this format.

The w riters chosen to represent each school

certainly do not exhaust each school's membership .

Other writers

could also have been included but the selection for this dissertation
was based upon two criteria:

(1 ) their typicality ; and ( 2 ) their

eminence.
The summa ry and conclusions portion at the end o f this section
will relate the findings o f this research to the writer's dissertation
topic and show the relevance that they have for any future analysis
of collective behavior.
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THE CLASSICAL SCHOOL
Gustave Le Bon
In his de finition of a crowd Le Bon differentiates between
crowd as used in the ordinary sense and from a psychological viewpoint.
The former is simply a gathering of individuals while the latter is a
new combination o f ideas and characteristics differing very much from

those of the individual personalities composing the physical crowd. 3
The characteristics o f the crowd are seen as melting into a single
collective mind.

This formation o f a single being is the process and

end result o f Le Ban's " law o f the mental unity of crowds . 11 4

The

collective mind is not a product or a sum of the individuals that
compose the crowd , it is rather composed of the characteristics that
each o f the individuals have in common.

Moreover, the common features

are governed by " unconscious forces " that most normal individuals have
to the s ame d egree.

5

The implication of his descriptions strongly

suggests that instinctual behavior is largely responsible for the
various actions o f crowds.
Le Bon identified three processes which are found in every
.

.

·1·

crowd--anonymity, contagion, and suggestibi ity.
3Gustave Le Bon, The Crowd, (New York :
1960 ) , p. 2 3 .
4rbid. , p. 24.
5 -b · d

�- , p. 2 9 .

6 rbid . , p . 3 0 .

6

It is the

Viking Compass Books ,
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combination of these three processes and their influence upon the
'individuals that largely explains the conduct of the crowd.

The net

effect of these processes results in leaving the members of a crowd
in a state that is very similar to hypnosis.

This "state" can largely

ex.plain the special characteristics of a crowd--"impulsiveness,
irritability, incapacity to reason, the absence of j udgment and the
critical spirit, and the exaggeration of sentiments. 1 1 7

These charac

teristics explain the fact that crowds are not influenced or controlled
to any degree by laws or institutions.

The crowd loses its " civili-

zation" and reverts back to a more primitive state of being.

The

actions of the crowd are similar to what Lombroso identified as the
"atavistic man . "

Le Bon did attribute both destructiveness and heroism

to the crowd ; however, in both instances the behavior is a result of
irrationality and impulsiveness.
Le Bon identified two basic types of crowds--heterogeneous and
homogeneous.

8

Heterogeneous crowds are defined as " . .. a composition

of individuals of any description, of any profession, and of any degree

9
.
1 1 1.gence.
·
of inte
"

These are the crowds that are most likely to

exhibit the "typical crowd characteristics" and include street crowds
and various formal assemblies.
7

rbid. , p. 3 6.

8 Ibid . , p • 155 •

9 rbid. , pp. 156-57.

The homogenous crowd is usually more
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restrained and reserved, but it depends upon the "quality" o f the
·individuals who compose them.

sects, castes, and classes. 10

Examples of this type would include:
Le Bon also discusses the criminal

crowd and its characteristics, but this type is more likely to be
labeled because of unfavorable de finitions attached to its actions
rather than the composition of its membership .
According to Le Bon the behavior of crowds can be attributed
to a number o f different factors or influences.

Paramount in impor-

tance are the controlling instincts that are manifested in a crowd

11
.
'
t 1.on.
situa

The "normal 11 behavior of individuals that is controlled

by laws and mores is placed in a position of secondary importance with
the formation of the "low-level" collective mind.

The ma j or factor

of influence now becomes subconscious instinctual behavior patterns
which the crowd participants have in common.
Other factors are also seen to have some effect on the behavior of particular crowds.

These include:

.
12
institutions,
a nd e ducation.
.
.
.

race, tradition, time,

However, these factors have only a

modifying influence upon the more basic instinctual behavior patterns.
Thus, cert ain "races" of people exhibit crowd behavior which is more
irrational and tempermental than others while highly educated persons
are less li.kely to succumb to the "temptations " of the crowd.
l0 rbid .

1 1 rbid. , pp. 162- 6 3 .
12 rbid. , p . 81.
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Georg Sirnmel
While Sirnmel ' s descriptions of crowds and their resulting
behavior are remarkably similar to Le Ban ' s, there are a n umber of
differences which are worth noting.

Simmel characterizes the " mass"

not as a sum of its individual qualities but an entirely new
" . . • phenomenon made up of only those fragments of each of them in

which he coincides with all others. 11 1 3

He further states that these

· · ·
11 1 4
fragmen ts are of necessi. ty the "l owes t and most prirrutive.

Thus,

the mass is always seen as being inferior to the individual, indeed,
the mass has a tenclency to " pull down " the individual to its level.
The resulting "mass mind" is described as radical, irrational,
and negative .
ideas.

15

The " mass mind " always centers on simple , often radical,

It is unable to weigh alternatives, but rather rushes to

achieve its aims or goals via the shortest, most simple routes .
Furthermore, the crowd rests upon "emotionalness" r ather than
" intellect. 1 1

16

Simmel believes that mass behavior is largely negative in
character.

This is a result of the fact that common features of

individuals which make possible their unification are more likely to
13Kurt H. Wolff , ed. , T he Socio
. 1ogy of Georg s im.
· "Tie 1, ( Glencoe,
Illinois: The Free Press, 1950), p. 3 3.
14 rbid.

l S rbid. , p. 3 4 .

1 6 rbid. , pp. 3 5- 3 6 .
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center around negative feelings. 17

The negative features o f the

unifying bonds are revealed, above all, in its norms.

The norms that

characterize a large group are almost entirely of a prohibitive and

.
.
nature. 18
restrictive

The main function of these norms is not to

pro vide direction for the group but rather to simply allow the mass
to maintain itself with a minimum of control.

As s tated ear lier, the

purpose o f this chapter is largely descriptive and not evaluative ;
consequently, no attempt will be made to criticize the work o f the
theorists included in the paper.

Surely exceptions to Simrnel's

analysis can be noted; however, in the context of this paper the
important contribution of Sirnmel lies in his attributi ng norms to the
masses.
While Simrnel does not formally distinguish between different
types of crowds, he indirectly finds differences between large crowds
and smal l crowds.

Generally ". • . as the size of group increases the

cowman features that fuse its members into a social unit become ever

fewer . 1 1 19

From this hypothesis it is apparent that Simmel thought

large crowds were more likely to exhibit "inferior " characteristics.
Small gro�ps are likely to retain some of the civilized features of
human beings ; whereas, these would disappear in large gatherings.
Simmel gives certain qualifications to this proposition, but considered it generally va lid.

17

18

rbid. , p. 3 96 .
rbid. , pp. 397-9 8.

19 rbid. , p. 3 6 7.
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The basic cause of crowd behavior was identified by Simmel as
a
· "collective nervousness" which is not found in individuals in an

isolated state. 20

This phenomenon was extremely receptive to stimuli.

Even casual stimuli could result in incredible behavior.

Simmel uses

as an analogy the spark which precipitates a stampede of a herd of
The collective nervousness is a result of a "mutual excita

cattle.

tion" that all members of a crowd experience.

Therefore, stimuli are

not met with any form of resistance on the part of the individual.
Furthermore, the individual himself acts as a stimulus for other
members.

As Sirnmel succinctly states :

carried away, carries away. 11 2 1

"The individual, by being

Gabriel Tarde
While Tarde has written a great deal about collective behavior,
most of his interest and work concerns the public.

In fact, most of

his views and ideas of a crowd are presented only as a contrast to
the characteristics of a public.

Tarde regarded the public as an

evolutionary result of the more basic, primitive behavior found in
crowd situations.

A public was an outgrowth of mass communications

and in most ways was more rational and objective than its older
counterpart, the c rowd.

g roup of the past. 2 2

Tarde believed that the · c�owd was a social

As man becomes more "civilized and sophisticated"

20 rbid. , p . 3 5.
21

rbid.

2 2Terry Clark, Gariel Tarde: On Communication and Social
Influences, ( Chicago : Univ. of Chicago Press, 1969), p . 2 81.
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his impulses w ill gradually be directed or channeled in the form of
public behavior.
"The crowd has something animal about it . 1 1 23

This one sentence

from Tarde ' s writings best sums up his views on the crowd.

The crowd

has a sort of magnetic attraction for the individual, who is drawn to
it and completely taken over by the mind of the crowd. 24

always marked by short sightedness and impulsiveness.

Crowds are

While an indi

vidual in a solitary setting may be quite liberal and tolerant p the
formation of a crowd s ignals an increase in authoritarianism and

25
.
. 1 beh avior.
tyrannica

A crowd is also characterized by what Tarde called a "mutual
contagion of sentiments. 1 1 2 6

A crowd may remain silent or inactive

for a long period of time, but if one individual starts shouting or
stamping his feet he is soon followed by the other assembled
individuals.
The likelihood that a crowd w ill form and its accompanying
characteristics depends upon three factors:

the temper of the times,

27
. .
the season, and the race of the participants.

Crow ds are more

likely to arise or occur during difficult, strenuous or stressful
23 rbid. , p. 2 7 8 .
24 rbid. , p. 2 8 1
25 b " d

�-

1

p. 2 8 9 .

26 rbid . , p . 291.

2 7 rbid. , p . 2 8 7 .
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tim es.

The implication in Tarde's use of this variable is that crowd

behavior may be the result of unfair practices of the rulers or at
least some crowd behavior may be political in nature.

Tarde also

observes that crowds were more prevalent during the summer and their
behavior was more hostile and "feverish" than winter crowds.

While

increased occurrence of collective behavior in the summer can be
e xplained by factors other than climate, it is interesting to note
the contemporary view of "the long hot summer " and its relevance re
garding potential riots.

Race or nationality was another factor in

explaining the occurrence and characteristics of collective behavior.
However, Tarde ' s use of the concept does not carry with it the racist
overtones that were depicted in earlier writings.

He believes that

his own nationality, the French, were most susceptible to participa
tion in forms of co llective behavior.
Tarde also identif ied types of crowds or rather " • . . four
stages of being which mark the various degrees of their passivity or
activity. 11

28

The expectant crowd is a gathering of individuals based

upon the anticipation of some forthcoming event.
a theater audience before the opening curtain.
called an attentive crowd.

An example would be
The second type is

Its attention is focused upon some event

or drama that is taking place and an example would be a church con
gregation or a lecture audience.
28 rbid . , p . 290.

Thirdly is the demonstrating crowd,

30
which is characterized by a type of activity usually marching, singing
or slogan shouting.

The last type is the active crowd .

The main pre

occupation for this type o f crowd is action, which is usually directed
against some object.

A typical example of this final type would be a

lynch mob.
The above categories can be viewed in two di f ferent ways.
First, this classi fication system can be used to categorize d i fferent
crowds and more importantly, it can be used to describe di fferent
phases of the same crowd from its formation through the final stages
of activity.
Robert Park
While Park's writings and descriptions of collective behavior
are in many ways similar to those that this wri ter has termed the
classicists; however, he is also responsible for many orig inal contributions which can only be appreciated by comparing them to contemporary
wri tings on the subject .

It is for this reason that he is not placed

in ei ther o f the schools o f thought, but rather is given a transi tional
location between the two.
Park believes that collective behavior is based upon some form

of

11

social unres t. " 29

This unrest is then transmi tted from one

individual to another in a process that is sim ilar to the "milling 11 o f
29

Robert E. Park and Ernest W . Burgess, Introduction to the
Science o f Sociology, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 19 2 1 ) ,
p. 866 .

31
a cattle herd.

In the introduction textbook which he co-authored,

Park uses much of Le Ban's work regarding descriptions of the crowd.
Because of the great deal of overlap in this area, most of this
paper's text will be concerned with his original contributions in the
etiology of crowd behavior.
Park thought that collective behavior was at least to some
degree a form of tension release.

30

However, this interpretation was

restricted to some fonns of "riotous or revelry " crowds.

He views

some aspects of society as tension producing or frustrating for the
individual and collective behavior was a "quasi-institutionalized"
form of release.

In some cases . this release had become standardized

in the form of "holiday crowd 1 1 behavior which would be viewed as
inappropriate at other times .
The political crowd was the subject of much of the innovative
thinking that characterized this writer .

A political crowd was a

mechanism for raising social issues, which could be either justified

or not. 3 1

In this context Park was heavily influenced by Lyford

Edward ' s book entitled The Natural History of Revolution.

As the

title implies this work dealt with revolution as a natural phenomenon
and as a "sometimes legitimate " tool for social change.

In this

manner, Park ' s work can be viewed as a reaction against earlier
30 Robert E . Park, Society, (Glencoe, Illinois :
19 5 5) , Chapter 1.
3 1 Ibid. , pp. 30- 3 1.

The Free Press,
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writers who described evolution or evolutionary changes as the only
"'legitimate" ones.

P ark ' s writings on this subject seemed to be the

first that were totally objective in describing revolution as a means
of social change.

To P ark, revolution was simply another form of

social change, granted that is is usually more violent and sudden,
but i t should be analyzed using the same frame of reference accorded
other examples of change. 32

Furthermore, collective behavior can be v iewed as a necessary

first step in the formation of permanent social justifications. 33 -

Crowd behavior can sometimes be a prelude to a more generalized social
movement.

A social movement, which becomes popular and pervasive , may

have its ideals and aims incorporated by society and the final result
would be a revised or new social institution.

Examples that he uses

to support this claim are the development of the various major
religious and political ideologies.
THE CONVENTIONAL SCHOOL
Turner and Killian
According to these authors, collective behavior is a lways in

sharp contrast to "normal" o r institutionalized behavio r. 3 4

While

32 rbi· a. ,
pp . 35 - 36 •
33 rbid. , p. 25.

3 4Ralph H. Turner and Lew is M. Killian, Collective Behavior,
(Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey : Prentice-Hall, Inc. , 1957), p. 12.

33

group norms may develop during the activity , these norms are emergent
and spontaneous as compared to the formalized norms which accompany
normal behavior.

Usually there is a certain amount of agreement

between formal norms , but the spontaneous group norms may be mutually
opposed to these and the result is a form of deviant behavior.

Be-

cause of this characteristic , collective behavior always stands in
opposition to what is considered "routine" group living.

Normal

behavior has tradition, function, and structure , while collective
behavior does not necessarily have any of these features.
Another unique characteristic of collective behavior is the
apparent lack of differentiation in the behavior of the individual
actors.

35

imagery ".

The crowd is dominated by a "uniform mood and uniform
This constitutes the other important reason why collective

behavior is different from ordinary group behaviors.

This common

mood is largely a result of a process called "milling".

Milling is

defined as the process or activity that is the result of an uncertain

.
t ion
·
situa
. 36

significance .

In a collective context this "milling" takes on new
In addition to serving as a release for the individual

it also serves as a stimulus for other members of the group.

Under

these conditions "milling serves in the development of a common
definition , providing a new basis for social cohesion and making
possible collective action. 1 1 3 7
3 S Ibid . , p. 59.

3 6 rbid .

37 rbid.

Specifically , milling is largely

34

responsible for the sensitization of individuals to each other, the

38
development o f common mood, and the development of a coromon image.
The authors identify six characteristics which are cormnon to
all crowds:

(1) uncertainty; ( 2) a sense of urgency ; (3) communication

of mood and imagery ; ( 4) constraint ; (5 ) selective individual suggest

ability; and (6) permissiveness. 39

All of these features are present

to a dif fering degree in all forms o f activity defined as collective
behavior.
An important contribution by Turner and Killian was their
identification of "differential participation patterns " o f individuals
in a crowd setting.

While the group develops a certain amount of

homogeneity through processes already discussed a crowd usually will

remain quite heterogeneous during a large part of its existence. 40

All crowds have both leaders and followers and it can be shown that
leadership elements change frequently during an episode o f collective
behavior.

Individuals have di fferent motivations for participating

and this is mainly responsible for the differential participation.
While descriptions o f crowds seem to focus upon the homogeneity o f
behavior, Turner and Killian maintain that the most significant findings o f crowd dynamics may very well come from studies that focus
.
. .
t 41
upon the differences in
the p articipan s .

38 rbid . , p. 60.

39 r bid. , p. 84 .
40

rbid. , p. 112.

41 Ibid. , pp. 119 - 20 .

From the standpoint of
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the process by which a crowd develops , the authors identify two
different types:
crowd.

42

(1) the emergent crowd ; and ( 2 ) the precipitous

The former i s an instance where the crowd forms as a slow,

gradual process , while the latter would be a situation where much of
the developmental processes were instantaneous.

Examples of the two

types would be a political movement and a panic mob , respectively.
While this dichotomy is useful, the authors find it necessary to
Crowds may

examine different types of crowds from other viewpoints.

also be classified as either solidaristic or individualistic. 43

A

solidaristic crowd is one that requires the combined and integrated
efforts of the crowd while an individualistic crowd has a series of
parallel individualistic objectives.

Crowds may also vary in the

degree o�� speci' f 1' c 1· ty of thei· r obJ' ect. 44

A focused crowd has a very

speci fic object but a volatile crowd may act upon many objects and
shift from one to the other.

Crowds can also be categorized according

.
.
ts seek. 45
. .
to the type o f ob J. ective
that its
participan

An active

crowd must result in some action upon an external object ; however,
an expressive crowd may have as its objective some s tate of being or
experience .

This objective is internal in nature and an example

wou ld be a group waiting to see a vision.
4 2 Ibi d. , . 64 .
p
43 rbid. ,

44 rbid. ,

p . 84 .
p . 85 .

45 rbid. , p. 86 .

This three-fold
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classification can also be combined to form other types.

A good

example would be an individualistic-volatile-active crowd whose
activity would center on vandalism.
Turner and Killian are also able to distinguish five different
types of participants based on the degree and type of motivation. 46
The five types are: ( 1 ) the active participants ; ( 2 ) the passive
participants ; ( 3 ) the insecure participants; (4 ) the spectators; and
(5) the uninhibited, including psychopaths and petty criminals.

While

these types will not be discussed in this paper the mention o f them
will shed light on the authors' views of collective behavior.
The cause of any instance of collective behavior is difficult
to isol ate and usually is the result of many factors.

Turner and

K illian have listed five underlying conditions of collective behavior :
1. Collective behavior is facilitated by absen ce, breakdown
or weakness of social control resulting from total lack or
inadequacy of existing social organization.
2. Collective behavior is fa cilitated by inadequate normative
integration.
3. Another condition that contributes to collective behavior
is inadequacy of communication.
4. The sense of complexity , intricacy, and involvement inherent
in the situation may also facilitate collective behavior.
S . Finally, the foregoing syndrome of conditions fun ctions to
frustrate the individual and predispose him to collective behavior.
In other words, the situation is so ambiguous and unstructured for
the individual that he turns to collective behavior as an attempt
.
.
.
to redefine or restructure the situation. 47
46 rbid. , pp. 103-10.
4 7 rbid. , Chapter 2.
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Herbert Blumer
Blwner ' s major contribution to the area of collective behavior
is probably his classificatory scheme which he uses to delineate
different types of collective behavior.

According to him there are

four major types of social phenomena which can be subsumed under the
heading of collective behavior.

First he describes crowdlike behavior.

48

He considers this type of action to be a rather unimportant type of
collective behavior .

Most of the early theorists seem to have identi-

fied crowd behavior as the only type of collective behavior, but Blumer
feels this approach resulted in an unnecessarily narrow interpretation.
Labels of "irrational" and "mindless" were unfortunately attached to
all forms of collective behavior as a result of this approach.

Crowd

behavior is cha racterized by simple forms of emotional interplay, lack
of intricate organization, and strong collective feelings such as

enthusiasm, courage or glee. 49

This display of collective behavior is

usually the most disreputable type but despite this, it should not be
covered by a blanket label of irrationalness.

Blumer was the first

major writer to question this previously accepted idea.

Blumer also

considers mass behavior to be a part of the larger category of collective
behavior.

This phenomenon is similar to what is usually termed the

48 Herbert Blum er , Collective Behavior, " in Review of Sociology:
Analysis of a Decade, Joseph Gittler, · ea . , (New York : John Wiley and
Sons , Inc. , 1957) , p . 131.
11
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This characteristic has been discussed at length by Riesman

public.

50
and termed "other-mindedness . 1 1

The processes at work in a crowd

situ ation a re si�ilar to those that determine the behavior of a mass ;
the obvious exceptions are o f those factors which depend upon face
to- face contact, present in a crowd, but absent in a mass.

51
are usually characterized by fads, fashions, and crazes.

Masses

The third type o f collective behavior discussed by Blumer is
the public.

Processes operating in the formation o f public opinion

are similar to those o f a mass ; however, they usually are highly
influenced by propaganda techniques employed by various interest

groups. 52

The fourth type identified by Blumer has the most relevance
He was probably the first major theorist

for this particular paper.

to consider social movements under the realm o f collective behavior.
Previously writers tended to lump social movements under their
descriptions o f crowd behavior, but Blumer rectified this mistake.
The social movement is one of the chief mechanisms for social change
in the modern society. 53

He discredits most o f the early attempts of

analyzing this behavior by showing the overemphasis that was placed
on the psychological character o f the part icipants.
5 0 oavid Riesrnan, The Lonely Crowd, (New York :
51Blumer, op. cit. , p. 137.
52 rbid., pp. 140-43 .
53 rbid. , p. 145.

Instead, he
Doubleday, 195 4 ) .
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proposes a two-fold treatment of social movements:

(1) determining

the factors involved in the construction o f the movement ; and
( 2) identifying the causative factors operating during the formation

era. 54

In addition to these main areas of concern, other important

factors include leadership o f the movement and the recruitment of

. .
ts. 55
participan

In general descriptions of col lective behavior,

Blumer follows the typical interpretations popularized by the conven
tionalists.

He maintains that collective behavior is separate and

56
d istinct from " . . . established or cultura lly defined behavior . 11

Usually activity i s controll ed b y established rules and norms ; however,

col lective behavior lies outside of this area of cu ltural prescription. 57
I n Blumer's theo ry, collective behavior by its definition must be
outside of the area of institutionalized behavior and collective behavior is found only in situations where cultural norms are inadequate .
If the norms surrounding a certain situation are adequate, then the
resulting behavior is culturally controlled.

If not , it is termed

collective behavior .
Collective behavior is a form of group behavior which emerges
in undefined and emotional situations .
54 rbid. , p. 147.

55rbid. , pp. 148-49.
56

rbid. , p. 1 28 .

57 rbid. , p. 130.

It is always distinct from

40
58
. d b ehavior.
.
organize
fluid situation.

The behavior is built or forged in a relatively

It starts as an unguided or spontaneous expression

of impulse and feeling. 59

The interaction processes which are at work

in this type of situation are the main area of concern for Blumer.
Thes e have not as yet been identified or studied and should be the
main concern for sociologists at the present time.
Report of The National Advisory Commission on Civil Disorders
In this writer ' s opinion the Kerner Commission Report occupies
a position similar to the writings of Robert Park.

In this respect it

acts as a bridge or a transitional stage upon which later writings are
based, either directly or indirectly.

While the Report has retained

many of the views of the conventional school of collective behavior,
it introduces two new interpretations of collective behavior in
general and "race riots , u specifically.

It is probably the first

major work on collective behavior that justifies or excuses the fact
that the incidents occur for valid reasons (white racism and its
concomitant forms of discrimination).

Secondly, it is also the first

widely accepted document that places a maj or share of the responsibility
for the disorder in the h ands of social control agencies (police,
national guard and to a lesser extent, the federal troops).

These

58 Herbert Blumer, "Collective Behavior, in A Dictionary
of the
Social Sciences, (New York : The MacMillan Company, 196 4), p . 1 00.
11

59 rbid.
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two findings coupled with the ameliorative proposals set forth
cbnstitute the major contri butions of this selection.

The three

authors chosen for the final portion of this paper are heavily influ
60
enced, despite being somewhat critical , by the Kerner Report.
The basic causes of the urban disorder as listed by the Report
are:

( 1) pervasive discrimination and segregation ; (2) black migrati on

to and white exodus from the central cities; ( 3 ) the creation of black
ghettos ; ( 4.) frustrated hopes; ( 5) legitimation of violence;
( 6) feeling of pow�rlessness ; ( 7) incitement and encouragement of

violence ; and (8) the action of police. 61

Many of the causes center

upon the social envi ronment of the black community and others concen
trate on the psychological reactions to these conditions by the
participants in the disorders.

The feelings of "rage " which have been

smoldering for many years finally manifested themselves in the form
of a race riot.

The Report placed great emphas is upon this psycholog-

ical state of the rioter as a major cause of the di sorders.
While the Report agreed that ghetto conditio�s were i ntolerable
and to some extent sympathized with the rioters , the commission
nevertheless condemned violence as a means of achieving the desired
ends. 62

In this res.pect there is agreement with the conventional

school regarding the behavior as inappropriate and useless.
6 °For example , see The Politics of Protest, Rights in Conflict ,
and VioleP-ce in America.
61
The Ker:ner Commission , op . cit. , pp. 203-206.
p. 2.
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THE NEW PERSPECT IVES
James A. Geschwander
Geschwander is attempting to compare the civil rights movement
to the urban riots of the recent era and determine the ma j or differences,
if any, between the two.

He points out that liberals h ave a positive

image of the civil rights movement and a tendency to view the urban
disorders with a mixture of fear and disgust.

63

He further points out

that social scientists have a tendency to follow this pos ition and view
the two types of collective behavior as separate and distinct
phenomena .

64

He uses Smelser ' s work to determine that the only difference
between a norm-oriented movement (civil rights movement ) and the hostile
outburst (urban r iots) is in the objects of their demonstrations.

The

norm-oriented civil r ights movement attacks discrimination practices,
whereas the race riots are perceived to center upon individuals or
stores in the ghetto area.

However, he points out that the urban riots

were not merely aimed at individuals or agents but instead were a
method of attacking practices (exploit ation in pricing and rents, poor

65
.
housing,
etc. ).

In this perspective there is actually little

difference between the objects that both types of movements seek to
change.
63James A . Geschwander, "Civil Rights Protest and Riots : A
Disappearing Distinction, " Unpublished Manuscr ipt, Michigan State
University, 19 6 9, p. 1.
64 rbid .

6 5 rbid. , p. 3.
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He states that the tendency to label the disorders as riots
rather than movements rests upon three characteristics :

(1) the large

amount o f looting ; ( 2) the belief that the disorders were spontaneous ,
unorganized, and leaderless; and ( 3 ) there were no lists o f political
demands to be met.

66

With regard to looting he suggests that looting

in itself is a form o f rebellion against the distributive system in a
He also points out that looting was not random in n ature.

society.

Certain stores were looted and others were left untouched.

Looting was

used as a form o f compensation against store-owners that had previously
been exploiting the ghetto residents.
While there w as found no evidence of that conspiracy, delibrate
incitement, or organization existed during the disorders, this is no
basis for concluding that they w ere not part of an overall social

movement. 6 7

A large social movement does not necess arily have an

organized core providing gener al direction.

The civil rights movement

contains many diverse groups that are generally agreed upon "ends ; "
however, there is disagreement regarding the means to achieve their
goals.

" The lack o f organization does not, ipso facto exclude the

looter, snipers , and arsonists from the civil rights movement. 11 68

Geschwander believes that the current civil rights movement had
become bogged-down in a stalemat e against the forces of discrimination.
66

1b1' d. , pp . 4 - 12 .

6 7 Ibid. ,
68

p. 7.

Ibl. d. , p. 8 .
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The changes or victories they had won were very slow and usual ly did
not have much effect upon the ghetto dweller.

He hypothesizes that

the civi l rights movement has undertaken a change of tactics.

The

change was characterized by a shift from creative disorders to creative
rioting. 69

The latter form of protest may be an attempt to speed up

change and bring its benefits to the ghetto.

He also points out that

meetings with leaders of the ghetto communities were held in twenty70
'
one of twenty- ��our d isturbances.

During these mee tings grievances

and issues were aired and discussed and this wou 1 d seem to indicate
that some form of political demands were present.

71

He concludes by stating that the views expressed in the article
should be interpreted as questions and not answers.

His main contri

bution is a new perspective in the analysis of the recent race riots.
Morris Janowitz
The previous portions of this paper have dealt with col lective
behavior as somewhat of an abstraction; however, th�s article by
Janowitz deals specifical ly with a single form of col lective behavior
commonly cal led "race riots. "

He purports to "trace the transformation

in the patterns of col lective racial violence in urban areas over the
69 rbid . , pp. 10-11.

70The Kerner. Commission, op. ci t. , pp. 126-127.
71 Geschwander , op. cit . , p. 11.
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last 50 yea!:'s through three different phasP-s . 11 7 2 . The following i s a
list of the three distinct phases or different types of col lective
racial violence that have occurred:

( 1) the communal riot (an inter-

racial clash usually at the boundaries of expanding black neighborhoods
during the twenties and thirties) ; (2 ) the commodity riots (largely
characterized by only B lack participation and occurred between 19401968) ; and (3) a more "selective terroristic use of force with political
overtones by sm a l l crganized groups of blacks . 11 7 3
The main thesis contained in the Janowitz argtunE.nt that is
germane to this paper is the be lief that the commodity riots were
primarily politica l in nature .

The earlier commun&l type riots were

"struggles for survival " where groups of different races openly
battled onE:: another.

'l'he disorders could also be characterized as

" contested area" riots because they involved territorial struggles in

new ly integrated areas . 7 4

Contributing causes of this type of disorder

were vast amounts of Negro migration to already overcrowded urban areas
and the relative lack of concern on the part of the ·authorities for
the i mplementation of measures to curb or arrest incidents between
the two groups. 7 5

7 2 Morris Janowitz, " Patterns of Collective Racial Violence, "
Hugh D. Graham and Ted R . Gurr, Violence in America, (New York :
Signet Books, 19 69), p . 39 3.
7 3 rbid . , pp. 39 3-9 4 .
74 rbid . , p. 396.
7 5 rbid.
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These factors are in contrast to the characteristics o f cities
that experienced communal riots during the middle sixties.

The

crucial dif ference appears to revolve around the amount and extent of
political participation that the black connnunity had or rathe r did
not have.

Cities with more raci ally integrated police forces had

fewer riots and the same was true of cities with a more r epresentative
form of local government. 76

There was no statistical evidence to show

that unemployment, low income, or inadequate housing was more
charac teristic of riot-prone cities than the group of cities that had

77
.
fewer or no riots.

The above evidence lends support to the supposition contained
in the article that the recent commodity riots ". . . had overtones
which might be called para-political. 1 1

78

Janowitz also claims that

"social tension" is vastly over-rated as a cause of the riots.

He

draws upon the work of Allan Grimshaw who concluded that "there is no
direct relation between the level of social tension and the eruption
.
. lence. ..
of soc ial
vio

79

This a rticle is included in the final section of this paper
because it lends support to the new perspective of studying riots or
76 rbid. , p. 396.

77 rbid.
78

rbid . , p. 407.

79 rbid. ,

p. 420.
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other forms of collective behavior as a political as well as a
psychological and soc iological phenomenon.
Jerome Skolnick
Skolnick is another of the recent theorists concerned with a
new approach to the analysis of collective behavior.

The previous

ways of studying " . • •riots have inadequately understood their social
and political sign ificance and need to be revised. 1 1 80

In his review

of previous theories of collective behavior, Skolnick finds them as
failing on the following counts :
1. They tend to focus on the destructive behavior of
disaffected groups while accepting the behavior of authorities
as normal, instrumental, and rational.
2 . They tend to describe collective behavior as i rrational,
formless, and immoderate.
3. Finally, it is insufficient to analyze r iots in terms of
"tension " and "frustration . 1 1 8 1
By the time the reader reaches this point in the paper the j ustifications for the above criticisms are obvious.

There are numerous

examples of evidence which sheds doubts on previous interpretations.
For example, the Walker Commission's l abe ling o f the Chicago demonstration as a "police riot; " examples of selective looting and riot
leadership; and also the various fo�.s of politica l a ctivities that
occured during riots.
S OJerome Skolni ck, The Politi cs of Protest, (New York:
Ba llantine Books, Inc . , 1969 ) , p. 329.
81 rbi' d . , pp. 335 -39.
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Skolnick also takes issue with the usual practice (the Kerner
Commission is the most recent ex ample) of labeling riots as abnormal

and useless. 82

Specifically, there are two fallacies in this

approach:
1 . This " violence does not pay" argument refers only to the
domestic violence of disaffected groups, while ignoring the fact
that systematic official violence for social ends is widely upheld
in other spheres.
2. Secondly, whether or not violence is "useless" is a problem
for historical analysis , not a certainty. 83
These two criticisms reiterate the theme of his contribution-
that any analysis of collective disorders must take into account
political overtones.
SUMMARY
It is possible to summarize the most salient characteristics
of the different schools of thought that have dominated interpretations
of collective behavior.

While the following table constructed by the

writer contains many oversimplifications, its usefulness lies in its
brevity .
8 2 rbid. , p. 34 0.
83

rbid. , p. 3 4 1 .
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Typical
Descriptive
Term

School

Classical

"irrational"

Conventional

11

New Perspectives

" non-pathological"

uninstitutionalized "

Major
Disciplinary
Interpretation
psychological
sociological
political

Causes

instincts
breakdowns in
social control
lack o f legitimate avenues of
redress

The different emphases that have been postulated by the different
schools should not be viewed as being mutually exclusive explanations
of collective behavior.
tions .

There are many areas of overlap and duplica-

This writer does not feel that one school is necessarily more

correct than any other.

The position expressed by this dissertation

is that a thorough understanding of collective behavior is possible
only when all three interpretations are employed.

For example, the

psychological explanation of collective behavior, while receiving much
of the recent criticism, is still necessary for a total understanding
of the spontaneous eruptions and milling that occurs in crowd
situations.

The psychological factors that were stressed by Le Bon

and Simmel are also necessary to understand the influence that rumors
played in the course of the disturbances .

The breakdowns of social

control that were emphasized by Turner and Killian must also be con
sidered to adequately analy ze their role in the causation of the
riots .

However, to restrict the analysis to either of these single
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dimensions is t o lose sight of the forest.

The causes must also be

considered from a political perspective that is advocated by the most
recent school of thought.

A more detailed treatment of the contri

bu tions of each of the theorists will be contained in the rationale
for the hypotheses in a later chapter.
In summary, a complete understanding of the basic tenents of
all of the schools is a necessary requisite to any researcher in this
field.

All examinations of collective behavior must be of a multi

dimensioned nature rather than the unilinear approaches which seem
to have prevailed in the past.

This section attempts to provide a

framework for the analysis of urban insurrections that follows.
REV IEW OF LITERATURE
The theoretical framework for this dissertation must rest upon
the contributions of two sub-disciplines in sociology.

Writings in

the area of co llective behavior, discussed in the previous section,
are necessary to analyze the processes operating during the actual
episodes.

However, another dimension is required that will account

for underlying conditions which existed prior to the outbreak of
violence.

Theories of social movements are the best tools available

for this task.
Lyford Edwards
Probably the first attempt at obj ectivity in the analysis of
episodes of social movements was accomplished by Lyford Edwards in
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his classic, The Natural History of Revolution.

Prior investigations

of · this nature were tainted with emo tionalism and subjectivity that
characterized the classical school of collective behavior.

Edward ' s

maj or contribution lies i n his treatment of revolution as a natural
social phenomenon subject to similar influences and patterns that
have been used in descriptions o f social organizational components.
His insightful method of analysis is simi lar to that of Edwin
Sutherland and his introduction of the concept "differential
association . 11 84

Before Sutherland, most investigations of the etiolo gy

of criminality sought their causes in socially disorganized elements
or in the nature of the criminal himself , but the theory of differential
association views the learning of deviant behavior as arising in
essentially the same manner as does the learning of non-deviant behavior .
Rather than criminality being caused by the "bad , undesirable" conditions
in societies or individuals ; it is seen as simply the result of a normal,
natural learning process .

The factors that produce deviant behavior

operate in much the same fashion as those that produce conformity .
Edwards de fines a revo lution as "a change brought about not
necessarily by force or violence , whereby one system of legality is
.

.

terminated and another originated.

11

8 5

The major cause for revolution

84

Edwin H . Sutherland and Donald R. Cressey, Principles of
Criminology, 7th ed . , (Philadelphia : J . B. Lippincott, 1966) , pp. 80-98.
85Lyford P . Edwards, The Natural History of Revolution , (Chicago :
The Universi ty of Chicago P ress , 1970 ) , p. 2 .
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is seen in the failure o f existing social institutions to provide
for the satis faction of man ' s four basic wishes.
from W . I . Thomas consists of:

This concept borrowed

(1) the wish for new experience;

( 2) the wish for securi ty; ( 3) the wish for recogni tion; and (4) the

. h for response. 86
wis

.
.
The likelihood
of revolution decreases to the

extent that these needs are met by the organized political i nstitution
of any society.

H is use of the biologica l concept of the "survival

of the f ittest" further attests, to him, the naturalness of revolu tion
as a social process.

Genetic mutations which eventually prove to be

beneficial, s urvive whereas those which don't answer a need are
selectively choosen for extinction .

Inefficient governments are sub

j ect to a s imilar process o f "natural selection, " w i th · only the able
ones continuing.
Another innovation in his analysis stems from his idea that
revolution is not necessarily characterized by v iolence.

Violence,

i f it does occur, is a result of the reluctance on the part of the old
order to accept the desired changes .

Those who favor change are forced

down the paths o f violence because of t..he "conserva tism which makes the
economically favored classes unwilling to recognize the fact that a
real and peaceful revolution has already occurred. 11
86 rbid. , pp. 2-3.
B ? Ibid. , p. 9.

87
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Revolution i s also pictured as a very slow, gradual proces s.
This is in direct contras t to the commonly held picture of revolutions
as being "sudden, unpredictable and exceedingly rapid in their

development. " 88

Edwards feels that a revolution has to have at least

three generations to become fully formed.

This period of time is

necessary for succeeding generations to become fully disillus ioned and
frustrated by social ins titutions, which too completely dominated the
thinking and actions of their ances tors. 89
This s tudent ' s account of his work will not support his typology
with actual examples ; however, the original work is rich in illus trations.

He concentrates on four revolutions in the cons truction and

reality tes t of his s tages of revolution.

The four are--the English

Puritan, the American, the French and the Russian.

He s tates that these

in no way cons titute a random sample of all pos s ible revolutions , but
were chosen because of one major consideration--the magnitude of their
s ubsequent importance.90

The s tages of revolution are viewed as those

s teps through which revolutions usually progres s .
doesn ' t neces sarily follow these s tages exactly.

However , a revolution
Some may occur before

others and often two or more s tages occur s imultaneously , but generally
these are the ess ential s tages through which the phenomena of revolution
will pas s in its development.

asIbi· a. ,

p. 16.

89 rbid. , p. 17.
9 0 r bid. , p. 2 1 0 .
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The first stage of a revolution is termed the symptoms of
unrest condition and is in operation before the actual revolution .
These conditions are· a direct result of the thwarting of the four
wishes mentioned in the preceding pages.

The symptoms of unrest

manifest themselves in four primary areas:

(1 ) a feeling of depriva

tion, when comparing themselves to other comparable societies;
general increase in forms of deviant behavior;

(3)

( 2)

a

a feeling of

"balked dispos ition" whereby legitimate aspirations and ideals are
being repressed; and (4 ) a marked increase in wealth, intelligence,
and power in the repressed sector of society. 9 1

This last change

brings about a change in mental attitudes and conditions which were
previous.ly considered tolerable and now viewed as intolerable .

This

is the reason that revolutions are often characterized as " revolutions
of rising e;xpectations. "
Another more advanced symptom of unrest is the "transfer of the

allegiance of the intellectuals. 1192

This occurs when the intellegentsia

of any society lose faith in the established classes and come to
sympathize with the repressed classes.

Unequal conditions in the

society are publicized and b lame is focused upon the rulers.

Various

mistakes and blunders of the governing classes are divulged and since
they, too , look to the intellectuals for guidance , the elites even come
9 1Ibi· d . ,

92 Ibid .

pp . 25- 33 .

, p. 9 .
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to question themselves and the legitimacy of their position . 93

The

fonnation of the syndrome of "felt insecurity " by the elites marks a
turning point in the process of revolution.

The likelihood of a

revolution occurring now becomes probable rather than possible.
The recognition of the economic incentive and the formulat ion
of the social myth is the last of the pre-revolution stages.

Edwards

states that the economic motivation is indispensable and that "no
great historical revolution has ever succeeded without the assistance
of the economic incentive.
.

two ways:

.

.

11 9 4

.
.
.
.
The economic incentive is manifested i n

(1 ) the discontent of poverty and ( 2 ) the envy of the rich

by the poor. 95

This economic reason for revolution is nurtured in its

final stages by the aforementioned rising expectations which usually
take place in the form of a concession shortly before the outbreak of
the revolution.

At the heart of the economic incentive is the newly

created middle class.

Their motivation for change is probably greater

than that of the peasants or the urban poor.

Their reasons for revolt

. · center around the restrictions against capital accumulation which are
imposed upon them by the aristocracy .
The creation of the social myth is necessary as a rallying point
for the revolutionaries.
93 rbid. , p. 59.
94 rbid. , p. 69 .
95

Ibid. , p. 70.

It is created by the intellectuals and usually
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described as a utopian idea of how "things should be" or "a new heaven

on earth. 1 1 9 6

The social myth is essentially non-rational in nature

and may even be inconsistent and contradictory.

Most are incapable of

verification and may be entirely delusional, but their strength or

impor tance lies in the intensity of the faith with which they are
believed.

97

The outbreak of revolution is the next stage and usually consists
of s ome act which is in and of itself very insignificant.

Once the

outbreak has taken place it marks the point of no return and the revol
ution now breaks out into fighting and violence as members of the
society align themselves on different sides.

This precipitant incident

is also exacerbated to a significant degree by mob behavior w ith its
irration ality and unreasonableness.

The mob, contrary to popular

opinion, is not composed of riffraff or the scum elements of society.
Most of the members are "decent, self-respecting common people " or what
could be called working class persons. 9 8

The immediate cause of the

outbreak is due to a number of "complicated accumulations of s tress,
to a multiplication of nervous tensions, to a concurrence of provoca-

.
. dent. 9 9
tions " any one of which might be enough to spark the inci
9 6 rbid. , p. 9 1 .
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98

Ibid . , p . 9 2 .
Ibl· a. , p . 10 2 .

9 9 rbid. , p. 1 05.

A

closely related factor to this is the "helpless incompetence revealed
.
class in
. th is
' emergency. " 1 00
by the governing

The total ineffectiveness

of the control agencies during this crisis actually ensures the success
of this first venture.
Following the initial success , a provisional government assumes
the new leadership role in the society.

The members of this government

are moderate in their political beliefs and this is eventually responsible
for their demise.

These are the persons who are in favor of slow, pro

gressive reform and actually can satisfy neither the radicals nor the
conservatives with their conflicting demands.

Eventually, the moderate

government fails and ·the "real revolution " now takes place between the
.

.

moderates and the radicals as they vie for power.
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Some revo lut ions
.

are stopped during the reign of the moderates or they are broken by
external forces, but those that continue experience the rise of the
radicals as the next stage.

This period of the revolution occurs

mainly because of the more able leadership qualities of those in positions
of authority in the radical ' s camp.

Their seizure of power is neces-

sitated by a growing fear that the revolution ' s success is in doubt .
The failures of the moderate re formers cause the movement to lose
popularity and prestige among the masses and a resurgence of act i vity
is necessary to regain lost momentum.
l O O i bid. , p . 105.
l Ol rb i d. , p . 12 0 .
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The tactic which i s employed by the radicals is called the
reign of terror.

This stage is necessitated by the threat of three

factors, any one of which might doom the revolution to failure.
three factors are:
(2)

These

(1) the threat of invasion by a foreign a rmy ;

the threat of an internal insurrection fostered by either the

conservatives or moderates ; and (3) the inexperience of the radical

leaders in governmental affairs. 10 2

The primary function of the reign

of terror is to act as a "safety- valve for the discharge of w rought-

.
11 103
up emotions.

.
. 1 ess
.
Far f ram being
an unrestrained,
bloody, and m ind

series of atrocities, it may be a deliberately planned and e xecuted

"stage show for purposes of emotional catharsis. 1 1 104

This portion of

the revolution is not as bloody and murderous as it is often portrayed.
Usually only a small percentage of the total victims of a revolution
lose their lives during this stage.

The main purpose of the reign of

terror is simply to frighten the masses into subjugation.

Actual mass

executions are used sparingly and then only for effect.
The last stage in the revolutionary process is what Edwards
terms the return to normality.

A revolutionary spirit can only exist

in a society during the time when emotions are aroused and eventually
this wrought-up period ends quietly.
l02 Ib id. , pp. 1 5 8- 1 7 2.

l03 rbid . , p. 1 7 4 .

l04 rbid. , p. 17 5.

"A revolution dies out in a
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cu riously insignificant and almost inconsequential way. 11

Popular

interest which is necessary to sustain a revolution, dies quickly with
the end of the reign of terror.
norma lity.

And an exhausted society returns to

This is not to imply that the society returns to the status

quo that existed before the revolution.

The new order has similar

features ; however, the changes that took place are now incorporated
and become an integrated part of the new society.
is usually one of peace and tranquility .

This period of time

The revolutionary society

requires time for recovery and recuperation. 106

The rebuilding of the

society centers on integrating the new way of life into the pre-existing
institutional order with as little stress as possible.
Crane Brinton
A similar account of revolution is entitled The Anatomy of
Revolution by Crane Brinton.

While the work contains a great m any

parallels, there are a number of basic di fferences worth noting.

From

his study of revolution, Brinton states that three �ajar conclusions
can be drawn :
. . . . first, that, in spite of their undeniable and dramatic
differences, they do present certain simple uniformities of the
kind we have tried to bring together under one conceptual scheme. . • ;
second, that they point sharply to tne necessity of studying men's
deeds and men ' s words without assuming that there is always a
l O S i bid . , p . 1 86.

l 06 Ibid . , p. 202.
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simple and logical connection between the two, since throughout
their courses, and especially at their crises, they frequently
. exhibit men saying one thing and doing another; third .that they
indica·te that in general many things men do, many human habits,
sentiments, dispositions, cannot be changed at all rapidly,
that the attempt made by the extremists to change them by law,
terror, and exhortation fails, that the convalescence brings
them back not greatly altered. l07
Brinton believes it is necessary to reevaluate old misconcep
tions and traditional stereotypes relating to revolutions, their
causes, characteristics, and consequences.

It is only by debunking

the previous emotionally- laden treatments of this topic that a
thoroughly objective analysis can be accomplished.

Brinton uses the

same samp le of revolutions--the English of the 1640's, the American,
the French, and the Russian--that Edwards used in his study.

This

probably accounts for the remarkable, almost plagiaristic, similarities
between these two works.
The first stage identified by Brinton can be termed the
inadequacy o f the old regime.

W'nile a ll societies at all times have

a certain amount o f disorder and social unrest, the revolutionary
prone society is characterized by an inordinate amount o f intra-conflict.
The tensions which typify a healthy society have been exceeded and the
future of the present regime, which is blamed for the troubles, becomes
doubtful.
10 7 crane Brinton, The Anatomy o f Revolution, (New York :
Books , 1 9 65) , p . 262.

Vintage
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The issue which is of over-riding importance during this
pre liminary period revolves around the economic conditions of the
society.

The economic motives have two main foci for expression. 108

First, and of lesser importance, is the misery of the lower classes
in the society.

The participation of these groups is important

during later stages, but a t this period they serve only as manipulated
tools for the newly arising middle class.

The condition of the middle

class is characterized by frustrations and restraints imposed upon
them by the nobility class, which fears their growing base of power.

109

The economic limitations and hindrances experienced by the middle
class are of greater importance in the determination of the revolution.
Economic misery, per se, does not seem to be of crucial importance;
however, the " gap" between " . . . what people ·want and what they have. . . "

110
. .
seems to be the determining
factor.

Brinton strongly emphasizes the class conflicts which exist in
the pre-revolutionary society.

The three classes--nobility , middle,

and the lower--have areas of conflict other than those of a simple
economic base.

The ruling class is guilty of inefficiency and in

competence while performing the normal functions of government.
l O B rbid . , p. 3 2 .

l09 Ibid . , p. 3 3.
ll O rbid . , p . 30.

62

Attempts at reforming or modernizing the government usua lly result
in fai lure.

This situation is exploited by the revolutionaries in

their efforts to show the "unfitness " of the present regime.
Another important incident that occurs during this prelimina ry
stage is the transfer of allegiance of the intellectuals.
"fourth c lass

II

111

This

of society acts as a pressure group on the other

classes, largely through the influence of their ideas for desirable
changes.

The intel lectuals first experience a pervasive alienation

against the existing government.

Later this vague negative feeling

focalizes in support of the proposed reforwE and changes advocated

by the revolutionaries. 112

The articulation of revo lutionary ideas

by the intellectuals gives a new aura of legitimacy to the cause and
in some instances results in the ruling c lass having self-doubts about
its ability to adequately perform its responsibilities .

In essence,

those persons most competent to rule are not found in the present
ru ling c lass, but rather in the midd le and lower classes.

Pareto

also describes the inevitabi lity of the "circulation of the e lites "
with o ld " lions 1 1 being replaced by new "foxes. "

Moreover, Brinton

points out that one of the initia l causes of discontent among the
non-e lite groups in society is the condition whereby they are denied
1 11 rbid. , p. 39.

l l 2 rbid . , pp. 46- 4 7 .
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access to the ruling class. 1 13

The most able persons in the middle

and . lower classes are refused "admittance" to the ruling class and a
stoppage in the normal absorption process of choosing members of the
governing class ceases.

This results in two conditions :

(1 ) an

unfitness of the ruling class ; and (2 ) serious frustrations of the
most cornpetent persons, who are now "frozen " in the lower classes.
Eventually, the plight of the lower classes worsens and
This

culminates in the second of Brinton ' s stages--the outbreak.

event is usually an abrupt and dramatic one, but always is caused by
conditions which have been smoldering for many years .
can be viewed in one of two ways:

The outbreak

( 1 ) a spontaneous event ; and

(2) the calcula ted result of planning by the revolutionaries.

Brinton

attempts a synthesis of these contradictory positions by stating that
both explanations contain some truth.

Citing evidence- with respect

to the psychology of crowds, he concludes that much of the outbreak
may be totally unplanned and spontaneous ; however, there is also a
certain amount of planning which preceded the actual event and the
revolutionaries, because of previously formulated strategy, act as a
.
.
.
.
the unpremed i. tated event. 1 1 4
contributing influence during

Thus, an

event which probably would have gone unnoticed is blown out of pro
portion and subsequently becomes the precipitating incident o f the
revolution.
113

rbid. , pp . 60 - 6 1.

114 Ibid . , p . 83.
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The outbreak causes the authorities to respond with force,
but .with a lack of success.

This failure to cope with yet another

dist urbance actually marks the death knell of the existing regime. 115
The military comes to the support of the revolutionaries and they
replace the existing government with a relatively easy victory.

The

overthrowing of the old government marks the end of the outbreak
stage.
The composition of the newly victorious government and its
supporters stand in opposition to the popular notion of the "riffraff"
theory.

Revolutionaries, at least in this juncture, are ". • . quite

ordinary men and women, probably a bit superior to their less active

fellows in energy and willingness to experiment. . . • " 1 16

The partici

pants in the revolution are more or less a representative cross
section of so ciety.

This finding is remarkably similar to tha t of

the Kerner Commission Report on civil disorders which concluded that
the typical rioter was not unlike his non-rioting counterpart with
the exception of minor differences .
One striking feature that is found among the insurgents centers
around their differing perceptions of the role of the newly-formed
government.

The "middle of the road " group is the firs t to a chieve

power and this is called the rule of the moderates stage.
ll S i bid . , p . 86.

ll6 Ibid . , p. 119.

The
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"honeymoon period" that was enjoyed immedi �tely after their in iti al
su ccesses soon ends and the moderates settle down to the task of
refo rming existing· institutions and making a new constitution. 11 7
Their efforts are greatly hampered by two groups.

First , an increas

ingly strong group of radicals and extremists feel that the moderates
have betrayed the revolution and secondly, the moderates usually find
themselves involved in a war which results from the intervention of
foreign powers that attempt to restore the recently vanquished
government . 118

The combination of external and i nternal strife dooms

the moder ates to failure.

The almost insurmountable set of problems

that confronts the moderate government coupled with the impatience
of its constituents prove to be too much and this government, as did
its predecessor, quickly falls to the more ex-treme elements in the
insurgency.
The accession of the extremists is the fourth st age of Brinton ' s
typology .

The radicals, during the rule of the moderates, find them

selves in a favored posi tion.

They can take credit for the new

government' s successes ; however , the failures must be shouldered solely
by the moder ates because they are the ones in the formal positions of
authority.

The extremists are usually few in number but they possess

almost fanatical dedication to their cause .
117 Ibid . , p. 122.

118 rbid .

As revolutions go on, a
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large number of people drop out of the political arena be cause they
p refer to attend to the ordinary features of their life rather than
giving to political affairs the ceaseless dedication and attention
.
1 19
.
require.
revo 1 utions

After the abdication by the "common people , "

the extremists are left with a clear field.

Actually, the small

number of followers that the extremists have is one of their strengths.
The high degree of homogeneity and its resulting unanimity in decision
m aking result in a highly organized cadre of professional revolutionaries.
The actual overthrow of the moderates is usually a very quick
and e asy task, an excellent example of the skill of the extremists'

.
120
·
. 1 at ion.
. the areas of organi. zation
leaders in
and manipu

Af ter they take the reigns of government the insurgents are under
tremendous pressure to obtain results.

The most commonly chosen method

of action is a process involving the re-centralization of governmental
authority.

Ironically, the revolutions begin because of this condition

and the oppression that usually accompanies it.

The crisis that the

new government faces also give rise to another phenomenon, the reign of
terror.
This fifth st age of revolution is necessitated by a perceived ,
it need not be real, fear of the revolution ' s f ailure.

This form of

adjustment to the crisis period is highly religious in n ature.
1 19 rbid. , p . 1 54
.
120 rbid. , p. 163.

The
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dev otion to the revolution supplies most of the psychological satis

121
factions that are commonly attributed to re ligion.

In fact, the

function that revivals perfo rm for religion, the reign of terror
accomplishes for the revolution .

It renews interest in the cause and

is accompanied by highly virtuous overtones.

Crusades against the

customary vices of the populace usually escort the advent of the reign
of terror.
The reign of terror also performs other functions as well.

It

effectively eliminates any opposition that may exist within the society.
The crisis period which precipitates the reign of terror in many
instances is very real.

Economic depressions, threats of invo lvement

in foreign or civil wars, and the inexperience of the extremists with
the machinery of government combine to produce an emergency situation

122
.
.
. h requires
.
d iate
'
whic
imme
action.

The suppression o f individual

liberties and the removal of opposition are seen as necessities to
assure the success of this program.
The reign of terror lasts only a brief period and ·is followed
by the last stage of revolution, the Thermidorean reaction.
period is a convalescence from the furor of revolution . 12 3

this stage marks a return to the pre-revolution way of life.
121

rbid . , p. 1 83.

12 2 1 , · d - , pp. 19 8-2 0 1.
�
12 3 rbid. , . 205.
p

This
Basically,
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Politically, this era is marked b y a return t o power o f an
unconstitutional tyrant, whose authority is unchecked.

A concomitant

feature during this period is the granting of amnesty to the prev iously

exiled political enemies. 124

The leaders of the reign of terror are

denounced and are now de clared "to have been fanatics, villains,

bloodthirsty tyrants, and scoundrels . 11 1 2 5

Economically, the Thermidorean period is marked by widespread
suffer ing and poverty, even worse than that which occurred during the
last years of the old regime.

This situation is tolerated because

the people are tired o f the revolutionary activity and there also
exists the promise of better conditions in the future.
Socially, the times are characteri zed by a search for pleasure.

1 26

This condition is a contrasting reaction to the piety and virtue that
marked the reign of terror.

The loosening of moral restrai nts continues

until it reaches a level comparable to that which existed before the
revolution.
Both the processes and end result of this stage are s imilar to
the return to normality that Edwards described.

However, i t is apparent

that revolutions do effectuate many permanent changes.

One r uling class

i s replaced by another with a divergent base of power and whose political
124

rbid. , p . 209.

1 2 5 rbid. , p 21 1.
.

12 6rbi d . , p. 218.

69
philosophies are different.

It is in the area of social arrangements,

which most intimately and immediately touch the average man , that the

actual changes effected by revolutions seem slightest. 127

Probably

the most lasting aspect of a revolution is that it establishes in that
society a tradition of suc cessful revolt.
a check on future abuses by governments.

12 8

This situation acts as

The memory of a great revol

ution is forever enshrined in their cultural heritage and a cts as an
important guiding principle for governmental policies.
Rex Hopper
In an attempted synthesis of previous works related to revolu
tions, Rex Hopper has added a number of useful dimensions.

The process

of revolution is viewed as similar to the process of institutionalization.
Starting with vague individual unrest, conflict is channeled through a
number of stages until it becomes a permanent feature of a modified
society.

Social psychological concepts are also used by the author in

his explanations of the early stages of revolution.

Drawing heavily

upon the work of Herbert Blumer, the author successfully combines
principles of collective behavior within a theoretical framework for
the analysis of social movements .
Hopper emp loys a five-dimensional approach in constructing the
four dif ferent stages of revolution.
127 rbid. , p . 243.

12 8 rbid . , p. 249.

These are :

dominant characteristic
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condit ions of the society, typical processes in operation at each
stage, effecti ve mechanisms for actions, types of leaders which tend
to prevail during each stage, and the dominant social form or grouping
of each respective stage.

129

By inspecting the differences which tend

to occur in each of these five dimensions it is possible to delineate
the stages through which the process of revolution proceeds.

Finally,

before summarizing this article it is necessary to define what the
author means by the term revolution.

A revolutionary change " . . • is

precisely that kind of social change which occurs when basic institu-

tional values of a social order are rejected and new values accepted. "1 30

In short, the change need not be violent - and sudden.

The phenomenon

termed the Industrial Revolution is an excellent example of peaceful
and gradual social change according to his operational defini tion.
During the preliminary stage the social psychological characteristics are most in evidence.

Wish repression, thwarted desires ,

increases in deviance are all present to an alarming degree in this
period.

Vague, unspecified feelings of unrest characterize individuals.

The process of " milling" is responsible for cormnunicating this dis1 31
.
parity between the ideal and real state of affairs.

Th e type of

leader which bes t exploits this type of condition is the agitator. 1 32

129Rex D. Hopper, " The Revolutionary Process : A F rame of
Reference for the Study of Revolutionary .Movements," American Sociological
Review, Vol. 2 8, (19 50 ) , pp. 27 1-272.
1 30 rbid. , p. 2
71.

1 31

rbid .
1 3 2 Il . d , p . 272 .
_:e2:_·
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His main function is challenge and question the present mode of
livi ng.

He creates unrest by raising questions about the abuses,

discrimination , and inj ustices that characterize the society.
133
.
h
.
i. s a psyc ologi cal mass.
resu 1t o f h i. s crea t ion

The

These persons

find themselves in a marginal position regarding the attitudes and
values of the present society.

The grouping is composed of

individuals with similar complaints but there is little intera ction
and no organization because of this common feature.
If the underlying conditions and features of the preliminary
stage are not corrected a second stage will emerge.

The popular

stage is characterized by the development of collective excitement
and • •. . . unrest i s no longer covert, endemic, and esoteric; it becomes

overt, epidemic and exoteri c . 11 13 4

The random milling and discontent

converge on particular 9bjects or persons.

This condition is

communicated throughout the society via the process of social
contagion.

13 5

The movement fosters group integration and loyalty

among i ts followers.

The leadership role at this stage is exericised

by the reformer or prophet, who adroitly formulates and promulgates
the social myth.

136

The social myth is largely a hypothetical

1 33 rbid.

134 rbid. , p. 27 3 .

135 rbid . , p. 274 .
136 1bid. , p. 275.
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construct of the reformers and advocates the establishment of a
utopia by correcting contemporary injustices.

The dominant social

form during this period is the crowd , especially an acting crowd that
confronts the present regime.
The next period, the formal stage, consists largely of the
formulation of issues and formation of opposing publics.

Struggles

between opposing factions earmark this stage of the revolution.

The

moderate faction wrests power from the old conservatives only to be
ousted later by the more radical elements of the movement.
relations dominate this stage of action.

Conflict

Opposing factions employ

techniques that are effeetive in the development of group morale and
i' deology. 137

The leadership function at this time is the responsibility

of statesmen. 138

They attempt to formulate policies and gather support

for their implementation.

Because of the discussion and deliberation

that occurs during this stage, the dominant social form is the public.
The final stage of revolution is termed the institutional stage.
The movement has seized power and it is legitimized dur ing this period.
This stage marks the formation of a new society and the revolution is
consummated.

139

Characteristics of this period are :

psychological

exhaustion of the populace, return to old habits, increased power of
13 7 rbid. , p. 2 7 6.
13 8 rb id. , p . 27 7.

139 rbid.
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a centralized government , and a re-accommodation of church and
st ate.

140

The attainment o f this stage is a final step in the revol-

utionary process :
. . . By which mass behavior, originating in unrest and d iscontent
generated by the institutional inadequacies and inefficiencies of
a society, becomes popularized and finds expression in the crowd ;
begi ns to acquire fo rm in the public; and finally legalizes a new
body o f sanctioned use and want. This is, a new society emerges,
its core being a new constellation of institutions. 14 1
However, the process o f institutionalization is neither perfect
nor complete.

A compromise is reached between the values o f the old

order and those of the new society.

The most effective leadership

type during this stage is the administrator-executive.

His main function

is the enactment o f the policies patterned during the previous era.
The dominant socia l form during this final stage is the society itself.
In fact, ". . . a revolutionary movement may be thought of as a development
in the course o f which a mass is transformed into a crowd, a crowd be.
.
14 2
comes a publi c, and a public evolves into a society. ..

Neil Smelser
Probably the most impressive and inclusive work in the field o f
collective behavior has been completed by Neil Smelser.

He has

developed a highly elaborate conceptual framework for the ana lysis of
all forms o f collective behavior and social movements.
140

rbid .

141 Ibid . , p. 27 8.
14 2 rbid . , p. 279.

Borrowing from
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the economist, S amuelson, the author formulates what he refers to as
the "value-added" theory of collective behavior. 143

Briefly, the

value-added theory makes use of six tleterminants or necessary condi tions
which combine to specify the nature and characteristics of any particular
The six determinants include the

variety of collective behavior.
following :

1. Structural Conduciveness. This refers to the situation in
which there exists an absence of institutionalized means of
resolving social unrest or conflicting interests.
2. Structural Strain.
sy?tem.

The presence of disharmony in the social

3. The Growth of a Generalized Belief. This condition marks
the identification of the caus e of the strain and the formulation
of an ameliorative action program.
4.

Precipitating Factors.

A specific incident or a "spark. "

5. Mobilization of the Participants for Action.
among the members of the dissatisfied group .

Organization

6. The Operation of Social Control. The various ways and
means by which agencies of social control discourage or encourage
episodes of collective behavior. 144
,,

These determinants are present in each and every occurrence of
collective behavior.

Moreover, beginning with structural conduciveness

each determinant is necessary for the one that follows and it also
establishes the limits within which the next determinate can operate.

145

143 Neil J. Smelser, Theory of Collective Behavior, (New ¥ork:
The Free Press of Glencoe, 1963), pp. 12-13.
144 rbid.

, pp. 15-18.

14 5 Gardner Lindzey and Elliot Aronson (eds. ) , The Handbook of
Social Psychology, (Reading , Ma.ss. : Addison-Wesley Publishing Company,
1954), Vol. 4, p. 556 .
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Any particular form of collective behavior produced by the
aforementioned determinants mus t be analyzed in terms of the four
basic components of social action.

According to Parsons (et. al. )

these are:
1. Values.
in a society.

The mos t general statements of what is desirable

2. Norms. These are the rules of behavior or guides for the
realization of the values.
3. Mobilization of motivation for organized action. Speci fi
cation of who will be the agents in pursuit of the valued goals
and how the action of these agents will be structured into roles.
4. Situational facilities. Refers to the means gnd obstacles
that facilitate or hinder the attainment of goals. 1 4
There are also seven levels of specificity for each component
of social action ; however, an explanation of these is not neces sa ry
at this summary level of interpretation.

It is possib ;I.e , us ing the

components of social action, to identify five basic types of collective
behavior.

Each type is explained or identified in terms of the

particular component of social action upon which the behavior is
focused.

The panic and craze are the first two types and both revolve

147
.
.
around s ituationa
1 faci· 1 i· t ies.
·

Examples would include bank runs,

stock-market crashes, and var ious fads and fashion.

The hostile out

burs t is the third type of collective behavior identif ied and is
146 rbid. , p. 559 and Smels er, op. cit. , pp . 2 3-28 .
1 4 7 Smelser, op. ci t. , Chapters 6 and 7.
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focused upon specific persons and their respective roles. 1 4 8

In this

type of predicament persons or groups are singled out for attack
because they are believed to be responsib le for the particular situation
about which the participants are concerned.

Various forms of scape

goating, lynch mobs, and "red scares" are typical examples.

The norm-

oriented movement as the label implies focuses upon rules and procedures
which are defined by the participants as unjust or illegai. 1 49

Since

it is this type of collective behavior that is the major concern o f
this dissertation, the norm-oriented movement will be covered in detail
later in this chapter.

For the present, civil rights movements, union

strikes and the actions of various pressure groups would be included
under this category.

movement. 150

The last of Smelser ' s types is the value-oriented

This movement attempts to change, modify or create new

values to replace the present ones operating in the society or subculture.

While the norm-oriented movement focuses upon means, the

value-oriented movement is concerned with changes in the very core of
society--its values.

Revolutions are typically given as examples of

the latter.
The urban insurrections of recent years conform to the criteria
of a norm-oriented movement.
1 4 8 rbid. , Chapter 8 .
1 49 rbid . , Chap ter 9 .

l S Oi bid . , Chapter 10.

They were a form of protest against
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abuses present in the system rather than a challenge to the values
upo� which the system res ts .

P articipants sought to change practices

not ideologies.
A norm-oriented movement " . . . is an attempt to restore, protect,

15 1
modify, or create norms in the name of a generalized belief. 11

The

American democratic creed serves as the generalized belief upon which
e fforts to attain political, economic, and educational equality are
based.

Actions of a norm-oriented movement may seek to directly

a ffect norms or to induce some constituted authority to do so in their

behal f. 152

While this type of movement may contain similarities to

those of panics or outbursts (i. e. , irrational acts or unnecessary
violence) they generally focus upon deliberative actions designed to
erradicate perceived inequities and injustices.

Frequent ly, norm

oriented movements employ various organizations to act as pressure
groups ; however , they may also develop when these groups have failed

1 53
. . .
.
.
to gain s atisfaction for its constituents
through routine
activities.
Structural conduciveness refers to conditions in the society
that foster or serve as the source of the demands and ; secondly , to
inadequate procedures for dealing with the grievances.
151
152

rbid . , p . 270.
rbid.

153
rbid . , p. 2 77

154

rbid . , p. 278.

Both of these
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condit ions must be present or a norm-oriented movement will never

materiali ze.

In addition to being thwarted, the discontented must

perceive some degree of access to methods of affecting the normative
order.

Democratic societies are characterized by norm-oriented

movements , but totalitarian governments are con fronted w ith value
oriented movements (i. e . , revolutions) because of the complete absence
of avenues for redress .

Al l modes of agitation cannot be closed,

then , if a norm-oriented movement is to occur.

Neither, however,

can these avenues be completely free from obstacles. 155

I f obstruc-

tions were not present, the grievance would be rectified and there
wou ld be no need for a movement.

In summary, structual conduciveness

for norm-oriented movements ". . . requires both the accessibility to
avenues for affecting normative change and the inaccessibility to
other avenues. 11 156

Structural strain associated wi th norm-oriented movements
usually results from real or perceived losses in wealth, power or
In addition to losses , a feeling of being " frozen 1 1 in any

prestige .

of these three social stratification dimensions will also produce
discontent.

Another source can be any disharmony between norroative

standards and actual social conditions. 157

This situation gives

rise to a movement whose ob jective is to modify the norms.
155 T b . d

-=-2:_ •

I

p. 2 84 .

156 rbid. , p. 2 86 .
157 rbid . ,

p. 2 8 8 .
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in co ngr uity can be a product of rapidly changing social norms or
soc.ial condi ti ons which create a s tate of anomie among societal
members .

Succinctly s ta ted , norm-oriented movements are generated

by s trains whi ch create demands for change ; however, this s i tuation
must be combined wi th appropriate conditions of s tructual conducive
ness before the next determinant, the growth of generali zed beliefs ,
can come i nto play. 158
The gene rali zed belief includes a diagnos is of the forces and
agents responsible for the failure of normative regulation and also
a program for i ts correction. 159

Generali zed beliefs may develop

over decades in li terature or they can be the product of a s in gle
person or group.

Diss emination of the idea usually takes the form

of mee tings, pamphleteering, and various other methods of communi cation.
The growth of the generali zed belief is invariably hastened by the
occurrence of a precipatating factor (s ) .

Mos t importantly, ". . . they

mark the sudden es tab lishment or symboli zation of one of the conditions
.. 160
.
of con duciveness
or strai. n .

They illus trate what has been

criti c ized ; they confirm s us picions.

The s ense of urgency that is

created by the precipi tating factor leads to the final determinant of
the value-added process, the mobili zation of the par ticipants for
action .
1 5 8 rbid. , p. 29 2 .
1 59 rbid.
160rbid. , p. 29 4.
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Generally, the mobilization phase is the most complex and
requires most of the movement ' s energies.

The leadership =unction

during this period is crucial for the success or failure of the
movement.

Strategies and tactics must be carefully planned and

executed .

'J.1he leader is also given responsibility for revitalizing

enthusiasm which invariably wanes during this lengthy period.

The

norm-oriented movement is usually terminated when it has achieved
its objectives or when it becomes apparent that failure is inevitable.
Another of the determinants, which isn ' t included in the chronological
sequence, is the role that social control agencies play.

Authorities

can either encourage the development of norm-oriented movements
(e. g. , closing off the avenues of legitimate protest, vacillating in
the face of pressure from the movement or by openly encouraging
protest) or discourage their formation (e. g. , permitting grievances to
be aired or giving a hearing for complaints). 161
In summary, Smelser states that the determinants don ' t neces
sarily follow one another in a temporal sequence.

However, each

phase does act as a limiting factor for the one that follows and, in
turn, is limited or defined by one that precedes it.
161 rbid. , pp . 306- 308. For a recent application of Smelser ' s
value-added theory to race riots, see Melvin DeFluer, William D ' Antonio,
a.nd Lois B. DeFluer, Sociology : Man In S ociety, (Glencoe, I llinois :
Scott, Foresman and Company, Inc. , 1971), pp. 363- 373.

81
The Kerner Commission Report
In addition to providing material for the theoretical framework
of this dissertation, the Kerner Commission Report has also compiled
a list o f generalizations based upon their survey of 2 4 disorders.
This list does not constitute a typology as do the other selections
in this chapter, but the common features of the riots will be use fu l
in the construction o f the urban insurrection typology.
1. No civil disorder was "typical" in all respects. Viewed
in a national framework, the disorders of 1967 varied greatly in
terms of violence and damage: while a re lative ly small number
were major under our criteria and a somewhat larger number were
serious, most of the disorders would have received little or no
. national attention as "riots " had the nation not been sensitized
by the more serious outbreaks.
2. While the civil disorders of 1967 were racial in character,
they were not inter-racial . The 1967 disorders, as well as earlier
disorders of the recent period, involved action within Negro
neighborhoods against symbols of white American society--authority
and property--rather than against white persons.
3 . Despite extremist rhetoric, there was no attempt to subvert
the social order o f the United States. Instead, most of those who
attacked white authority and property seemed to be demanding ful ler
participation in the social order and the material benefits enjoyed
b y the vast majority of American citizens.
4. Disorder did not typically erupt without preexisting causes,
as a resu lt o f a single "triggering" or "precipitating " incident .
Instead, it developed out of an increasingly disturbed social
atmosphere, in which typically a series of tension-heightening
incidents over a period of weeks or months became linked in the
minds of many in the Negro community with a shared network of
Tu.7.derlying gri·evances.
5. There was, typically, a complex relationship between the
series of incidents and the underlying grievances. For example,
grievances about a llegedly ab usive police practices, unemployment
and underemployment, housing and other conditions in the ghetto,
were often aggravated in the minds o f many Negroes by incidents
involving the po lice , or the inaction of municipal authorities on
Negro complaints about police action , unemployment, inadequate
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hou s ing or other condition s . When grievance-related inc i dents
recurred and r i s ing ten s ions were not s ati s factorily re s olved,
a cumulative proce s s took place in which pri or incident s were
readily recalled a nd grievances re i nforced. At some point in
the mounting ten s ion, a further incident--in itself o ften routine
or even trivial--became the breaking point, and the ten s ion
spilled into vio lence.
6. Many grievances in the Negro community re s ult from the
di s crimination, prejudice and powerle s snes s which Negroes often
experience. They al s o re s ult from the s everely di s advantaged
s ocial and economic conditions of many Negroe s a s compared with
those o f whites in the s ame city and, more particular ly, in the
predominant ly white s uburbs.
7. Characteri s tically, the typical rioter was not a hoodlum,
habitual criminal, or ri ffraf f ; nor wa s he a recent migrant, a
member o f an uneducated undercla s s , or a per s on lacking broad
In s tead, he was a teenager or
s ocial and political concerns.
young adult, a high-s chool drop-out--but s omewhat better educated
than hi s Negro neighbor--and almost invariab ly underemployed or
employed in a menial job. He wa s proud of hi s race, extremely
hosti le to both white s and middle-cla s s Negroe s , and, though
informed about politic s , highly distru s tful of the political
sy s tem and of polit i cal leaders.
8 . Numerous Negro counter-rioters walked the s treet s urg i ng
rioter s to "cool it. " The typical counter-rioter resembled in
many re spects the majority o f Negroes, who neither rioted nor
took action against the rioters, that is, the non-involved. But
certain differences are crucial : The counter-rioter was better
educated and had higher income than either the rioter or the
non-invo lved.
9. Negot iations between Negroes and white o f ficials occurred
during virtually all the di s orders surveyed. The negotiations
o ften involved young, militant Negroe s as well as older, established
leaders . Despite a s etting o f chaos and disorder, negotiations in
many case s involved discu s s i on of underlying grievances a s well as
the handling of the di s order by contro l authorities.
10. The chain ,ve have identified--discrimination , prej udice,
d i s advantaged condition s, intense and pervasive grievances, a
series o f tension-heightening incidents, all culminating in t.�e
eruption o f di s order at the hands o f youthful, politically-aware
act ivists--mu s t be understood as describing the central trend in
the disorders, not as an explanati on of all aspects o f the riots
or of all rioters. Some riote rs , for example, may have s hared
neither the condition s nor the grievance s of their Negro neighbors ;
s ome may h ave coolly and deliberately expl oited the chaos created
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by others ; some may have been drawn into the melee merely because
they identified with, or wished to emulate, others. Nor do we
intend to suggest that the majority of rioters, who shared the
adverse conditions and grievances, necessar ily articulated in
their own minds the connection between the background and their
actions.
1 1. The background of disorder in the r iot cities was typically
characterized by severely disadvantaged conditions for Negroes,
especially as compared with those for whites; a local government
o ften unresponsive to these conditions ; federal programs which
had not yet reached a s i gnificantly large proportion o f those in
need; and the resulting reservoir of pervasive and deep grievance
and frustration i n the ghetto.
12. In the immediate aftermath of disorder, the status q uo o f
daily life before the disorder generally was quickly restored.
Yet, despite some notable publ ic and private e f forts, lit tle basic
change took place in the conditions underlying the disorder. In
some cases, the result was increased distrust between blacks and
whites, diminished inter-racial communication, and growth of Negro
and white extremist groups. 162
Thomas Rose
The most recent typology o f a social movement has been advocated
by Thomas Rose.

Basically, his hypothesis is that violence occurs as

both control and revolt in a continual and recurrent cycle showing
163
.
·
. esca1 at ion.
th eir
various peaks and outbursts during

Violent revolt

is seen as a reaction to the violent control of the ruling groups.
This dualism o f practices of v iolence is described accordingly :
Violent control restrains and regulates, and is a method o f
socio-political control . Violent revolt is dissent and strives
to create change. Both violent revolt and violent control can
162

The Kerner Commission , op. cit. , pp. 1 10- 1 1 2.

163 Thomas Rose, "How Violence Occurs: A Theory and Review o f
the Literature, " i n Thomas Rose (ed . ), Violence i n America, (New York :
Random House, 19 70), p. 2 6.
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be understood in terms of a continuum: for violent revolt, at
one end is influence and persuasion, and at the other are revolution
and overthrow ; for violent control, at one end are regulation and
defensive acti on against revolution or threat of revolution, and
at the other are total control, overpowering totalitarianism, and
fascism. 164
Violence used as a control measure has as its main purpose the
maintenance of the status quo.

Control can be used construct ively as

a means of socializat ion ; however, it may also appear as brute force.
Violent control is mobi lized when the threat of unwanted change is
present.

In fact, the threat , per se, often brings about pre-emptive

violence on the part of those who are in control.

While the violence

employed by both sides has different causes and methods, one form can
be as destructive as the other.

165

Violent revolt is a characteristic of the Amer ican pol i tical
process and should not be considered as outside traditional sociopo 1 1t1.ca
. . 1 l 1.' f e. 166

Violent revolt is directed against the ruling class

and has as its basic causes injustice and inequality.

The American

tradition of successful revolt may have been one of the causative
fac tors in the big-city rebellions of the 1960's.

Violence s eeks

social change and yet it is also, in part, caused by social change .
Under normal condit ions, violence is spasmodic; as abundance r ises for
the majority, violent revolt increases among the less affluent; and
164

rbi' d . ,

pp. 26- 2 7 .

l65 rbid . , p . 27.
166 rbid

. , p. 3 8 .
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finally violent revolt is also caused by a� imperfectly coordinated
system (due to rapid change) of culturally prescribed goals and socially
structured means for achieving them. 167

Another characteristic of

violent revolt is its functionality in the maintenance of the society.
It may serve as a force of re-integration for society or it may serve
as a danger signal of a serious malfunction. 168
Unlike the other theorists in this chapter, Rose is specifically
interested in urban insurrections as contrasted with revolutions or
collective behavior in general.

The cycle of vi�lence that he proposes

was constructed using data gathered from narratives and other accounts
of race riots that occurred in the United States during the decade of
the 60 ' s.
The basic cause of these disorders is found in the �se of violent
control.

During stage one, violence has become an efficient and

expedient means of control. 169

The power groups in the society dominate

the instruments of violence and democratic bargaining processes break
down because of this centralization.

Fear of violent revolt by the

underprivileged groups produces pre-emptive violence on the part of the
167 r bid. , p. 41.
168 Frantz Fanon, The Wretched of the Earth, ( New York: The Grove
Press, 1966 ) ; Ralf Dahrendorf, Class and Class Conflict in I ndustrial
Society, ( Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1960 ) ; and
Lewis A. Coser , Continuities in the Study of Social Conflict, (New York:
The Free Press, 1967 ) .
169 Rose, �- cit. , p. 47.
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co ntro l ling groups in the society.

A ls o characteristic o f this stage

is . a lack o f a lternatives (for goal achievement) and o f "participatory

70
. .
politics. 1 1 1

Stage two marks the initial appearance o f violent revo lt.
Reta liatory measures are used against those who employ vio lence control.
Typical examples o f this form of vio lence wou ld include strikes,
demonstrations, and riots.

The instigators, who feel estranged from

legitimate political processes, see violent revolt as the on ly alter71

native open to them. 1

Most attempts to use vio lence to counter the

force o f the state have ended in a dismal failure because the state

. lence. 17 2
unleas hes a steady s t ream o f counter-vio

The resurgence o f control as counterviolence marks the occurrence
o f stage three .

The revolt is quickly put down and smashed.

Further

measures of control are instituted to guard against the likelihood of
a future revolt.

An excel lent example o f this technique is the equip

ping of various police forces with more s ophisticated weapons and
increased riot-contro l training courses.

These measures were adopted

in lieu o f those reconu.�ended by the Kerner Commission Report which
would a lleviate or attack the under lying caus es of the revo lt.
During stages four and five both sides escalate their respective
tactics o f vio lence.

Those in revolt are labeled as outlaws and have

l ? O ibid. , p
. 47.
171 rbid . , p. 8.
4
172 rbid.
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counterviolence against the state.
bring
they
d,
abele
l
o
s
en
be
cities and increas ingly violent react ions
Re� ell ions sprea d to other
such as the National Guard.
characteri ze control agencies

Nationally,

es yet, but isolated pockets of over
we have not reached these stag
be identifi ed (e. g. , Newark, Detroit, or
powerin g mutual violence can
Or angeburg).

1 74

e will
I f allowed to continue this spir al of vio lenc

ming totalitarian poli cy o f control
eventually culminate in an overwhel
on the part of the state.
S UMMARY

The purpose o f this chapter is to prov ide direction and guide
lines in two areas.

First, the analysis of the general underly ing

conditions which existed both prior to and dur ing the recent urban
insurrections.

By starting w ith a general treatment of revolution

and narrow ing the focus to include only one speci fic form o f social
movement , race riots ; this portion of the dissertation h as hopefully
accomplished this ob jec tive.

All of the literature cited in this

chapter conta ins many s im i lar ities and parallels which when d isti l led
from the text can provide rather spec i fic directions for the inter 
pretations o f the narratives and accounts o f urban insurrections.
For instance, a l l invest igations of social movements attr ibute
a certain amount of rationale and purposefulness to the actions o f
173 rbid . , pp . 49 - 50.
174 Ibid . , p. 50.
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r evo lu tio na ries, demonstra tors, or riot e �s .
can not b e d emo nstr a t e d

as

logic a l, but

neithe r

bl anket ed with a label of irr a tiona lity.
these theorists lies in the ir depiction

Al l of thei r

acti ons

can they b e err0 ne ously

Another common the me
of viol enc e

of

o n th e part of the

d emonstra tors as b e i n g a r e action to pr e vi ous forms of vio l e nc e
i nstig a t e d by control ag e nci es i n the ir soci e ties.

Thes e

v i ews

the

dict commo n ly he ld misconceptions th at portray th e viol e nc e of
low e r classes
the r e

as

spont an e ous or "blind-r ag e " re actions.

a lso e xists

contra

I n ge n e r a l ,

striking simi larities amo n g the typologi e s.

This

findi n g is despite th e f act tha t thr ee diff e re n t types of so cial
mov e me n ts we r e include d in the su rve y .
f ar from pe rf ect .

Th e pa rall e ls

are ,

h ow eve r,

For the purpos e of this dissertation o n ly

outbr eak st a ge s of a re volution wil l b e of di rect rel ev anc e .
the urb an in sur r e cti ons c a nnot be consid e r ed
did

not

att ai n the stage

of

o ver-thr owi n g the

I n spi te of this b asic diff e rence, the re do es
ne ss

re vo lu tions
e xisting
e xist a

th e

pre

Obv iously,

b e c ause

t hey

governmen t.
rem arkabl e l ike

betw e e n the pr e-re vo lutiona ry soci e ty and the l i f e situation of

the typic a l ghe tt o-dw e l l e r .
i ts resultin g frust ra tion s

Insti tutionaliz e d discrimi nation , an d
a re

both good

e xampl e s

of the prec edin g

st ate men t.
The s e c on d m a j o r con tribution of this se ction can be found in
the function it per fo rms in the formulation of a g P-ner a l hypo thesis
that wi l l b e t est e d i n the latt e r portion of this diss e r ta t io n .

The

guid e l i ne s estab l ished, wh en comb ined wi th the principles f o rmed i n the

89
pre ceding section , will be used in the construct ion of a general
hypothesis in the form of a typology.
Another important aspect of this chapter rests with its
es tab lishment of the constructed typology as a legitimate research
tool for this type of investigation .

It shows that social phenomena

of this nature can be sub jected to a scientific analysis.

In essence ,

it sanctions both the area o f study and the methodolo gy that wil l be
uti li zed .

CHAPTER IV
RESEARCH DESIGN
HISTORY OF THE METHODOLOGICAL TOOL
The constructed typology or its classical prototype, the
ideal or abstract type, has a long history of usage in the social
sciences in general and sociology in particular.

Probably one of

the earliest examples of an ideal type can be found in the classic
political science treatise by Plato entitled The Republic.

In this

work the idealized political city-state is described in great detail
not as a reality but rather as an utopian state of aff airs from
which reality could be gauged and evaluated.

The philosophers of

the Enlightenment period also made extensive use of this device in
an effort to advance not only their studies of the nature o f society
but also as a method o f furthering their own political beliefs and
value j udgments concerning the respective rights anq f reedoms o f
both men and governments.

Montequieu ' s four types o f societies-

republic, monarchy, despotism, and nonliterate/traditional--are
excellent examples as are Rousseau ' s "natural man " and the "social
contract. "

While these applications of this analytical tool have

some merit they are heavily-laden with personal value judgments and
biases.

However, the most serious misuse of these writings was

committed by later scholars and laymen who fell victim to the fallacy
o f reification.

The early usages of the ideal type h ad no basis in
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th e r e al world and were solely men tal constructs qf
author .

e ach

respective

Th e literal int erpretatior...s of these types by later writers

wer e the basis of much confusion

and

misunderstanding withi n acad emic

circles with resp ect to th e n a ture of the ide a l type and

i ts

appro

priate usage in the analysis of socie ty.
The deve lopment a n d sophistication of the ideal type reac�ed
its zenith with the writings of the German sociologists during the
l a tt e r porti on of the nineteenth century and early years of the
twen tie th ce n tury .

Under Max Weber the concept

a cquired

a new

precision and was r e-de fined to limit the scope of its appl i cation .
The crux of Weberi a n methodology was the

id eal

type .

It consists of

the cons t1.71 c tion of cert ain el ements of rea lity into a logically
pre cise conception . 1
ficial mode l

a nd

Weber felt that only by constructing- an arti

moving from it to empirical real i ty and the n back

to the constYuct with necessa ry mod ifications could an increas ingly
adequate understanding of the phenomenon be achieved . 2
Accord i n g to Weber, the ide a l type, per se, was not to be
confused as

a

hypothesis, but could be use d for gu i dance in th e

construct i on o f future hypotheses.

3

I t w as neither an average nor

1Max Weber, From Max Weber: Essays in Sociology, translated
Oxford
a nd edited by Hans H . Gerth and C. Wright Mil ls, (New Yorl::
Uni versity Press, 1946), p . 59.

2 rrving M . Zeitlin, Ideology and the Development of Soc i o
logical Theory, (Englewood Cliffs , New Jersey: Pren tice-Hall, Inc. ,
1968) , p. 119 .
3 Max Weber, The Methodology of the So c ial Sc i ences, ( Glencoe,
I l linois � The Free Press, 1949 ) , p. 90 .
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a faithful description of reality.

Rather, it was an accentuation

of what the investigator regarded as the essential characteristics

and tendencies of the phenomenon under investigation . 4

Weber l s ideal

types were still highly abstract and because of this they had a
tendency to be highly impressionistic.

His major applications of
His

the ideal types were probably responsible for this abstractness.
main concern was with speci fic historical problems and the use of
comparative sociology as a method of analysis.

In his studies of

different societies he employs the ideal type conceptions and uses
history as a storehouse of e mpirical examples for these concepts.

5

The nature of the problems he selected for investigation probably
necessitated that his methodology be largely abstract in nature.
This apparent shortcoming, however, should not detract from the
magnitude or importance of his writings .

The ideal type was still

useful as an analytical tool more than a depiction of reality.
use fulness was primarily as a heuristic device.

Its

Concerning the

evolution of the constructed typology , Weber 1 s main contribution
revolves around his use of empirical reality.

Despite the lack of

sound empirical referents the ideal types now had their counterparts
in the real world, something that the earlier versions could not
claim.

Weber made extensive use of newly de fined concept.

Examples

4zeitlin, op. cit., p. 120 .
5weber, From Max Weber:

Essays in Sociology, op. cit . , p. 60.
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include the following:

the Protestant Ethic, the Spirit of Capitalism,

aµd the characteristics of both bureaucrats and a bureaucracy.
While his own contributions are noteworthy , Weber's maj or
contribution to sociology may rest with his influence upon both his
contemporaries and later scholars .

His new legitimization of this

standard methodological tool probably resulted in the increased nurober
of applications that followed.

Georg Simmel (super-ordination/sub

ordination and forms-of-sociation), Ferdinand Tonnies (Gemeinschaft
and Gesellschaft), Emile Durkheim (mechanical and organic types of
solidarity and egoistic , anomic, and altruistic types of suicide),
Charles H . Cooley (primary and secondary groups), Pitirim Sorokin
(ideational, idealistic, and sensate types of societies), Robert
Redfield (folk and secular types of societies), and Talcott Parsons
(the pattern variables of role responsibilities and obligations) are
but a few of the well-known contributions of men who owe a great
debt to Weber's work.
The ideal type as it was conceptualized by Weber and those
who followed him performs three functions.
classification of phenomena.

6

First, it serves in the

However, the type is more than a mere

label ; it represents patterns and general concepts which serve to
identify com.man features of phenomena which might otherwise be

York:

6

Theodore Abel, The Foundation of Sociological Theory, (New
Random House, 1970), pp. 64-66 .
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vi ewed as unique events or objects .

Secondly, the ideal type can be

h�lpful in locating the factors that would explain the deviations
observed in concrete cases from the ideal type.

used in this manner

it enables the researcher to discover differences as well as similar
ities among the class of objec ts under investigation.

Third ly, and

most importantly, is i ts use in theoretical analysis.

In particular,

the ideal type can be used as a predictive device within a limited
range of power.

The ideal type should serve as a correcting mechanism
As a constant check on the validity

for the present body of theory .

of theory it performs the a ll-important function of self-correction in
science .
The functions of an ideal type are basically the same as those
of the more contemporary constructed type.

As it is used at the

present time, the constructed typology underwent major revisions w i th
the work of Howard P . Becker.

For him the word

11

ideal" was unacceptable

with its connotations of "perfectness, " abstractness, or something that
represented the desired state of being .

Becker preferred the term

"constructed type" or " constructed typolo gy" because it implies and
is based upon a more sound quantitative, empirical base.

Whereas its

forerunner w as largely conceived �n theoretically abstract terms, the
constructed type is constructed from emp irical reality and uses as a
guide in this process the theoretical contributions that are applicable
to the phenomenon under scrutiny.

The basic differences between the

ideal type of Weber and the constructed type of Becker are best
described by McKinney:
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The role of interpretation i s much greater _ in the method
of ideal typing. The ideal type involves comparison from the
ideal limits of the cas e, whereas the extracted [cons tructeq]
type involves comparison from central tendencies . The extracted
type is based upon the notions of avera ge, common, and concrete
rather than upon those of accentuation and abstractness. ?
Becker ' s work involved a movement o f what has become the
constructed type away from the "ideal pole " . of a continuum and toward
the "extracted pole. "

He accomplished this by placing the emphasis

of the constnlcted typology on the ob j ective probability of empirical
occurrence rather than on its mere ob jective poss ibility. 8

Earlier

ideal types were not empirically valid, did not represent any concrete
reality, and served mainly as devised and delimited conceptual tools
in the analysis of the empirical world. 9

As Becker conceptually

developed it and as one of his students, John C. McKinney, defined it
the constructed type:
. • . I s a purposive, planned selection, abstraction, corobination,
and (sometimes ) accentuati on of a set of criteria with empirica l
referents that s erves as a basis for comparison of empirical
cases. 10
As it wil l be used in this dis sertation, the final BeckerMcKinney s ynthesis i s defined as:
. • • An ideal type shorn of any p urely fictional qualities,
firmly g rounded i n the particularities of actual situations ,
11
and constituted by attributes that are empirically discoverable.
7 John c . McKinney, Constructive T y pology and Social Theory,
(New York : Appleton-Century-Crofts , 1 966) , PP · 24-25.
8

Ibid. , p. 25.

9 rbid . , p. 23.

i q ibid. , p. 3 .
11 - b . �

-�. , p. 2 6.
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CON STRUCTION O F THE TYPOLOGY
The a ctual steps involved in the construction of a typology
are not explicitly delin eated in either Becker's or McKinney ' s writings .
However, the latter cites the work of Alexander von Schelting as the
most convenient summary of the processes that are involved.

Para-

phrasing von Schelting, the writer can identify the following steps :
1. The analysis of the complex phenomenon (or process} in
such a way that it is broken down into separate identifiable
elements (or stages) .
2. The presupposed existence of general laws (largely in the
form of theories) to a ct as guides in the process.
3. Hypothetical elimination or alteration of one or more
fa ctors of the elements (or sta ges) . This step allows the
resear cher to make modifications to more closely fit the typology
to the nature of the data.
4. Hypothetical construction of what would then be the
expected course o f events.
5 . Comparison o f the hypothetical conception of the possible
developments with the a ctual course of events that are observed
in reality .
6. On the basis of this comparison, the drawing of con clu
sions regarding the supporting or refuting of the hypothesized
sequence of events . 1 2
Using this framework as a guideline, the researcher will employ
the following course of action as the methodologica l component of
this dissertation :
l 2 Ibid . , p . 44 .
added by this writer. )

(Also, the parenthetical phrases have been
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(1)

Analysi s of urban insurrections in order to discove r the

p oss ibility o f the existence of sequential stages of social action.
This intial attempt at analysis will be of necessity a super ficial
examination.

This wi ll be mainly an exploratory venture and will

not yet enjoy the formal support of a theoretical framework.
(2)

Providing a theoretical framework will be the task o f

this stage i n the construction.

The highly specul�tive conjecture

of the first step will now be introduced to the existing body of
theory.

it will then be possible to interpret the phenomenon in a

way that will be consistent with the previous knowledge that exists
in this particular area .
(3)

Using the theoretical framework and the findings reported

in the review o f literature, it will then be possible to modify and
revise the tentative typology that was proposed in the first step.
This step in the construction should culminate in the bringing to bear
on the problem all o f the necessary information for the actual
construction o f the typology.
(4)

Formulation o f the actual constructed typolo gy by delin-

eating and i dentifying the different stages o f

-:1

race riot which

would be expected to occur on the basis of the procedures per formed
in steps (1) and ( 2).

Rather than actually taking the form o f a

constructed typology at this time the "model " will in reality be a
series o f working hypo theses which will either be supported or re futed
in t..rie analy sis o f data section o f the dissertation.
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(5 )

The comparison o f the hypothesized typology to empirical

re ality is the central task of this stage of the construction.

The

tentative constructed type will be compared to actual narratives o f
the three major urban disorders chosen for examination.

In short,

the model will be sub jected to empirical testing .
(6)

The drawing o f conclusions in this research wi ll consist

of an eva luation o f the "goodness of fit" characteristics that are
exhibited by the typology during the testing.

To be considered as

valid each o f the sequential stages o f the typology should have
their respective counterparts in each of the narrative accounts of
the urban insurrections.

If only two of the narratives are found to

support the typology at any stage the matter will be fully discussed
in the summary and conc lusions section of the dissertation and a
judgment will be rendered as to its being retained or modi fied as a
stage in the typology.

I f only one of the accounts can be discovered

to suppor t any stage of the proposed type then this stage will be
deleted from the finalized version of the constructed typology.

The

same procedure will be followed, of course, in the event that no
suppor t can be found to exist for any stage of the typology in any
o f the narratives.

When any stage o f the hypothesized typology is

deleted an examination will be undertaken to determine the feasibility
o f including a new or revised stage in the typology.

The empirical

testing stage will be used to per form two functions :

re futation of

the presently proposed stages of the typology and the presentation
of evidence that could support the inclusion of new stages.

If
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there is present a

c onsistent

pattern of the refuting evidenc e then

this unanticipated stage (s) will be in cluded in the revised version
of the typology.
(7)

The empirical testing will m ark the end of the constru c tion

of the typology o f urban disorders ; however, there is one more impor
tant phase of this resear ch .

The relationship that exists between

theory and re� earch is probably most su c cinctly depicted by Walter L.
W allace in h is book, Sociological Theory:

An Introduction.

cess or relati onship is essentially circul ar. 13

The pro

St arting with the

body of theory the res e ar cher logically deduces hypotheses whi c h are
transformed into obse�vations through the processes of operational i
zation and instrumentation.

The observations or collections of data

are then transformed into empirical generalizations by the use of
another class of methods--scaling and measurement.
in this

c ircul a r

The fina l step

diagram involves the re-integration of these gener a li

zat ions back into the body of theory using the process o f logi ca l
induc tion.

This final stage represents the goa l of the l ast section

of this dissertat ion.

The finalized version of the constru c ted

typology can be viewed simply as a set of empiric a l genr aliz ations,
whi c h while represen ting an interesting and useful set of findings ,
c annot

contribute fully to the fie ld unless it is couched in terms of

1 3walter L. Wal l ace, Sociological Theory: An Introduction ,
(Chicago : Aldine Publishing Comp any, 1969 ) , pp . viii and ix.
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the existing body o f theo:ry or unless it adds to the present body of
theory.

An early discovery of this research was the existence of a

th eoretical vacuum in the middle of the collective behavior--social
movement continuum o f social action.

One of the aims of this research

is to fill this gap assuming that the findings are determined to be
significant.

The best method o f pursuing this end will be the

selection of Talcott Parson's pattern variables as a frame o f reference
for the analysis o f the di fferent types of social action.

By comparing

the three types o f collectivized social behavior--episodic collective
behaviors, urban insurrections, and revolutions--with respect to
salient variables both di fferences and similarities can be discovered
and the body o f theory will be that much more complete.

The completion

of this portion of the theory-research circular diagram wi ll fulfill
the primary obligation of every investigation--the enhancement or
enrichment of the existing body of theory in the respective discipline.
ANALYSIS OF DATA
The analysis of data for this study will take the form o f
superimposing the proposed typology o n narrative accounts o f the three
major urban insurrections--Detroit, Newark, and Watts.

Unfortunately,

there is not enough info rmation available regarding the race riots
which were smaller in scope .

For this reason, the research wi l l be

re luctantly limited to the three disorders mentioned above.

10 1
The most important types of information that constitute the
data for this study will be secondary sources.

The distinction

between prima ry and secondary sources is somewhat arbitrary.
Gottschalk defines the two as fo llows:
A primary source is the testimony of an eyewitness, or of a
witness by any other of the senses, or of a mechanical device
like a dictaphone--that is, of one who or that which was present
at the events of which he or it tells. A secondary source is
the testimony of anyone who is not an eyewitness--that is, o f
one who was not present at the events o f which he tells. 1 4
By applying this de finition to the accounts o f urban insur
rections, it becomes clear that primary sources wou ld provide so much
information that it wou ld exceed the point of diminishing returns as
far as one researcher's ability to assimilate the data.

The primary

sources rest at the base of all of the secondary sources, but the
secondary sources h ave been examined for consistency and objectivity
by researchers whose sole purpose was to obtain the most accurate
accounts possible.

The prima ry sources of urban disorders were shown

by the Kerner Commission Report to be highly biased or distorted and
at best could only give one person ' s imp ressions of a very large and
complicated socia l event.

Primary sources and their validity rest

upon and are limited by both the ability and willingness of the
observers to te ll the truth; consequently, even the sum total of all
1 4Louis Gottschalk , Understanding History : A Primer
of
Historical Method, ( New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950 ) , p. 5 3.

102

personal accounts might not yield an accurate and consistant narrative
of the race riots .

The primary sources had to be examined and re

examined in an e ffort to eliminate as many errors and contradictions
as p ossible.

The resulting secondary source documents are unquestion

ably the most detailed and accurate accounts of the race riots that
were possible given the conditions and magnitude o f the problem.
Each o f the race riots w ill be examined separately i n chapters
and a determination w ill be made as to the extent that this data
supports or refutes part or all of the hypothesized typology.

This

process will be i n accordance with the procedure outlined earlier i n
this chapter.

The various governmental commission reports will

constitute the central core of the informational data.

All o f these

documents were based upon extensive primary sources o f in formation
and were compiled by the most authoritative and prominent special ists
in each of their respecti ve disciplines.

Moreover, these accounts

were written immediately after the occurrence o f each of the disorders,
thus the . ·data loss because of the passage of time was kept to a
minimum.

The McCone Commission Report (Watts ) , Report for Action

(Newark) , Report to Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh (Detroit) , and the
Kerner corrcmission Report (coverning all three of the disorders ) are
the specific works that will be the principal sources o f data .
While these documents have been subjected to criticism from some
academic c ircles because of the conservative nature o f their inter
pretations and recommendations, their narrative accounts o f the riots
remain unquestioned as the most complete and truthful descriptions
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available.

J ournal articles and selected chapters from edited books

will also be considered as supportive data .

Obviously these are not

as complete as the commission reports but they tend to be more detailed
in their depictions of certain portions of the disorders.

These

sources also have the added feature of more recent information that
was not available to the commission reports at the time of their
publication.

These governmental reports were usually under some

publication deadline and could not wait in some instances for the
additional information.

The journal articles also have the benefit

of a certain amount of both professional and emotional detachment
from the actual disorders while the commission reports were not
immune from certain political pressures from both sides of the
community.

CHAPTER V
HYPOTHESES AND RATIONALE
THE TYPOLOGY
It is the purpose of this chapter to - present the hypotheses

and give the rationale that was used in their fonnulation.

The

general hypotliesis of this dissertation can be stated as fo l lows:
Th�t there does exist in the phenomena termed urban
- insurrections the bas is for a typology composed of d iscernible causa l, sequential stages that can be identif ied.
This hypothesis was sugges ted by a cursory examination of urban
disorders and has been supported by contr ibutions from the exis ting
body of theory.
The actual typology will be presented in the form o f five
working subhypotheses:
Subhypothes is 1:

The existence of a long term d iscrepancy
between the ideal and real cul tures o f
ghetto dwe llers will eventual ly cause them
to identify the causative factors.

Subhypothes is 2:

The wides pread acceptance of the identifica
tion of the causative factors will eventually
cause the occurrence of a precipitating
incident.
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Subhypothesis 3:

The occurrence of a precipitating incident
wil l cause e1e succession into the rioting
stage.

Subhypothesis 4 :

The advent of the rioting stage wil l cause
a reaction by cont�ol agencies.

Su.bhypothesis 5 :

The successful intervention by control
agencies will cause

2

relatively rapid return

o f normality.
_ To ful ly eA-plain and understand the elements of each of the
stages the typology can be outlined as follows :
1.

Discrepancy between real and ideal cultures
A.

Disproportionate occupation of degrading statures

B.

Rising expectations and unresponsive institutionalized procedures

c.
2.

3.

Exacerbating local conditions

Identification o f under lying, causative factors
A.

Di ffusion of the generalized be lief (prose lytizing)

B.

Consensus among respondents (acceptance)

The precipitating incident
A.

Existence of a casual crowd

B.

Occurrence of a seemingly innocuous incident

c.

Vio lence-coun ter violence spiral (individualized
level)
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D.

Mood shift accompanied by milling, contagion, and
se lective perception.

E.
4.

Distortion of the incident and diffusion of rumors

The rioting stage
A.

Initia l co l lective action based on rioters' conception
of the precipitating incident

B.

Perception of the b reakdown of officia l control

c.

Recruitment of addit iona l personnel

D.

Se lective burning and looting

E.

Identification of the most easily accessible and
readily identifiable of the causative factors

5.

Reaction by control agencies
A.

Violence-reactive violence spiral (col lectivized
leve l )

B.
6.

Suppression of riot

Return to normality
A.

Re latively unchanged conditions

B.

Individua lized selective violence against po licy
E XPLANATION

The sequence of predisposing conditions as wel l as events of
the actua l riot include the perception by the soc ia l ly and economical ly
subordinate group that there exists a discrepancy between the rea l
and ideal cultures .

This d iscrepancy is manifested i n a dispropor

tionate occupancy of degrading statures and ris ing expectations which
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ar e met by unresponsive institutionalized procedures.

A further

manifestation is the existence of exacerbating local conditions,
specifically police brutality, usurious interest rates, and higher
prices charged for goods and se rvices in relation to other areas of
the city.
Fixations o f responsibility for the discrepancy between real
and ideal culture is accomplished through the identification of under
lying, causative factors .

These factors are stated in the form of

a belief or social myth , and the dif fusion of th ls belief is carried
out through the various forms of proselytism.

If the identification

o f causes for these discrepancies is widespread in the subordinated
community , then there will be a high degree of consensus and acceptance concerning the validity o f the be lief.
Given the predisposing conditions described above, the
occurrence of a precipitating incident is necessary to ignite an
urban insurrection.

As defined here a precipitating incident is

predicated upon the exis tence of a casual crowd which witnesses the
occurrence of a seemingly innocuous incident.

This type of even�

occurs many times every day in the ghetto without any ramifications
or furthe r incidents; however, this particular one is slightly
different because of the following reasons.

The principal participants

(usually police and the suspect) in the incident react toward each
othe r with increasing hostility and aggression .

This violence-

counter v iolence spiral produces a mood shift in the c rowd as awareness
is heightened that the witnessed scene is symbolic of the generalized
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belief concerning the existence and causes of social, economic and
political disparities.

Selective perception leads to distortion of

the inciden t , while milling and contagion contribute to the diffusion
of rumors.
The circulation of rumors operates on two levels within the
typical urban insurrection.

Rumors are present within the eye-witness

crowd as a concomitant feature of milling and t.Jey diffuse through
the c rowd through the process of contagion.
during the recruitment phase of the riot.

Rumors also have impact
Members of the immediate

crowd spread their distortions to persons who were not present at the
actual incident.

In the former instance, rumors facili tate the

transformation of the behavior of the crowd from individual and nondirected to collective and directed.
The metamorphosis of the crowd creates the inception of the
rioting stage .

Initial collective action is based upon the rioters'

conception of the precipitating incident.

The resistence of the

authorities involved in the precipitating incident is overwhelmed
and the rio ters receive greater momentum from their perception of the
breakdown of offici al con tro l.

As the area of the rio t e xpands from

the location of the p recipitating incident, accompanying rumors
facilitate the rec ruitment of additional personnel.

The generalized

belief wi thin the s ubo rdinated community concerning the attribution
of causali ty for their disparate condi tion induces selective burning
and looting by the rioters.

Destructive acts are associated with
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the identification of the most easily accessible and readily identified
of the causative factors which comprise the generalized belief.
The early successes of the rioters produces a reaction by the
control agencies.

The individualiz ed violence-counter violence spiral

of the precipitating incidents is repeated in the form of a violence
reactive violence spiral on a col lectivized level.

The reinforcements

of police and National Guard contingents are accompanied, at least
initially , by a more intense reaction on the part of the rioters.
Looting and burning may diminish, but personalized violence becomes
more widespread and the general level is escalated.

In the reaction

phase however, the control forces eventually prevail and the riot is
suppressed .
The return to normality following the suppression of the riot
is characterized by relatively unchanged conditions from those that
prevailed before the riot.

Hostility is rechannelled from widespread

violence to individualized se lective violence against the police
forces.
RATIONALE
Each of the points described in the proposed typology has its
antecedents in the writings discussed in Chapter I I I.

It is felt

that comparison of the typology with generalizations found in other
studies of col lective behavior and social movements wil l justi fy its
use as a descriptive and analytical device.

llO
The concept o f a discrepancy between the real and ideal cultures

�s a predisposing factor is gener al ly supported by Park who found that

collective behavior is based on some form of social unrest, and also by

Brinton who stated that a revolutionary outbreak is always the result
of smoldering conditions.

More specifically, Turner and Kil l i an stated

that conditions of collective behavior were predicated upon a breakdown
or weakness o f soci al control resulting from inadequate social organ
ization and normative integr ation.

The normative mechanisms of the

dominant society are the only acceptable means of goal attainment but
are relatively inaccessible to the subordinated group.

This situation

results in a perceived discrepancy and feelings of relative deprivation.
This relationship was also described by Edwards who discerned
the basic cause of revolution to be the inabi lity of existing social
institutions to satisfy the b asic wishes of new experience, security,
recognition, and response.

In Edwards' terms the idea l culture wou ld

be defined in terms of wish-fulfi llment, while factors contributing
to the thwarting of wish-fulf illment represent the real culture.

In

terms o f the typology, the f actors direct ly associated with the
thwarting of the four b asic wishes are the disproportionate occupation
of degrading statuses, rising expectations and unresponsive institu
tionalized procedures, and exacerbating local conditions.

The effects

of these f actors are the same as those stipulated by Edwards .
Further support for the predisposing factors presented in the
typology is derived from Smelser ' s writings.

For him the discrepancy

between the real and ideal would be stated as the conditions in society
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wh i ch serve as a source of demands coupled with inadequate institu
t i onali zed procedures for dealing with these demands.

The occupation

of degrading statuses, rising expectations, and exacerbating conditions
would be descr ibed by Smelser as the real or perceived loss of wealth,
status or power, or the feeling of being frozen in one or more of
these dimensions.
Perhaps the most signif icant factor associated with the discrepancy between the real and ideal cultures is the existence o f rising
e xpectations which are met by unresponsive institutionali zed procedures,
particularly in the realm of political expression.

Smelser saw this

condition as str ucturally conducive to revolution as did Rose who
attr ibuted violent revolt to the estrangement from participation in
leg itimate political processes .

In support of this Janowit z observed

that in the 1960's, the crucial factor separating cities which exper
i e nced riots from those which did not was the amount and extent of
local political participation on the part of the black community.
cities with more pr oportionately integrated police forces and more
r epresentative forms of government had fewer and less severe riots .
Stage two of the typology-- the identi fication of vagu e causative
factors-- is supported by Edwards and Smelser who alluded to the formation
of a generali zed belief (Smelser ) or social myth (Edwards ) as an
outgrowth o f the gen e rali zed bel ief resulted from a perception by the
suppressed group that certain forces and agents were responsibl e for
the felt con ditions of in j ustice .

According to Smelser, the di ffusion
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accomplished through various forms of
of the generalized bel ief was
proselyti zing .

Hopper ' s analysis of social movements also contained a stage

unrest would result from a
whe re vague, unspecified feelings of
and ideal cultu res.
perception of dispa rity between the real

Widespread

the dispa rity would depend
consensus or acceptance of the nature of

the ideal situation in terms
upon the skill of agitators who question
to the acceptance of the social
of the real. As a preparatory feature

s would be spread throughout the
my th, the challenges of the agitator
speeches, writ ings, and p amphleteer 
subordinated community by means of
also involved perceptions of the
ing. Brinton's study of revolutions
these perceptions would achieve
unfitness of the social o rder, and that
of conversi on.
b road acceptance thro ugh the function
ter contain ed some mention
seve ral studies reviewed by the wri
form or another as a prelude to
o f a p rec ipitati ng incident in one
lent confrontat ion . The Kerner
collec tive behavior involv ing vio
to race
study argued that, in rel ati on
Commiss ion Report and smelse r ' s
nt exe mpl i fies one or more of the
rio ts, the precip ita tin g incide
a
ord inated communi ty to per cei ve
conditions which has led the sub
ideal cultures. As pre vio usl y
dis crepancy between the real and
cific
revolutionary outbreak as a spe
mentioned Bri nton perceived the
revolu 
g condit ions. Edwards also saw
inc ident related to smo lde rin
cant
from some seemingly ins ignifi
tionary out bre ak as res ult ing
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inci dent.

Finally, Le Bon implied at least, the necessity of some

ng of indivi duals into a
in ci dent which would transform a gatheri

psy chological crowd.

nt
Among the factors contributing to the precipitating incide

rection, the existence of a
as a typological stage of an urban insur
al necessity. That a
casual crowd is presumed to be a defin ition

that activities associated
crowd m ust exist at some point in orde r
self-evident. That the c rowd
with collective behavior might occu r is

collective behavior is not
is casual at some point implies that
y, but rather at some point an
gene rated individually and spontaneousl
sfo rmed into what Le Bon called
aggregate of individuals must be tran
of the mass mind . P rio r to
a single being, or to Simmel's concept
defined as a casual crow d for the
that change, the aggregate would be
purposes of this paper .

ocuous incident has been
The occurrence of a seemingly inn
ology
the preceding paragraphs . The typ
mentioned in various contexts in
ed gro up
a casual crowd into a like-mind
describes the transformation o f
some
behavi or as being a functi on o f
engaging in violent collective
viewed as
nt itself might ob j ectively be
specific incident. The incide
ide nt
Sub j ectively, howeve r, the inc
inn ocuous or t rivial (Edwards).
olization
mat ic (Brinton ) due to its symb
wil l be perceived as highly dra

quities (Smelse r).
of long-standing normative ine
n
nte r violence spiral has not bee
The concept o f a violence-cou
ed or
tings on either an individualiz
treated extensively in other wri
innocuous
othesi zed, however, that a truly
a collec t ive level. It is hyp
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generate suffic ient antagonism among
i nc ident wil l not in itself

iented col lective behavior .
wi t nesses to induce vio lence-or

The

ively deviant act, is perce ived
ini tial i ncident invol ving some normat

minor ity--as a triv ial and
by witnesses--members of a repressed

a member of their group and a socia l
perh aps com mon encounter between
ity. Because thi s inc ident is
co ntrol agent from the domin ant major
itude of host i lity or even
perceived as trivial , there is a low magn
interest.

e employed by the
The inci dent is transfo rmed when the forc

cept able to the "dev iant " memb er
agent of the dominant majority is unac
to engage in countering violence.
of the minority group , inducing him

two increases in intensity until
The pushing and shoving between the
oy measures wh ich the members of
the control agent is forced to empl
The escalating spiral of vio lence
the casual crowd view as excessive.

t and antagonism among the w itness
increases the magnitude of interes
ounter vio lence esc alates between
ing m inority group. As vio lence-c
by
ident is increasingly perceived
the intia1 partic ipants, the inc
ure
generalized belief about the nat
the w itnesses as a symbol of the
ditions.
and causes of the repressive con

lence-counter v io lence, apart
The concept of a spiral of vio
ported
ch it is uti lized above, is sup
from the specif ic context in whi
behavior,
tua liz ation of v iolent soc ial
by Rose's study. In his concep
l. The
d reaction to vio lent con tro
vio lent revolt was a considere
ce spi ral
and a vio lence-counter vio len
k
wor
s
'
e
Ros
n
wee
bet
ion
lat
re
fe lt
c lear ly eviden t ; however, it is
as a col lective phenomenon is
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that the principles involved in violence-counter violence can be
equally applied at an individuali zed leve l.
perception o f

the

At thi s level the

forces o f violent control--shared by the entire

repre s sed minority as part of the generalized belief--is intensified
and foca lized by them when the deviant individual minori ty member
encounters violent con t rol resulting from a specific incident.

If as

Rose stipulated, violen t control induce s violent revol t, then the
motivating force for violen t revolt would be presen t when an incident
of violent control i s experienced.
There is no lack o f

s upport

fo r the po s ition tha t the t rans -

formation or mood shift o f the ca sual crowd is accompanied and
accelera ted by milling, contagion , and se lec tive perception.
s tated

Park

that co llective behavior i s bas ed on some form of unre s t.

However, the unrest or antagonism generated among witnesses of a
specific incident is based e s sentially on indivi dual pe rcep t i ons and
would remain - such in the absence of some f orm
o ther words, individual antagoni sm is

of

t ranslated

communication.

In

in to group an tagonism

through communicati on.
According to Park, communication of unre s t within the crowd i s
accomplished

through

milling and contagion.

Thi s communication has

the effect o f merging individual perceptions into a commonly-held
perception of

the

incident, or what Turner and Killian cal led creating

unifo rm mood and imagery.
common pe rcept i on

of

Individual images which rein force the

the incident are retained; those which produce

disso nance are rejected.

Parallel ing this approach , Tarde included
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the cont agio n of sentiments as part of the developmenta l process in
collective behavior.

That collective behavi or is preceded and

accompl ished by a common definition of the situation is supported by
Le Bon who defined the crowd as a single being composed of the
characteristics which each of its members possesses in common, and
by Simrnel fo r whom the mass mind was made up of only those fragments
of each member which coinc i de with all others.
D istort i on of the precipitating inc ident, and diffusi on of
rumors are seen as logic al consequences of mi lling, contagi on, and
selective perception.

Le Bon mentioned suggestibi lity as being a

characteristic of a crowd as did Simmel, who emphasized its extreme
receptiveness to stimuli.

To Simrnel the mutual excitation of crowds

negates individual resistence to stimuli.

This receptiveness to

stimuli is thus seen as facilitating the spread of rumors.

Rumor

diffusion is the p rocess of communicating perceptions of an incident
by the collectivity to its v arious individual parts.

Since individual

perceptions of the incident are limited and tend to reinforce only
the co l lective perception, distortion is inevit ab le .

In this sense,

individual perceptions and assessments of the obj ective s ituation
are sub j ectively defined by the p arameters established dur ing the
collective percep tion.
The culminat i on of the processes engendered by the precipitating
inciden t is the riot outbreak , or in Blumer ' s words, a spontaneous
expression of impulse and fee ling.

Applying a con cept of Rose ' s,

the outbreak is accompanied by a feeling of total estrangement from
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legitimate political processes.

The violence-counter vio lence spiral

embedded in the precipitating incident is perceived as a symbolic
representation of the dual system of justice which exists in the
society.

This incident emphasizes the inaccessibility of the ideal

cultu re by utilizing acceptable (and accessible) norms.
This emotional c losure creating the collective or m ass mind is
manifested in a reactive, col lective action based on the rioters '
conception of the incident.

In Turner and Killian ' s typology , the

initial behavior of the crowd would be described as active, focused
(on the incident) , and solidaristic (insofar as it is aimed at
· incapacitating the agents of control ) .
According to Brinton the reactive force immediately available
to the agents of control is inadequate to quell the outbrea�.

Edwards

also stated that control agencies are initially tot a l ly ineffective
in suppressing the riot.

The ensuing retreat of the police contributes

to a gene ral perception on the part of the rioters of the breakdown
of official control.

This perception induces the belief that the

rioters are beyond the l aw, or as Le Bon put it, that they are not
controlled by laws or institutions.
The retreat of the agents of control and the res ultant feeling
that a situation exists to which the law cannot be applied changes
the crow d ' s focus from the initia l situati?n--the events surrounding
the precipitating incident--to a wider range of ob j ects and events.
The exp anded focus of the crowd i ncorporates those ob j ec ts which
directly contribute to, or are symbolic of, the felt state of
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th e ri ot are virtual ly unlimited.

The secrmd f a cto r pres cr i bing the

· 11.· ty
_ of reacti o n by the
c e rtainty of ri ot failure is the inev itab1
contr o l

agencies .
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repression and subordination experienced in the rioters' normal l ives.
As the focus o f the riot expands and fragments, so does the physical
area of the r iot .

The increas ingly dif fuse area of the riot exposes

greater numbers o f people to the riot s ituation.

E xplanations and

justifications for behavior--including distorted accounts o f the
precipitating incident and the observation that official control has
broken down--extends the riot mood and encourages the recruitment o f
additional_ personnel .
The expansion o f the riot area and the increase in the number
of rioters trans forms the c rowd (in Turner and Kil lian ' s typology)
from focused to volatile, and from so lidaristic to individua l istic.
For the individual rioter however, acts of violence against specific
objects tend to reflect his perception of those objects as rea l or
symbolic factors o f repression and subordination.

Selecti ve burning

and looting then, is accompanied by the identification of the most
easily accessible and readily identified of the caus ative factors.
Geschwander reported from his study of the Kerner Coromission Report
that looting was a rebe llion against the distribut ion system o f a
society (economic repression) .

Stores were looted as a form o f

compens ation against exp loitative store-owners.
Regardless o f t he size of the area or the number o f individuals
affected by the riot, its suppress ion is inevitab le.
account for this :

Two factors

whereas the potential resources available to the

rioters which could s ustain the riot are limited , the potential
resources avai lab le to the agencies of social control for suppressing
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the riot are virtually unlimited .

The sec0nd factor prescribing the

certainty of riot failure is the inevitability of reaction by the
control agencies.

Control agencies cannot ignore the significant

disruption of the social organization which is inherent in a riot
and will therefore find it necessary to mobilize their r esources for
suppression.
Specifically the process leading to the termination of the
riot parallels the process which generated the riot.

The spiral of

individuaiized violence-counter violence which 0 Y iginally fused a
collective mind and crer.3.ted a riot condition is , during the course
of a riot, repeated on collectivized level .

If as in Rose's terms,

violent revolt is a reaction to violent control, theil escalated
violent control must be seen as a reaction to the initial violent
revolt .

The difference at the collective leve l is that contr ol

agents can no longer retreat since collective violence threatens the
very existence of the dominant social system.

As violence-counter

violence spirals upward, the level eventually exceeds the resource
capacity of the insurgents .

At this point the insurgents perceive

what Smelser termed the inevitability of failure , and the riot is
suppressed.
The last stage of a riot is termed the return to normality.
The primary characteristic of post-riot conditions is the existence
o f unchanged conditions (Brinton , Edwards) .

The failure of the riot

is more than a failure to satisfy immediate goals .

Conditions which

were perceived as mitigating against meaningful participation in the
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dominant society are still present, or in some cases , even exaggerated.
Rose, for instance , explained that the occurrence of a revolt would
inspire greater measures of control to guard ag ainst further revolts.
Additionally, Rose felt that the violence of greater control
would promote the counter-violence of greater revolt.

On this basis

it is hypothesized that the tactics of revolt will not only be
escalated, but changed since the control forces have demonstr ated
their superiority in suppressing riot tactics.

It is there fore ex

pected that post-riot violence will take the form o f individualized
selective violence against police (Janowitz).

The presumption o f the

adoption of this t actic is grounded in the insurgents ' perception
that violent action against organized and mobilized control is in
effective ; whereas , violent action against individual agents of
control is potentially e ffective.
Besides individualizing the victims of violence for pragmat ic
reasons, it is also presumed that victims will be selectively,
rather than r andomly chosen for symbolic e ffect .

Victims will be

selected on the b asis o f behavior which most closely represents the
repressive stereotype .

CHAPTER V I
WATTS:

AUGUST 11-17 , 1965

The first of the "contemporary" race riots occurred i n a
suburb of Los Angeles during the late summer of 1965.

Durin g the

previous year there had been sporadic episodes of violence in both
the Harlem and Bedford-Stuyvesant sections of New York City; however,
they were both short-lived and damage was minimal.

The Watts

di_sorder was the first to be characterized by a relatively lengthy
period of time during which little or no police control was in

evidence.

It was also the first modern urban disorder in which many

persons lost their lives and property damage was measured i n millions
of dollars.

The importance of the Watts disturbance lies i n its role

as a symbol.

A symbolization of a major change in the nature of

black reaction to the white discrimination.
docility to aggressiveness.

It marked a change from

It restyled protests and ·was undoubtedly

a major caus ative factor of the subsequent riots that were to occur
in the latter half o f the decade.
The riot statistics grimly illustrate the magnitude of the six
day disturbance .

There were

34

persons killed and 1, 0 3 2 reported

inj uries, including 90 police officers, 1 36 firemen, 1 0 National
Guardsmen,

23

persons from other governmental agencies, and nearly

8 00 civi lians - -both black and white.

One hundred and eighteen of

the reported injuries resulted from gunshot wounds.

Of the

34

killed,
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1
one was a fireman, one was a deputy sheriff, and one a policeman.
The remainder were looters, innocent bystanders, suspected snipers,
and arsonists .
The looting and burning during the disorder caused damage
which h as been estimated to have exceeded 40 million dollars o f
assessed evaluation.

More than six hundred buildings were damaged

and two hun dred o f these were tota lly destroyed by fire .

The

destruction was centered on foo d markets, liquor stores, furniture
stores, clothing stores, department stores , and pawn shops.

-

2

These

types o f stores were singled-out by residents for punitive measures
because o f the exploitation p ractices they were accused o f employing
in their dealings with the residents .

There were virtually no

residences that were damaged intentionally and damage to schools,
libraries, churches, and public bui ldings was minimal. 3

During the disturbance almost 4, 000 persons were arrested.
Approxi mately 3, 500 adults were arrested and the majority o f these
persons had no p revious record or had only a " minor" criminal record
consisting o f misdemeanors.

Most of the juveniles arrested during

the riot had also never been arrested before and less than 10 percent
o f 514 juveniles that we re arrested had ever been in "serious "
1Governor ' s commission on the Los Ange les Riots, Violence in
the City--An End o r A Beginning, (Colunfuia, Mo. : Lucas Bro thers,
(This document is commonly called the McCone
1965 ) , pp. 23-24 .
Commission Report. )
2

Ibi d .
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troub l e b efore .

e
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rif fraff th e ory" of riot

p artic ipa tion .
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dppress i on--the pol i ce.
at

Every ye ar sin ce 1960 had been marked by

least one m ajor "fl are-up ; " however, these i nc i dents involved only

small numbers

and

were usually ext ingui shed as quickly

The incidents grew more

i ntense

as

and h ave been su.rnmarized

they st arted.
in

a report

of the Los Angeles County Human Rel ations Commiss i o n in 1964:
About two ye ars ago , th is Commission stated that a situation
was deve lopi ng in the commun ity in whi ch po li ce-m inori ty group
co nf licts were be coming almost a "self-fulfilling prophe cy."
We feel th at the same situat i on aga in exists. A s i gn i f i c ant
a nd ever-growi n g number o f minor i ty-group persons are be i ng led
to feel th at in any contact they have with the poli ce off i cers,
they are going to be treated roughly. On the other hand, a
growin g number of l aw enfor cement off i cers feel that in any
cont a ct they have w i th members o f minority groups they are likely
to meet w i th resistance. These "expec t a ti ons" on the par t o f
both groups are likely to produce what each expects. . .. We bel ieve
that the c l i m ate has deteriorated in the past several weeks
between law-en for cement agenc ies and m inority-group c ornmun i ties. 5
W i th the above described
that their grievan ces

a re

cond i tions,

in

whi ch both sides

legit i mate ones, prevailing for

of ye ars the oc currence of a major disorder was almost

a

feel

number

i nevitab le.

In fact the most pert i nent quest i on m ay not be--"Why d i d it happen? ",
but rather--"-Why d i dn't it happen sooner?"
Dis crepancy Between Re a l and Ideal Cultures
The statisti cs indi cate that

the

residents of Watts

most depr ived in all o f Los Angeles Coun ty.
suburban

community

whose populat i on

are

the

Watts is a sprawling

composition

has been radi cally

5Joh n Howard and Wil liam McCord, "Watts: The Revolt and After, "
in Life stv les in the B la c k Ghe tto, Wi l liam McCord, John Howard,
Bernard Friedberg, and Edwin Harwood (eds. ) , ( New York: W. W . Norton
a nd Company, In c . , 19 69 ) , p. 5 7 .
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The conditions which pervade the slum area of Watts have
long been known to governmental officials in the city.

However,

only recently has there been any concerted effort to ameliorate the
conditions.

The estab lishment of agencies designed to change these

conditions did not appreciably alter the life style o f the typical
ghetto dwe ller.

The new agencies were beset with power str uggles

between city hal l and local residents concerning control o f the new
programs.

Initial reaction to the efforts of the agencies was highly

favorable, but it became readily apparent that they were fai ling in
their efforts to change the conditions.

The complaints against the

agencies have been described :
1. One hal f o f the agencies had provisions for emergency
service in an area that has high requirements for such services.
2. The requirements o f highly specialized agencies governing
the conditions under which service could be obtained made it
extremely di fficult for those most in need to be e ligible.
3. Most of the new poverty program agencies had no w aiting
lists for services, but the agencies offering highly ski lled
professional services in health, mental health, and f amily
services did have them.
4. Only a very small minority of agencies had representatives
o f the client population on their po licy-making boards. In
general, the maj ority of agencies did not seem to b lock access
to their services with excessive intake demands and long waiting
lists. However, there was limited c ase finding or reaching out
for people who cou ld not connect without some additional help.
I f the individual or f amily did not have the strength to get
there and stay there , he went unserved. The highest leve l o f
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expertise was not frequently available to the low income
resident o f south central Los Angeles eve n when the agency
was located in this area. It was felt that this may lead to
an increased sense o f relative deprivation which is so often
the seed of v iolence . 10

seems to
The net result o f the agencies and their e fforts

ability and sincer ity
have been further disillusionment with the
ring the ghetto
o f the white community's actions toward bette
cond itions.

E f forts did not succeed.

Nearly twice as many people

s located in other sections
crowd into homes in Watts than into home
conducted by UCLA mino rity 
o f the c ity. And according to a survey
r
e sirable quarters than othe
group fami li es not only live in less d
11
pay more.
families w ith the same income, but they

were also inef fect ive
Employment programs in the Watts area
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income o f Watts decreased by 8 per
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12
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1 2 rbi d .
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city and also on a nation-wide comparison level.

The schools in the

area are characterized by less-experienced teachers, double sessions,
fewer libraries, poorer facilities, and lack of funds.

The school

dropout rate is higher than in surrounding non-ghetto schools and
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even those who finish receive a poorer quality of education.

The proposed revision of the we lfare system also fel l con
siderab ly short of expectations.

Generally, the changes which were

made tended to reinforce an individual for remaining on welfare
rather than encouraging them to get off.

Frequently voiced complaints

inc luded inadequate payments, loss of privacy, loss of self-respect,
and loss of incentive to go to work because of inconsistent requirements
and po 1 icies.
. .
lLI.The grievances of the residents of the Watts area were many and
varied but they can be summarized as fol lows:
1. When asked to state their biggest gripe, 3 3 percent said
poor neighborhood conditions, 14 percent mistreatment by whites,
and 1 3 percent economic conditions. On ly 21 percent had no
specific complaints.
2. When asked specifically about exp loitive practices by
merchants, approximately one-third c laim to have encountered
"frequently " the experience of being overcharged and sold inferior
goods.
3. When asked about job discrimination, 54 percent of the
males and 3 3 percent of the fe�ales mentioned that it happened to
them persona lly .
1 3 rbid.

14 rb� d. , Pn • 55- 57 •
.1:
..L.
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4. M3.les we re als o more likely to report discrimination in
housing practices by landlords and in schools. Thirty- four
percent of the males stated that they had experienced discrimination in housing.
5. Police brutality is frequently mentioned as a major factor
in the Los Angeles riot. An analysis of the data indicates that
wel l abave a ma j ority of both sexes believe that most forms o f
police malpractice--including the more violent, such as us e o f
unnecessary force in arrests, beating up people in custody, and
s earching home unnecessarily--occur in this cormnuni ty _ 1 5
People who migrated t o Watts did so i n a search for a be tter
life.

However, upon arrival they found that new patterns of prejudice

and discriminatioP had been substituted in place o f the established
norms o f the South.

Economic opportunities were very limited.

Exploitation by store owners was very pervasive. 16

Unemployment,

inferior educational facilities, broken homes, high rates o f crime .
and delinquency all characterized the living conditions of Watts.
In general, the white conununity was apathetic except to make certain
�
· d. 17
ti1at
the area was heavi· 1y po 1 ice

Identification o f Underlying, Causative Factors

The exi.stence o f discriminatory practices and the resulting

conditions cannot, however, explain the occurrence of the r iot.
1 5cohen, op. cit. , pp. 3 36-3 37.

16Jerry Cohen and William s. Murphy, Burn, Baby, Burn : The
Los Angeles Race Riot August, 1965, (New York: E. P. Dulton and
Company, Inc. , 1966), p. 205.

1 7Melvin L. DeFleur, William v. D'Antonio, and Lois B. DeFleur,
Sociology: Man In Society, (Glenview, Illinois : Scott, Foresman and
Company, 197 1 ) , •P. 3 6 5.
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The residents must come to reach a consensus regarding the c ausation
of the conditions.

During the last two decades, the citizens of

watts have come to see their problems as a result of inadequacies in
the white institutional structure rather than the fault of their own
lack o f education or various skills.

With increasing consensus the

residents came to view themselves as unjust victims o f white oppression.
Specifically, they came to view the police as a symbolic representation
of this oppression.
Because o f the programs of moderate civil rights group (i. e. ,
NAACP, The Urban League, and the SCLC ) and more recently militant
protest groups (especially the Black Muslims ) the residents of Watts
became more and more aware of the reasons for their problems.

The

Muslims were especially active during the period of time be fore the
occurrence of the riot and also during the riot.

They were responsible

for circulating inflammatory literature and undoubtedly were an active
force in the creation o f a tension-laden situation.

They cannot be

held responsible for causing the riot, but their philosophy of life-
based upon reverse racism--played an important role in the identifica.
.
tion
o f causative
f actors. 18

The extent o f the acceptance of these efforts at identi fication
are clearly revealed in a post-riot survey conducted in the Watts
area :
18cohen and Murphy,
� - cit. , pp. 247 and 3 0 0 .
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. . . The events of the riot were deplored, and the wish was
expressed that the authorities had stopped it earlier. Yet the
authorities tended to be criticized and the rioters defended.
The causes of the riot were described in terms of genuine
grievances with those who were attacked ; e. g. , a history of
friction, discrimination, and economic exploitation with local
merchants and police. The purpose of the riot was seen as being,
on the one hand, to call attention of whites to Negro problems,
and on the other, to express resentment against malefactors.
The riot was expected to bring help to the Negro population from
whites, though major improvement in interracial personal
relationships was not expected. This "riot ideo logy" seemed to
justify and defend the riot • . • . 1 9
While most residents of the area did not participate in the
riot, they expressed sympathy and understanding toward those who did.
Most of the residents thought that the riot targets deserved the
treatment that they received during the course of the disturbance.
Most persons viewed the riot as a protest against discrimination,
not as an irrational exercise in violence. 20

The most frequently

mentioned cause was police brutality ; however, probably more important
is the belief that po lice are representative of the dominating white
establishment.

They are symbols of the white community ' s efforts to

simp ly keep the " lid on tight" rather than e liminate the causes of
the conditions.

There was widespread hostility between police and

Watts residents and ". • • if a breakdown of social order was to occur,

it w as likely to be precipitated by an incident invo lving the police. "21
1 9 navid o. Sears and T. M. Tom linson, "Riot Ideology in Los
Angeles: A Study of Negro Attitudes, " in Bracey, (et . a l. ), op. cit. ,
pp. 20 6-20 7.
2 0 rbid. , pp. 195-1 96 .
21

oeF leur, (et. al. ) , op. cit. , pp. 36 5-3 6 6 .
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The Precipitating Incident
E ar ly in the evening of Au��st 1 1, 1965, two C alifornia State
Highway P atrolmen stopped a car containing two m e n for what appe ar e d
to be r eckless driving and speeding.

The siren of th e mctorcyc le

attracted a smal l crowd from nearby houses and apartment units.

The

arrest proceeded without incident and the mood of th e gather e d
assemb l ag e was good-natured and amused. 22

The sa1ne mood characterized

th e officer and thG susp ect as they exchanged quips during the routin e
arrest procedures.

Th e c rowd continued to grow � however, its mood was

stil l one of curiosity rather than vindictiveness.

Th e d efendent ' s

moth er, who

l ived

neighbors.

The mother proceeded to v erbally attack her son for his

a f e w blocks away , was call e d to the scene by

intoxicated condition and this r ebuke changed his n1ood from joviality
to b e l ligerenc e .

A t this point he started to strugg l e with the

arresting officers, who were att empting to subdue him and place him
in a po lice car � which contained two mor e patrolmen and had be e n
cal led to take th e suspect to jail.

The suspect ' s resistanc e to

arrest increased until one of the officers was forc e d to us e his riot
baton on the defendent.

This was the start of a vicious spir al :

2 2cohen and Murphy, op. cit. , p. 27 .

13 3
Undoubtedly the situation at the scene of the a rrest w as
tense. Belligerence and resistence to arrest called for forceful
action by the officers. This brought on hostility from Mrs.
Frye (the suspect.'s mother ) and some of the bystanders , which in
turn caused increased actions by the po lice. Anger at the scene
escalated and, as in a ll such situations, bitter recriminatio ns
from both sides followea. 23
The crowd became increasingly hostile as the po lice attempted
to arrest both the suspect and his mother; however, they succeeded
without incident and were in the process of leaving the area when a
second "spa rk" occurred.
member of the crowd.

One of the officers was spat upon by a

The guilty party appeared to be a young women

who was standing amid the front ranks.
caught her.

The officer chased and

She was a beauty operator and was wearing a light colored

smock, which gave her the appearance of being pregnant.

Rumors

circu lated throughout the crowd that the police were beating a preg
nant women.

Large numbers of the crowd interpreted her p li ght while

being led away as one more humiliation of the Negro by white police
and, ". . . as it turned out, a final insult that they were not prepared
to accept without retaliating. 1 1 24

As the last police car left the area, it was stoned by the now
irrate mob.

Distorted versions of the arrest spread throughout the

immediate area:
Many of those on the sidelines embroidered on what they had
seen--or thought they had seen. . • The particul ar nature of the
Frye and Gaines (the beauty operator) encounters with white
23The McCone commission, op. c it. , p. 320.
24cohen and Murphy, op. cit. , p. 56.
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policemen was an open invitation to the circulation of near
truth, half -truth , partial-truth and, finally, uncontrolled rumor
that p rovoked the outrage soon to follow. 2 5
The gathered crowd did not disperse after the police had left
the immediate area, but increased in size, initially, and then b roke
up into smaller groups that roamed the streets throughout the night.
Window smashing and looting were the primary activities o f the gangs ;
however, the most publicized o f their actions was the stoning o f cars
driven by whites and the frequent beatings that they admin i stered
to the occupants o f the stopped cars.

Other than rescuing the assaulted

motorists, the pol ice maintained a low-profile as the damage inflicted
by the crowd remained relatively slight.

By 1: 00 a. m. , the outbreak

seemed to have subsided despite " the sporadic reports of unruly mobs,

vandalism, and rock throwing. 11 26
The Rioting Stage

The next day saw a complete restoration o f norma l every-day
activity.

Busines $ went on as usual in the Watts area and high-leve l

governmental o ffic ials described the previous night's activities as
the work of juvenile gangs.

There was little concern about the riot

continuing, but to quell rumors and reassure communi ty residents
there was a community participation meeting scheduled for that
afternoon.
2 5 rbid.

26The McCone commission, op. c i t. , p. 12.
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The meeting, which had been a n attempt t o air grievances to
both b la ck and white leaders present, back-fired.

It became ev ident

that the people in Watts had no leaders representing them .

Commonly

defined b lack leaders in the Los Angeles area, at least from the
white conununity's perspect ive, were not acknowledged by the residents
o f Watts.

The most enthusiastic response by the persons in attendance

at the Athen's Park meet ing was for the young militant who spoke and
elaborated on the needs of the community and the failures of the
efforts to solve the problems.

The meeting broke up with nothing

reso lved.
Rumors spread throughout the community all day, and, in
addition, inflammatory handbills suddenly appeared.

The activ it ies

intensified the rioting mood and caused it to spread from one district

to another w ithin the curfew area. 27

During the early evening another meeting was held between
black leaders and higher echelon police offic ials.

Instead of re

ducing tensions the meeting produced ill-feel ings on both sides. 28
The previous night ' s pattern was repeated.

young men atta cked cars dr iven by white persons.
usua lly beaten and their cars set afire.

Ro aming gangs of
The occupants were

However, the actions of

Thursday night were broadened in scope to include more looting,
27

Cohen and Murphy , op.

28 rbid . , p. 9 1 .

·

C J..t

. , p • 9 0.
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bu rning, and a few substantiated episodes of snipers, usually directed
agains t firemen and the police.

Rather than completely s topping

riot, the police s trategy was a imed at containing
a cordoned area.

the

the

violence w ithin

The police had not yet fired a shot at any of the

participants despite having been fired on by a sniper during
efforts to rescue motorists.

their

The first episode of police shooting

occurred when a car ran through a roadblock and was s topped by gunfire.
The number o f police at the scene was increased throughout
and

there

the

evening

was even some discussion concerning the involvemen t o f

t he

National Guard, but no thing was finalized.
The number o f participants was now in
the firs t t ime they ranged ou tside
est ablished by

t he

the

the

thousands and for

perimeter area

tha t

had been

police forces:

Five hundred police officers, deputy sheriffs, and highway
pa trolment used various techniques, including fender- to-fender
sweeps by police cars, in seeking to disperse the mob. By
4: 00 a. rn . Friday, the police department fel t tha t the si tuation
was a t least for the moment under control. 29
Their optimism, however, proved to be premature.
loo t ing and burning

tha t

morning subsided during
daylight.

The massive

characterized Thursday night and Friday
the

dawn hours but was quickly r esumed during

As early as 8: 00 a. m. a large crowd had assembled near

the

si te of the original arres t and was con tinuing the previous night's
29The McCone Commission , op . ci t. , pp. 14-15.
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activities that had temporarily been halted.

Rumors centering on

supposed incidents of police brutality (later shown by the McCone
commission to be entirely unfounded) inflamed the already tense
sit uation.

Recruitment of additional participants increased during

the morning hours as pamphleteering by Black Mus lims intensified an
already deteriorating situation.
The mob attacks concentrated on white-owned businesses, but
Negro business did not enjoy the special immunity that was to
characterize some of the later riots in the decade.

The rioting was

quickly spreading to other neighborhoods and crowds now numbering
many thousands continued the assault on business establishments:
Block of businesses owned by "whitey" were afire- -drug stores,
markets, liquor stores, laundries and pawnshops. Before the mobs
burned the latter , these shops provided the rioters with their
arsenal. More than 3,000 weapons were stolen from pawnshops and
sporting goods stores during the rioting, less than a third of
which were later recovered. Sniper fire soon became widespread,
but stil l no deaths were reportea. 3 0
During the Friday d aylight hours many arrests were made, but
the rioting continued unabated.

The mayor of Los Angeles, Sam Yorty,

and the governor of California, Pat Brown, were both appraised of
the situation but no decisive action regarding a possible Nationa l
Guard cal l-up was made.

At approximately noon the first requests

were made for National Guard uni ts ; however , the final decision by
3 0cohen and Murphy, op. cit. , p. 123.
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the Lt. Gover nor was delayed pending a perso nal inspectio n of the
a rea.

Follmv i ng his visit to the Los An geles area he issued orders

that committed over 1, 000 National Guardsmen to defe nd the riot's
perimeter areas.

The order was s i gned

in

the afternoon, but the

assembled u nits were not actually deployed until approximately 10: 0 0 p. m. .
Part of the blame for this unnecessary delay can be attr ibuted to a
lack o f commu nication between the control agencies, but i t ·was mostly
due to the loca l police forces ' feeling that they could handle the
disturbance themselves.

As Friday evening wore on it became increas-

i ngly evident that they could not :
Friday was the worst night. The riot moved out of the Watts
area, a nd burning and loot i ng spread over wide areas of southeast
Los Angeles several miles apart • . . Despite the new tactics (sweeps
on foot ) and added personnel, the area was not u nder co ntrol a t
any time on Friday night, as major calls o f looting, burning and
shooting were reported every two to three minutes. 3 1
The Reaction by Control Agencies
The bulk of the total number of National Guardsmen that were
going to be used had bee n deployed to various areas by early Saturday
morn i ng.

The i r effect was felt almost

i mmed i ately.

In fact, most of

the rioting and i ts level of intensity has been blamed on police
laxness during the ear ly stages of the riot.

Later investigations

felt that the r iot could have been contained and termin ated earlier
if

police would have exerted their authority in the beg i nning.

3 1 The McCone commiss ion, op. cit. , pp. 18-1 9 .
the writer's . )

The

( Italics are

1 39
lev e l of vio lence immediately escalated as the tro9ps met with
resistance on the part of the rioters many of whom were now anned.
By dawn on Saturday, ten persons had been killed and eight dying as
a result of gunshot wounds.
The daylight hours of Saturday were characterized by a main
tenance of the high level of violence.

Ten additional persons were

ki l led during this period as control forces continued to sweep
through the beseiged neighborhoods.

Slowly the combined forces were

able to contain the spread of rioting activity and the area not
under control .

Rumors of impending attacks on the white neighborhoods

adjoining Watts proved untrue but they caused a panic of weapon
purchasing among whites and also convinced local authorities to make
over tures to the Federa l government concerning the possible dep loyment
of regular Army units if the attacks did happen.
Snipers p layed an important part in the Watts riot and were
general ly responsible for the maintenance of the leve l of violence
even after most of the rioting activity had subsized.

Their poor

marksn1anship was the only thing that kept the number o f deaths among

the control agencies at .a re lative ly low number. 32

The role of

s niping wou ld be untruthful ly exagge rated during later riots, but
that it was an important feature in this riot there can be little
doubt.
32cohen and Murphy, op. cit . , P · 188 .
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The imposition of a curfew, which called for no unauthorized
personnel on the streets after 8 : 0 0 p. m. , was another important factor
in the attempt to regain control.

This allowed the control agencies

to make blanket arrests of many actual and potential rioters and also
served as a deterrent to curiosity seekers, who had hampered police

efforts to re-establish controi. 33

Saturday night and early Sunday morning was relatively calm
. compared to the halocaust which had occurred Friday night.

The only

major incident was the burning of two new blocks of stores in a pre
viously untouched neighborhood .

Snipers prevented firemen from

battling the flames which spread until they had consumed the entire
two block area.

The peak of the sniping activity was reached during

the early hours of S unday, but it continued with decreasing frequency
during the next week. 3 4

The major fires were under control by Sunday ; however, there
were some new ones and some rekindling of old ones.

Slowly b ut

surely the riot activity dwindled :
Burning, loot i ng, and sniping. Each continued to exercise
its own special terror throughout Sunday night, and would con
tinue to do so Monday, Monday night, Tuesday, and Tuesday night.
But on each succeeding day, an ebbtide was noticeable . •. . 35
33Ibid. , p. 194.

3 4 rbid. , pp. 195-196.

35 rbid. , p. 231.
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The contr ol agencies continl!ed their sweep,tng operations with
increasing Sl!ccess.

The level of rioting had been all but s topped

by Tuesday evening when the curfew was li fted.

Sporadic incidents

occurred during the evenin g-, but the riot was officia l ly listed as
ended by Tuesday evening and the Natio4al Guard started to withdraw
on Wednes day.

After a week of unprecedented violence, control was

final ly restored.
The Return to Normality
The Watts disorder occurred in a period of American history
during which the country was engaged in a "war on poverty. "

The

Viet Nam War had not yet reached the level of intensity that it
would during the latter portion of the 1960 ' s.

Watts was a lso the

only maj or disturbance at this time and, consequently, received almost

all of the attention during this time.

Yet despite a ll of these

favorab le factors (i. e. , avai lability of funding and virtual ly no
competition among cities for Federal funds), little was accomplished
in Watts to alleviate the basic problems.

In fact, most of the post

riot activity centered on attempt s to affix responsibil ity for the
dis or der.

Charges and counter-charges were made by both b lack and

white communities.

Various levels of government blamed one another

for the bureaucratic blunders that had occurred during the course
of the riot.

Conc rete efforts to ameliorate the conditions have

been minimal:
Ob jective measures of the socioeconomic situation in Watts
confirmed that little .has changed since 1965: unempl oyement
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apparently has not been reduced. While conflicting reports
exist, the weight of evidence indicates that joblessness has
stayed at about the same level as before the 1965 r iot. The
Chamber of Commerce attempted a crash program to produce more
jobs �ut, according to the County Human Relations Commission,
. came up with perhaps 200 to 3 00 jobs and job-training opportun
ities when at least 5,000 were needed to make a serious impact
upon the Watts problem. 3 6
The welfare roles remain high in the Watts area and this is
probably the best indication that things haven ' t changed.
there are indicators that conditions cou ld get worse.

In fact,

A n addit iona l

2, 000 Negroes continue to arrive in Los Angeles each month and they
do not have the ski l ls that are required by the loca l industr ia l

complex. 3 7

Hous ing patterns of Los Angeles show no great evidence

of increased integration.

The tax rate ($ 10 per $ 100 ) has reached

a level regarded as one of "negative return " by economists and serves
as a barrier to economic growth:
The face of Watts has changed litt le s ince 1965. The rubble
has been c leared and l ittered parking lots have rep laced the
burned out stores. Few businessmen have re-establ ished their
enterpr ises F often because they are unable to secure insurance
for their premises. The businesses which have been rebui lt
resemble fortresses : mass ive, windowless, concrete structures. 3 8
The mood o f peop le in Watts have also changed l ittle.

The

massive publ ic ity given to the riot and programs des igned to change
36Howard and McCord, op. cit. , pp. 65-66.

37 rbid.

38 rbid.
(For a more personalized account of the post -rio t
conditions in watts , see Watts The Af-terrnath: By The People of Watts,
ed. by Paul Bul lock , (New York: The Grove Press, 1969 ) . )
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conditions were not perceived as being able to accomplish much.
There were no frustrated "rising expect ations" in the post-riot
period.

But r ather a pervasive fatalism and skepticism:

Since the August rioting, there has been little building
here, little buyi ng . Lots where buildings were burned o f f
them are still waiting vacant and littered with garbage,
occupied only by a parked car or two, or kids fooling around
after school, or winos sharing a pint in the early mor ning. 3 9
The hypothesized change from collectivized violence against
. the police to individualized, selective violence with certain police
men as targets c annot be supported by any reliable evidence.

Despite

the vicious hate campaign waged by certain militant groups they have
not gathered much support among the majority of community residents.
In the aftermath of the riot and under pressure from v arious groups
because of the many documented incidents of police brutality, the
police attempted to change their image.

However, this has also not

resulted in much o f a perceptive change in their definition o f their
role privileges and responsibilities.

"So far, the young people

report little observable change in the day-to-day actions of the

policeman on the local beat. 1 1 40

There still exists, perhaps to a

lesser degree, the dual system of justice that was prominent among
the original causes.

The local people strongly believe that Beverly

39 Thomas Pynchon, "A Journey Into the Mind of Watts , " in
William L . O ' Neil, American Society Since 1945, (Chicago : Quadrangle
Books, 1969 } , p . 2 2 1.
40Bullock , op. cit. , p. 1 3 3.
(For a personalized version of
the Watts riot see Rivm of Blood , Years of Darkness, by Robert
Conot, (New York : Bantam Books , Inc. , 1967 ) .
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Hills ' law enforcement is a complet ely different '_'ball game" from the
experience of the Watts' residents .

In the six year period following

the riot there have been fatalities among policemen ; however, these .
were not attributed to the work of any extremist group within the
black community.

CHAPTER VII
NEWARK:

JULY 12-17, 196 7

The follo,...,ing narrative describes the urban insurrection that
occurred in Newark, New Jersey during July of 1967.

The disorder

continued for a five-day period in which twenty-three persons were
killed and property d amage and losses were in excess of $ 10, 000, 000.
- Newark is a relatively large city (population of over 400, 0 00) and
has in common with othe r urban areas the many problems which
characteri ze the modern American urban complex.

Demographic trends

alone can explain many of the problems which are present .

In the

past twenty years the white middle class has been deserting the city
in favor of the outlying suburbs.

This trend has occurred at an

increasing rate during the period 1960-67, during which the city
lost 70, 000 white residents and switched from 64 percent white to

52 percent Negro and 10 percent Puerto Rican and Cuban. 1

This

situation results in a great loss of tax revenue s and an increasing
need for more social welfare services which cannot be supported with
the present tax base .

It is only within this context that the

following events can be completely understood.
Discrepancy Between Real and Ideal Cultures
According to a recent .Model Cities Application Report, Newark
has the nation's highest percentage of bad housing, the most crime
1 The Kerner Commission, op. cit . , · 5 7.
P
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per 100, 000 people , the heaviest per capita tax burden, the highest
rates o f venereal disease, maternal mortality and new cases o f
tuberculosis.

Newark is listed as second in infant mortality,

second in birth rates, and seventh in the absolute number o f drug
addicts.

Its unemployment rate, more than 15 percent in the Negro

community, h as been pers istently high enough to qualify the city as
one o f the five cities singled out to receive special assistance

under the Economic Deve lopment Act. 2

Underemployment, as perceived

by residents, w as perhaps a more serious problem.

Seventy percent

of interviewed participants in the riot felt that they occupied a
"dead-end" occupation which did not have the necess ary income nor
responsibility they felt they should have. 3

The typical p articipant

felt that it was not possible to obtain a desired job in the city
and the prej udice and discrimination and not l ack o f experience was

the maj or f actor responsible for this situation. 4

These conditions, however, have existed for many years and are
not sufficient to explain the caus ation of the disorder.

The

phenomenon o f rising expectations coupled with unresponsive institu
tional procedures must be included in the analysis.
Newark in 196 7 w as Hugh Addonizio.

The mayor o f

He had come to power in 1960 by

2 Tom H ayden, Rebe llion In New ark: Officia l Vio lence and Ghetto
Response, (New York: Random House, 1967 ) , pp. 5-6.
3The Kerner commission, op. cit . , p. 175.
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forging an Italian-Negro coalition to overthrow the long-time Irish
domination of city hall .

Initially his efforts to provide better

services for his black constituents had met with success.

Negroes

were brought into governmental positions and the police force was
integrated.

However, progress was slow.

As the Negro population

became more numerous within the city , their proportionate representa
tion became less and less.

While more money was being obtained from

the federal government for various welfare funding projects, the
civil rights and anti-poverty activists saw the proper solution in
terms o f power, rather than money , for the black majority .

In the

spring of 19 67 blacks occupied only token positions in the city administrative and political life and these positions were more dependent

on the Mayor ' s will than the power support of ghetto voters. 5

Despite their decreasing numbers in the city proper , the white
population retained political control of the city.

On both the City

Council and the powerful Board of Education seven of the nine members
were white.

Black constituents and their white representatives found

6
.
.
themselves on opposite sides of almost every crucia 1 issue.

Relationships between the community and the police were especially
strained.

Charges o f excessive force and brutality were leveled

5 Hayden, op. cit. , pp. 6-7.

6 The Kerner Commission, op. cit . , p. 57.
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against the almost exclusively white police force.

The establishment

of a police review board tempo rarily appeased the demands of the
black community ; however, the review process was cumbersome and
lengthy and was described as a failure by personnel on both sides.
In addition, there was not much redress for other complaints.

city s imply had no money for adequate supervision. 7
of the city continued to exceed its tax revenues.

The

The expenditures
P roperty taxes

continued to increase as mo re and more land which had been cleared
for urban renewal lay fallow year after year.

Most persons refused

to purchase or renovate property within the city limits.

Tenement

houses deteriorated as rent that was charged to tenents continued to
rise.

Commuters who continued to use many of the services to Newark ,

contributed nothing to its needs.
decreasing services.

With decreasing tax revenues came

The area which suf fered most acutely was the

city ' s educational system.

Newark ' s per capita outlay on s chools was

considerably less than that of the surrounding communities in the
suburbs.

A large per centage of the students were on double sessions

and the dropout rate was estimated to be as high as 33 percent. 8

The vicious cycle of race prej udice and discrimination was present
w ith all of its features.
7

Lack of education and adequate training

rbid . , p. 5 8.
(Also see Vio lence As Protest : A Study o f
Riots and Ghettos, Robert M. Fogelson, (New York : Doubleday and
Company, Inc. , 197 1 ) , pp. 5 7 and 7 0.
8 rbid. , p. 59.
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prevented youths and young ndults from attaining suitatle employment.
Low wage earning power forced them into poor housing and is one of
the causative factors of family disorganization and the high rates
of various forms of deviant behavior .
Identification of Unde rlying, Causative Factors
Under the above described conditions a major segment of the
Negro population became increasingly militant:
Largely excluded from positions of traditional political power ,
Negroes tutored by a handful of militant soc i �] activists who had
moyed into the city in the early 1960 ' s made use of the anti
poverty program , in which poor people were guaranteed representa
tion , as a political springboard. This led to friction between
the United Community Corporation, the agency that administered
the anti-poverty program, and the city administra tion. 9
In the weeks immediately preceding the riot , tensions between
the municipal government and the Negro leadership were increased.
Two issues were at the center of the controversey.

A vacancy on the

Board of Education was filled , at least temporarily, by an appointee
of the mayor rather than a more fully-qualified Negro nominee.

Mayor

Addonizio later withd rew the appointment when the incumbent decided
to stay in office for another term.

However, it was regarded in the

black community as a glaring example of discriminatory political
patronage in favor of whites.

Another confrontation occurred over

the proposed condemnation of 150 acres of land within the black

1 50
community .

This land was to be used for the cons truction of a new

medical school.

However, the blacks interpreted this as another

example of "Negro rernoval n rather than " urban renewal. "

The original

request had only been for 50 acres and had later been expanded .
Black leadership and their followers defined this expanded request
as an attempt to dilute the growing political power by moving out
Negro res i' dents.

10

There were charges of mis-appropriation of funds by black
leaders against the virtually all-white municipal government.

They

blamed the government and their social agencies for both fostering
and neglecting social problem s.

They were also accused of using

federal funds to bolster their patronage rolls rather than attempting
to attack the major problems that were present in the city. 1 1

Despi te warnings to the contrary the mayor went ahead with
his two decisions in the above described areas of dispute.

Black

militants used the two is sues as examples of the powerlessness of the
black community.

Warnings and threats of res ulting violence were

issued but were ignored by governmental officials.

Even in the eyes

of middle clas s Negroes, their situation and that of their lower
clas s counterparts had not only not improved it had worsened.

ll Hayden, op. cit. , p. 7.

This

15 1
angry outlook of the previously moderate element within the black

community was spreading into the consciousness of the total black
12
.
population.
During the early part of July there were 2 4, 000 unempl oyed

blacks in Newark.

Moreover, their number was increas ed by as many

as 2 0, 0 0 0 teenagers when school was let out .

The summer recreation

programs had no funds for operation; consequent ly, they had nothing

to do and no place to go. 13
The Precipitating Incident

In this tension-laden situation there occurred an event which
is usually given credit as being the spark which ignited the disorder.
During the evening of July 12, 196 7, a cab driver named John Smith was
arrested for "tail-gating" a police car.

During the routine arrest

procedure a fight broke out between Smith and the arresting officer.
Police charged that Smith had used abusive language and had struck
one of the officers.

Smith, however, said that he had been unneces-

sarily assaulted by the police and proceeded to file a countercharge of brutality against them.

Smith was then placed in the police

car and taken to the 4th Precinct station.

Witnesses across the

stree t in the Hayes Housing Project reported that they saw the cab
driver being dragged from the police car and into the front door of
the station house.
1 2 rbid . , p . 8 .

l3�h£ Kerner Commission, op. cit. , p. 60.
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after:

The following is a description of what happened immediately

Within a few minutes at least two civil rights leaders re
ceived calls f rom a hysterical woman declaring a cab driver was
being beaten by the police. When one of the persons at the
station notified the cab company of Smith's arrest, cab drivers
all over the city began learning of it over their cab radios .
A c rowd formed on the grounds of the housing project across
the n arrow street from the station. As more and more people
arrived, the description of the beating purportedly administered
to Smith became more and more exaggerated. The descriptions
were supported by other complaints of police malpractice that,
ove r the years, had been submitted for investigation--but never
been heard of again. 14
As the crowd continued to grow in size local civil rights
leaders were called in to quell the mounting tensions.

In an effort

to satis fy the crowd, the civil rights leaders were reluc"::.antly
allowed an opportunity to see and interview Smith.
ca l led and Smith was taken to a hospital.

A..."1. ambulance ·was

The size o f the crowd

outside the station now numbered more than one hundred and antipoverty program officials (a more militant contingent o f local leader
ship) were asked to assist in efforts to calm the angry mood of the
crowd.

These persons attempted to channel the mood o f the crowd

into a peaceful protest march but their ef forts were largely
unsuccessful.

As the second of their speeches, which u rged the crowd

to disperse and go home, had come to an end, several Molotov cocktails
smashed against the walls of the pol ice station.
14Hayden, OJ2.· cit_. , p. • 14.

The firebombs were
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thrown across the street from the darkness of the housing project.
The assembled crowd moved back in anticipation of the police reaction.
The police came out of the precinct house wearing riot control garb
and were greeted by a barrage of rocks, bricks, and bottles .

People

started to retreat even further as the street became a battle zone. 15

As the police charged they caused the crowd, which now exceeded 500
persons, to retreat a cross the street to the relative safety of the
housing project.

However, the participants did not return home,

instead they broke up into smaller groups and continued to ro am the
streets.
The P�oting _ Stage
In less than one hour the first looting began.

The first

stores chosen included liquor and furniture stores whi ch were located
close to the housing projects.

Initial ly, the looting p ar ticipan ts

were exclusively young males, but they were soon joined by a cross
section of the population of the housi?g pro ject when it became
evident that the police were no longer in contro l of the situation :
The po lice now began patrolling on foot in smal l teams. It
was clear that they were both outnumbered and uncertain of them
selves in the streets. Police violence began. . • But in the first
hours the police could not control the streets in spite of
nearly a hundred arrests and numerous attacks on people. . . More
po lice tried in vain to regain contro l of 17th Avenue and Belmont
(the site of the initial looting) but were trapped in a pattern
of frustrating advance-and-retreat. 16
15 rbid.

16 rbid . , pp. 1 8- 19.
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This pattern continued throughout most of the night into the
early hours o f July 1 3th.

The number of rioters gradually decreased

and the police were finally able to regain contro l at approximately
4: 00 a. m. .

The riot did not spread beyond the immediate geographical

area and it was described the next afternoon as an isolated incident
by the mayor.
City o fficials met with civil rights leaders during the day
and various concessions were made to the spokesmen o f the black
community .

However, it became obvious that the participants in the

previous night ' s melee had no spokesman and that the riot ' s continuance
was not going to be averted by meetings .

Regardless of what the Mayor

did, regardless of what the civil rights leaders did, regardless of
what the p lanners of the demonstration did, the riot was going to
happen .

The authorities had been indifferent to the community ' s d�mand

fer j ustice ; now the community was going to be indif ferent to the

authorities ' demand for order. 17

Rumors of po lice brutality (concerning previous nights '
actions) spread throughout the b lack community .

One story that was

being circulated described how the cab driver, Smith, had died in the
hospita l.

While most of these rumors had no bases in fact the people

interpreted them as rea l and the tension continued to mount during the
afternoon and on into the early evening.
17 rb id. , p. 26.

Inflammatory leaflets were
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distributed throughout the neighborhood and they called for a "Police
Brutality Protest Rally " in front of the 4th Precinct Station.

The

rally was peacef ul until the crowd was addressed by the director of
He promised a full investiga

the Human Rights Commission in Newark.

tion of the Smith incident and the promotion of a black policeman to
the rank of police captain.

Instead of dispersin g the crowd the

r esponse to the speech was derisive.

The audience interpreted the

concessions as hollow and meaningless.

The speaker was insulted by

verbal taunts from the assembled group.

Rocks were also thrown at

him and the barrage of rocks and bottles that followed placed the

·
18
.
police
stati. on unde r a temporary sta te o f siege.

The police came out of the station to disperse the crowd.

The

level of violence escala ted as there was little restraint o f language

or action by either side. 19

were in j ured in the scuffle.

A number of police officers and blacks
The crowd was broken up, but the rioting

followed a pattern that had been established during the p revious
night.
persed.

Lootin g began as soon as the mass of demonstrators was dis
Without enough men to adequately patrol the total area the

police . were forced to cordon of f a section of the area to protect;
however, the roaming bands of looters were free to plunder and
pillage the rest of the neighborhood :
1 8The Kerner Commission, op. cit. , p. 64.
19 rbid.
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• • • Bands of youth roamed up and down smashing windows. Grocery
and liquor stores, clothing and furnitu re stores, d rug stores and
cleaners, appliance stores, and pawnshops were the principal
targets. Periodically police officers would appear and fire their
weapons over the heads of the looters and rioters. Laden with
stolen goods, people began returning to the housing projects. • •
As news of the disturbance had spread, however, people had flocked
into the streets. As they saw stores being broken into with
impunity, many bowed to temptation and joined the looting. 20
The stores were not looted on a rarndom basis.

There was a

selection process based upon the perception of previously exploitative
practices of the different establishments.
the brunt of the looting.
controlled and focused.
white owned stores.

The gouging merchants bore

For the most part the '. rioting was relatively
The damage was aimed almost exclusively at

While the participants realized that other insti

tutions in the area had also been responsible for oppression (i. e. ,
banks) there was little contained in these buildings that could be
carried off.

To this extent the rioting was concrete rather than

symbolic, even though the riot in general was more symbolic than a
concrete attempt to overthrow the government .

attacks upon "soul brother" stores. 21

Also, there were no

The contagion that occurred also brought middle class blacks
into the neighborhood to participate in the looting.

The disaffection

of the black middle class was based upon different causes but was
nonetheless as real.
20 rbid.

These participants were acting upon an assumption,

2 1Hayden, �- cit. , p. · 3 3.
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later con firmed by police a ttacks upon black owned busin esse s, that

raci sm ul ti mat ely m akes no distinction be tween "prope r" and "lowly "
blacks. 22
As the nwnb er of par ticipants grew and the riot expande d in
scope,

the

frus trations of the police became grea ter.

orders that call e d fo r the use of g re at
quell the rioting.

d ay wh e n

th e y

the t ask

of contain i ng the riot an

Th e police we re firing blanks until midnight o f Thu rs

were given o rders to use all necess ary measu res to d e fend

th ems elve s from snipers (real or imaginery).
up

to

in th ei r actions to

Thes e handicaps plus the relatively small size of

. the i r force combined to make
impos sibl e one.

re str aint

Th ey w ere give n

No one had been killed

this poin t d e spite the fac t that hundr e ds had been arrested.

Howe ver, now with no

re straints

police w ere f ree to us e any means at

their disposal to stop the disorder.
The firing o f stores also played an impo rtant pa rt in th e riot.
Many times riote rs would set fire to a particular building in an

e ffort

to distrac t police and firemen f rom a n ewly chosen t arget for looting .
Police, firemen, and ambulance a tt e ndents wer e som ewha t hamp ered in
their

e f fo rts

by snipers.

Although these reports wer e v astly over

dramatized and in most instances wer e

e ntirely

unsubs t antiated, th ey

were us ed as justification fo r the rather brutal over-reaction on the
part of control agen t s which follow ed .
22 rbid. , pp. 31-32.

Reports r e ached the police
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headquarters that sniping was endangering the lives o f thei r personnel.
About the same time guns were reported to have been stolen f rom an
area department store.

The looting, setting of fires, and shooting

now had expanded to a much larger area and it was at this point that
the Governor o f New Jersey, Richard J. Hughes, decided to declare a
state of emergency and send the state police and National Guard t roops

to suppress the disorder. 2 3

The Reaction by Cont rol Agencies
The initial impact of the rein fo rcement o f 3000 National Guards
men and 500 State Policemen had unintended results.

The intensity of

the disorder actually increased because of rumors o f pol ice brutality
.

'

against innocent memb ers o f tl1e communi. ty. 2 4

The disorde r continued

largely unabated during the early hours of Friday and on into the day
time hours.

The control agencies began to occupy more ter ritory

and as they did the level of rioting and looting began to subside.
Reports o f looting and fire alarms became less and less f requent.
However, as the violence of the rioters decreased in intensity the
violence displayed by control agency personnel actually increased.
The reasons for the "over-reaction" on the part of the police and
related agencies are many and varied.

One of the major factors of the

23The Kerner commission, op. cit. , P · 64.
2 4 rbid. , pp . 640-64 1.
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t rigger-happiness was because of fear , confusion , and exhaustion. 25

Many of the troops were ass igned to around-the-clock duty under
con ditions of severe tension.

They were usually un familiar with the

area and in many instances could not tell the direction o f the pur
ported sniper fire.

Because o f a poor network o f communication

Guardsmen and police were o ften shooting at themselves and mistaking
one another for the reported sniper fi rings .

Several problems

contributed to the misconceptions regarding snipers :

poor communica

tions , the fact that one shot might be reported many times because o f
echos , the fact that the Nation al Guard lacked riot training and
finally simply because of the fact that they (the National Guardsmen)
26
. h
.
.
previous contact wit Negroes.
were young, scared, and had had little

Another factor given for the high level of violence exhibited
revolves around the charge that there was "general and deliberate
violence employed against the whole comrnunity. 11 2 7

People were more

or less indiscriminately stopped, beaten, and in some ins tances shot. 2 8
The contagion and milling that had characterized the crowd p articipants

earlier in the disorder now were also in operation among the control
25Hayden, op. cit. , pp . 46- 47.

26 The Kerner Commission , op. cit. , pp. 66-67.
( Also, see
in R acial
Janowitz
Morris
by
" Social Control of Escalated Riots,"
(Chicago :
,
)
(ed.
Grimshaw,
Violence in the United States, Allen D.
.
506
p.
Aldine Publishing Company , 196 9 ) ,
27H ayden, op. cit. , pp. 47-48.

28The . Kerner Commission, op. cit., pp. 66-6 8.
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agency forces.

They fired freely and wildly up streets and into

buildings at real or imaginery looters or snipers.

r t was during

this phase of the insurrection that most of the innocent victims
were killed during the five-day disorder , six were women and two
were children.

Moreover , most of the males that were killed were

not involved in the ri ots , but were simply victims of an inadequately
prepared contingents of police and National Guardsmen.
By Friday evening , most of the burning and looting had ceased;
however, reports of snipers were still coming into headquarters from
various police or National Guard personnel in the area.

The reports

of sniper fire were " • . . according to New Jersey National Guard reports ,
deliberately or otherwise inaccurate. 11 29

It is entirely possible that

the riot would have run its course by Friday if the troops had not
entered the community.

The snipers were used by officials to commit

retaliatory violence against the whole Negro community. 30

While violence

on the part of the rioters and looters was subsiding, violence on the
part of control agency personnel was just beginning.
Probably the most blatant act of retaliation against the
community occurred in the early hours of Saturday.

Witnesses testi

fying before the Kerner Commission reported that troops carried on a

·
3 0Hayden, op. cit.
- •
, p. �l
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wholesale attack against Negro-owned businesses i n
the area.

The

stores marked with "Soul Brother" signs remained more
or less untouched

during the riot.

However, the troops carried out a systemat i c patt
ern

of destruction against them for reasons unknown.

The stores w e re

either shot into or had their windows broken with the butts of
ri fles

or both.

One of the spokesmen for the black community in Newark

repoited that '' • • . the non-rioting Negroes are more afraid of the police

than the rioters because police were retaliating instead o f
protecting. 1 131

While the following declaration from the American Civil Liberties

Union is probably an overstatement of the case, it does raise inter

esting and pointed arguments regarding the role of policing forces in
the riot:
• . • �he police (and other control agencies ) were the instrument
of a conspiracy to engage in a pattern of systematic violence,
terror , abuse, intimidation, and humiliation to keep Negroes
second-cla.ss citizens. The police seized on the initial disorders
as an opportunity and pretext to perpetrate the most horrendous
and widespread killing, violence, torture, and intimidation, not
in response to any crime or civilian disorder, but as a violent
demonstration of the powerlessness of the plaintiffs and their
class
. Thus it seems to many that the military, especial ly the Newark
police, not only triggered the riot by beating a cab driver but
then create d a climate of opinion that supported the use of all
necessary force to suppress the riot. The force used by police
was not in response to snipers, looting, and burning , but in
retaliation against the successful uprising of Wednesday and
Thursday nights . 32
3 1 rbid. , pp. 49-50.

32 .!...2:__
b ' d•

I

p • 53 •
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Throughout Friday, S at urday, and Sunday nights sporadic
episodes of looting and burning continued but these incidents were
greatly overshadowed by the continuing actions of police against real
or imaginery rioters, snipers, or looters.

It was during this period

of time that most of the deaths in the disorder occurred.

It was

during this period that a white police detective was killed by sniper
fire and a white fireman was the victim of a gunshot, but the source
of which was not determined by subsequent investigat ions.

The kill

ings of these two persons probably served as a rallying point for
the further brutality in flicted upon the community by the control
The purpose of this dissertation is not to place blame or

agents.

praise upon the participants of either side, but rather to show that
the forces of collective behavior (i. e. , contagion , rumors, and
irrational, reactive behavior ) were operating among the personnel in
both camps.
By Sunday the disorder was on the verge of entering a new

stage of intensity . 33

There was a generalized feeling among the

community that the actions of the police and troops during the pre
vious two nights should not go unanswered.

The conditions which

originally precipitated the riot, largely complaints against police
b rutality among others, now were being repeated on a much more
pervasive l evel.
33

Moreover, these acts were in full accordance with

rbid. , p. 60.
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and had the approval of the higher echelon governmen tal officials.
There is ev idence that a counter-attack from the commun ity would have
taken place.

The general atmosphere that existed seems to be s wnmed

up in the following fatalistic statement-- "Why should we quit when
they got twenty-five of us and only two of them are dead? 1 1 34
Fortunately, this counter-attack never occurred.

After two

nights of relative calm , except for the aforementioned acts of the
control agents, the state police and National Guard units were with
drawn on the afternoon of Monday, July 17.

The suppression o f the

riot had been complete.
Return to No rmality
The normal pace of life that had existed during the pre-riot
era was quickly restored .

Mopping-up operations were begun immedi

ately after the withdrawal of the troops and the restoration of order.
Bus inesses , partially damaged during the disorder, were re-opened ;
others which had suffered fire damage and extensive looting were

never re-opened. 3 5

Many of the razed tenement houses were completely

torn down ; others were repaired or re-built.
Despite the many lofty promises and recommendations o f various
inves tigating committees , little has been done in Newark since the
disorder.

The most common expression w�ong the black community is

much has change d. 11 36
that " . . . nothing
.

In fact, the Kerner Commission

3 5 The Kerner Commission , op . cit. , P · 157.

36 rbid. , p. 151.
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has specifically cited Newark as an example of a city which has done
the least in proposi ng steps to ameloriate the causes of the disorders.
Officials continued to pursue the medical center proj ect , which wou ld
result in the disp lacement of thousands of Negro families.

A list of

recommendations was given to the Newark government officials; however ,
little h as been done to implement them.

The l ack of funds , which no

doubt is an important reason , is invariably given as the reason for
the inaction.

The federal government has also cut-back in its support

to urban areas because of the growing costs of the Viet Nam war and
also {ts efforts to fight inf lation.
Rather than serving as a st arting point for a massive reintegration

of society , the race riots have apparently resulted in a further
polarization of the two races.

Both black and white extremist groups

are gaining support within their respective communities. 3 7

Despite

the establishment of the Committee of Concern , an inter-racial group
of prominent citizens , and the appointment of a black p olicem an to
commanding officer of the 4th Precinct (the origina l site of the riot ) ,
blacks have grown increasingly distrustful of whites.
dition exists within the white community.

The same con-

Under pressures from whit�

extremist organizati ons the Newark City Council authorized the purchase
of $2QO , OOO worth of armor ed cars , riot guns, helmets and other riot
.
t. 38
contra 1 equipmen

Efforts in Newark seem to be focused upon methods

37 rbid. , p. 15 3.

38 rbid. , p. 191.
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of preventing and controlling future riots rather than upon attacking
conditions which caused the riots in the firs t place.

Evidence

regarding a changing tactic of violence against selected members of
the white establishment cannot be supported.

Although grave pre

dicti ons about the possibilities of future guerrilla warfare have
been made by many authorities it has not ha.ppened.

On a nationwide

scale there does appear to be an increase in the murders of police
officers in the line of duty, but there is no evi dence that this
campaign is occurring in Newark.

CHAPTER VII I
DET ROIT :

JULY 22-AUGUST 1, 1967

The urban disorder that occurred in the city of Detroit
dif fered s lightly from others that occurred during the same era.
First, it was the largest in scope.

It lasted longer than any of the

others ; it resulted in more deaths than any ot.½er riot; it resulted
in more inj ured persons and more arrests; and finally the property
damage resulting from the burning and looting was also greater than
that which occurred in any other city.
attributed to the disorder.
million dollars.

Forty-three deaths can be

The total property damage exceeded 50

The total number o f inj ured persons on both sid es

was approximately 1, 000 and lnore than 7, 200 persons were arrested
during the near week-long insurrection.
The Detroit race riot was also different from the perspective

of inter-racial participation. 1

The other disorders dur ing this

period were almost without exception a black phenomenon.

While the

number and percentages cf white looters was still relatively small,
it is signifi cant enough to make the Detroi t race r iot unique in
this respect.
1 Jerome R. Corsi, " Detroit 1967: Racial Violence or C l ass
War fare, " in R; ots in the Citi es: An An alytical Symposium on the
causes and E f fects, Richard A. Chikota and Michael C. Moran (eds. ) ,
(Cranbury, New Je rsey: Associ ated University Presses , 1968 ) , PP ·
168- 1 72.
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Also present in Detroit, but absent in most other riot cities

was the existence of a "riot tradition. 1 1 2

In 194 3 Det roit experienced

an inter-racial riot in which 34 persons were killed and property
damage was extensive even though this was no t a commodi ty-type riot .
Blacks had experienced absolute economic gains as a result o f the
war-time shortage o f labor.

The white population felt resentment

because o f these gains and attempted to thwart further advances.
Police , with their strong anti-Negro sentiment, were especially
responsible for the series of events that eventually resulted in the

two-day riot. 3

Obviously, nothing was settled by the riot .

conditions and pol icies which caused the riot remained .
brutality that infuriated the black community continued.

The

The police
The atmos

phere that was both reflective o f and created by the earlier riot
kept alive the fires of racial hatred in Detroit and culminated in
the urban disorder o f 1967.
Discrepancy Between Real and Ideal Cultures
The site o f the disorder, the 12th Street Area, was in many
ways typical o f other black communities in Detroit and prob ably any
large urban center .

Urban renewal projects (called by the residents

of the black community, "Negro removal
2Fogelson, op . cit. , PP · 5-8.

11 )

has displaced m any thousands

3s ee for examp le, "The Gestapo in Detroit, " by Thurgood Marshall
and "Race Riot, " by Alfred Mcclung Lee and Norman Daymond Humphrey in
Racial violence in the United States , A llan Grimshaw, (Chicago : Aldine
Pub lishing Company, 19 69).
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of black persons and had changed the 12th S treet Area f rom a relatively
neat, integrated neighborhood into a virtually all-black residential
ghetto.

The 12th Street Area consists mainly of over-crowded apartment

houses.

The density was more than 21, 000 persons per square mile and

only 1 8 percent of the residents were homeowners.

Twenty-five percent

of the housing units were considered so substandard that they had been
condemned for clearance; moreover, an additional 19 percent were listed

as having major deficiencies. 4

In a 1966 survey conducted under the auspices of the Psychology
Department of the University of Michigan, researchers found i t to be
an area of high stress and tension.

Residents indi cated great dis-

satisfaction with thei r environment :
Of those interviewed, 93 percent said they w anted to move out
of the neighborhood; 73 percent felt that the streets were not
s afe ; 9 1 percent believed that a person was likely to be robbed
or beaten at night; 58 percent knew of a fight within the last
12 months in which a we apon had been employed; 32 percent stated
that they themselves owned a weapon ; and 57 percent were worried
about fires .
A significant proportion believed municipal services to be
inferior: 36 percent were dissatisfied with the schools ; 4 3
percent with the city ' s contribution to the nei ghborhood ; 77
percent with the recreational facilities; and 7 8 percent believed
police did not respond promptly when they were summoned for
help. 5
The partially responsible demographic trends were also in
evidence in Detroit.

Mi ddle class whites w ithin the central city

were being replaced by under-skil led or unskilled blacks.
4 The Kerner commission, op . cit. , pp. 86-87.

5 r bid . , p. 8 8.

The black
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population o f Detroit increased from 30 percent to over 4 0 percent

between the years 1960-67 . 6

Over 50 percent of Detroit's schools

were classified as overcrowded and the black enrollment in the school
system was 57 percent.

In the inner city schools, more than ha lf of

the pup i ls who entered high school fai led to graduate.
were overwhelmingly black chi ldren.

The dropouts

The per capita educati onal

eA-penditures for inner city pupi ls was $500 less than for those
located in the suburban fringe. 7

Unequal employment opportunities were very much present in the
city.

H igh school diplomas from the inner c ity schoo ls were regarded

by company personnel directors as less va luable than those from the
suburban areas.

Unions ,

ihich have long been an avenue of upward

socia l mobi l ity for minority groups, were large ly closed to blacks.
In July of 1967 the unemployment rate reached a five-year peak.
Between 12 and 15 percent of the Negr o men in the 12th Street Area
were unemp loyed a nd the percentage was over 30 for those under 25
years of age. 8

Opportunities open to blacks seemed even more limi ted as their
educationa l level became higher.

The median income of white h igh

school graduates was approximate ly $ 1, 6 0 0 higher than the i r b lack
counterparts.
6

The discrepancy for col lege graduates was even greater

rbid . , pp. 89-9 0 .

7 rbid. , p . 9 0 .
8 rbid .
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( $2,600) . 9

The rising expectations of the educated b lack population

was stifled by an unresponsive white institutional structure.

The black population was also under-represented in the local
government.

Although many blacks had been appointed under the recent

a dministration, only one of the nine city counci lmen was a Negr ? ·
They were also greatly under-represented on the locally important

city schoo l board (only two of seven were black ) • lO

Detroit w as also suffering from a decreasing tax base which
meant that services would have to be maintained at the present level
of funding.

Complaints about sporadic garbage collections and poor

lighting in the 12th Street Area went unheard .

Federal monies,

usually under the Mode l Cities Program, often did not have an immediate
effect on the grass roots leve l where the need for increased services

was greatest. 11

An essential feature of the ideal-real c ulture discrepancy is
the ro le of the police and its effect on the residents of the black
community .

The Detroit Po lice Department in many ways symbolized the

practices of the white comraunity in its relationship to the blacks :
. . • Although local police forces generally regard themselves
as public servants with the responsibility of maintaining law
and order, they tend to minimize this attitude when they are

l O i bi d . , p. 9 1 .

11�. , pp. 9 1-92 .
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patrolling areas that are heavily populated with Negro citizens.
Th � r �, they tend to view each person on the street as a potential
criminal or enemy, and all too often that attitude is recipro
cated. Indeed, hostility between the Negro communities in our
large cities and the police departments, is the major p roblem in
law enforcement in this decade. It has been a m ajor cause of all
recent race riots . 1 2
There had existed a long history of hostility between blacks
and the city ' s policemen .

Findings of the Commission designated to

investigate the causes of the 1943 riot indicated that there exis ted
a state of open warfare between Detroit Negroes and the Detroit Police
Department. 13

The seriousness of this situation has not abated in the

two decades since then.

A Citizen's Complaint Committee w as established

to dea l with this problem; however, it was largely ineffectual.
These conditions have been termed the "blocked-opportunity"

explanation of riot behavior . 14

The continued exclusion of Negroes

from full participation in American social and economic life is the
basic cause of riots.

This exclusion is a result of arbitrary racial

barriers rather than lack of ability, motivation or aspirations on the
part of blacks.

Bl acks ·who rioted did so because their conception of

their lives and their potential had changed without any commensurate
improvement in thei r chances for a better life.

A major change

occurred when b lacks switched from self-deprecation and self-incrimination
1 2 rbid. , p. 85.
1 3 rbid .

14Nathan s. Caplan and Jeffery M. Paige , 1 1 A Study of Ghetto
Rioters, " in scientific American , Vo l . 2 1 9, August , 1968 , pp . 15- 21.
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to the identificati on of causes within the white power structure.
This change resulted, at least in part, in the Detroit race riot.
Identification of Unde rlving, Causative Factors
In an atti tudinal survey conduc ted by the Detroi t chapter of
the Urban League immediately after the disturbance the following
conditions were considered by the black community as having a great
deal to do with causing the riot :
The following is a list of specific causes, and the percent
ages of Negroes interviewed who felt that these factors contributed
greatly to causation : police brutality, 57 percent; overcrowded
living conditions, 55 percent ; poor housing, 54 percent ; lack of
jobs , 45 percent; poverty, 44 percent ; dirty neighborhoods, 44
percent ; anger with local business people, 43 percent ; . . • broken
political promises, 39 percent. . • . These conditions indicate both
mental anger and a real situation 0£ social and economic
deprivation . 1 5
This survey was not limited to riot participants nor was it
confined to persons who were arres ted.

This was a general community

survey in which most of the respondents indicated that they had not
participated in the riot.

This document does show, _however, the

pervasive nature of this commonly held belief system and the degree
of consensus that was present in the black community.
1 5The Detroit Urban League, A Survey of Attitudes of Detroit
Negroes After the Riot of 196(, (Detroit : Detroit Urban League,
196 7).
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Knowledge of conditions and political awareness are e ven
better illustrated by those who did take an active role in the rioting.
The " riffraff theory " si·mply 1.· s not app 1 1.c
·
· able to th is
· social
phenomena.
In general, the rioter was better educated than his non-rioting counterpart.

The rioter was more active in community organizations and affairs

than the typical non-rioter.
"poorest of the poor. "

In addition, the rioters were not the

They were not the newly arrived migrants from

the South, but rather life-long residents of Detroit.

There is nothing

in the evidence that was gathered that would tend to label him as a
personal failure or an irresponsible person.

On the contrary, many of

the indices of adjustment, such as education and occupational aspira-

16
·
.
tions,
surpasses the non-rioter.
show that the r ioter
.

The efforts to bring about a revitalization of black culture
and black awareness were highly successful in Detroit.

The combined

efforts of black organizations and newspapers in the city brought
forth new hope and programs to deal with the present situation.

Self

repo rted rioters were more likely to belong to Negro Rights groups
and participate in periodic discussions regarding strategies .

Rioters

expressed great anger with unresponsive politicians and police
p ractices.

seventy-five percent of the interviewed rioters felt that

16caplan and Paige, op. cit. , pp. 19-2 0.
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unkept political pr omises contributed greatly to the riot and 90
percent felt that police brutality contributed directly to causing
the riot. 17
The mayor of Detroit had originally come to power because of
his popularity with the Negro voters .

However, his popularity quickly

waned as it became evident that his e fforts to fulfill campaign
promises were largely futile. 18

The police department was symbolically

chosen or selected as an example of the mayor ' s inability to cope with
his administration's laggard efforts to ameliorate the problems of the
black community.

The mayor ' s difficulties with the Detroit Police

Department were a constant sour ce of embarrassment and finally culminated in a massive "Blue Flu" attack in which most policemen refused to
report for duty.

This episode, at least to the residents of the Black

community, demonstrated the autonomy of the police force with the
municipal government.
Police brutality was a recurrent theme in the 1 2th Street Area.
The crime rate w as nearly twice that o f the city as a whole and the
police were often less than diplomati c in their e fforts to control
crime in the area.

In the month preceeding the outbreak of the riot,

17The Kerner commission, op. cit. , pp.
176- 178.

18Richard Komisaruk and Carol E . Pearson , " Children of the
Detroit Riots : A Study o f Their Participation and Their Mental
Health, " in chikota and Moran , op . cit . , pp . 1 1 3 -ll4.
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tensions reaching a breaking point with the murder of a recently
returned black Viet Nam war veteran by a gang of white youths .

The

police arrested only one member of the gang and the city ' s white
owned newspapers played down the incident in an attempt to ease
tens ions.

The intent backfired and black leaders inte�preted it as

a flagrant example of a double standard of reporting :

playing up

crimes by Negroes and playing down crimes cormnitted by whites. 19
· Largely unresolved, this issue was immediately responsible for the
strained atmosphere whi ch was present during the evening of July 22,
1967.
The Precipitating Incident
On that particular data the Detroit Police Department raided
five "blind pigs. "

These blind pigs were private social c lubs which

had originated during the Prohibition era and had survived as after
hour drinking and gambling places.

These es tablishments were often

the targets for the vice squad and the firs t four raids were carried
out without incident.

In the course of the fif th raid of the evening

the police were surprised to find over eighty patrons when they had
expected only a few do zen.

The place was the scene of a party for

returning Viet Nam veterans and many of the customers voiced resent.
.
.
ment at the po lice
intr us ion. 20

19 The Kerner Commission , op. cit. , pp . 8 5-86.
Z O i bid. , pp . 84- 8 5.

1 76
I t took the police an une xp ectedly long time to arrest all
of the patrons and during the hour-long procedure a cro wd of over
two-hundred persons gathered in the s treets outside.

During the

course of the arrest procedure there occurred pushing and shoving
i ncidents on both sides, but no one incident can be s aid to have
precipitated the riot.

The police were the objects of verbal abuse

from the crowq, but again there was no single episode which can be
said to have been the spark for the rest of the riot.

Tension between

the crowd and the arresting officers mounted and finally culrniLated
in an empty bottle being thrown through a rear window of one of the
police cars.
smashed.

About the same time the first window of a sto re was

Both incidents occurred without any form of retaliation

from the assembled policemen.

Rumors were circulated that police

had used excessive force during the raid and the number of persons
in the crowd increasea. 21

More vandalism occurred when it became

evident to the crowd that the police could not a dequ at e ly enforce
their duties.

Reinforc�ments were ordered ; however, after their

arrival the total number was still only forty-three.
time the crowd now nu.rnb ered in the thous ands.

At the same

Looting and vandalis�

became more widespread and at approximate ly 8: 00 a . m . , a 17-man

21 Ibi�. , p. 86.
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po l ice commando unit was dispatched to disperse the crowd.

rt was

unsuccessful in the face of a crowd now estimated to be more than

3, 000 persons. 22

By m id-morning the police detail in the 12th Street Area had
grown to over 500, but rather than inter fere with the looting and the
burning they concent rated on establishing a cordon to contain the
growing riot :
According to witnesses, police at some roadblocks made little
effort to stop people from going in and out of the area. Banter
ing took place between police o f ficers and the populace , some
still in their pajamas. To some observers, there seemed at this
point to be an atmosphere of apathy. On. the one h and,
police failed to interfere with the looting. On the other, a
nUi.7lber o f older, more stable residents, who had seen the street
deteriorate from a prospeious commercial thoroughfare to one
ridden by vice, remained aloof. 23
The Rioting Stage
The hesitancy o f the police to conu.�it themselves to decisive
action was undoubtedly the initial impetus that transformed a small
disturbance into a full-blown disorder .

The inaction of the police

was based upon the assumpt ion that the 12th Street incident was a
diversion and many of ficers were sent to other areas of the c i ty,

especially those that were the site o f the 1943 riot. 24
22 Ibid. , p. 87.
23 rbid.

17 8
The carefree nihilistic atmosphere prevailed dur ing the rest
of the morning as the riot grew both in area and the number of participants:
Numerous eyewitnesses interviewed by Commission investigators
tell of the carefree mood wi th which people ran in and out of
stores, loo ting and laughing, and joking with the police officers.
Stores with "Soul Brothers " signs appeared no more immune than
others ( it was later shown that they did enjoy a certain amount
of immunity ) . Looters paid no attention to residents who shouted
at them and called their actions senseless. An epidemic of
excitement had swept over the persons on the street. 25
Shortly before noon Congressman John Conyers attempted to
address the crowd in an effort to disperse them ; however, he was
unsuccessful.

Poor "change-of-command" communicati on among the

assembled policemen caused them to retain their inactive status as
the r iot became larger and more destructive :
By that time a rumor was threading through the crowd that a
man had been bayoneted by the pol ice. Influenced by such stor ies,
the crowd became belligerent. Numerous of ficers reported injuries
from rocks, bottles, and other objects thrown at them . Smoke
billowed upward from four fires, the first since the one at the
shoe store early in the morning . When firemen answered the alarms ,
they became the targets for rocks and bottle s . 26
Community leaders met with Mayor Cavanagh not to present a list
of demands but rather simply to discuss the total extent of the rioting.
Looting and burning were spreading out from the 1 2th Street Area when
the Mayor requested that 300 state policemen be sent to the area.
They were deployed in the immediate area but were unable to stem the
25 rbid. , p. 8 8.

26� - , p . 92.

tide of disorder.

Fires also became an increasing hazard as winds

up to 25 miles per hour whipped the flames to adjacent buildings.
This was coupled with the fact that firemen were being pelted by
rocks and bottles when they attempted to fight the fires.

As the

afternoon wore on the firemen were forced with increasing frequency
to abandon their efforts to contain the burning because they were
not being adequately protected by the limited number of police in
the area.

The fire chief of Detroit estimated that two-thirds o f the

buildings were destroyed by spreading fires rather than fires set
at the scene.

Of the 68 3 structures which were damaged, approximately

one-third were residential, and in few, if any, of these was the fire
s et originally. 27

As it became evident that the present contingent of police was
not large enough to contain the spreading riot, Mayor Cavanagh request
ed that National Guard troops be assigned to Detroit.

The request

was made late in the afternoon of Sunday and the first troops were on
the streets by 7: 0 0 p. m. .

28

During the evening the first deaths were reported.
the slain persons were looters who had not heeded warning s .

Most of
Despite

the rather sizable numbers o f both state police and National Guard
troops (8 00 and 1, 2 00 respectively, with an additional 8 , 0 0 0 Guardsmen
27 rbid. , p . 9 2.

28 rbid . , p. 93 .
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on the way ) the riot showed no signs of abating.

Early Monday mo rning

the Mayor first contacted the federal government offici als reg arding
the possibility of dispatching federal troops to the area.

The final

decision was de layed, but shortly before noon President Johnson
authori zed the sending of paratroopers to a nearby Air Force b ase.
The d aylight hours of Monday brought a temporary wan ing to the riot
and the decision to employ federal troops w as delayed.

As darkness

settled Monday, the number of incidents of deaths , looting , and fires
increased.

Several of the incidents involved injuries to police

officers, National Guardsmen, and civilians by "gunshots of undeter
mi ned o rig in. "

By midnight the situation had deteriorated sufficiently

enough and P resident Johnson signed a proclamation federal i zing the

Michigan N ational Guard and authori zing the use of the p aratroopers. 29
The Reaction by Control Agencies
The reaction o f the control, as was also demonstrated in the
other urban diso rders cited in the dissertation, was less than
effective.
petence .

In fact, their performance borders upon blatant incom
Many factors combined to produce the appal ling situ ation

that was p resent in the city:
At this time there were nearly 5, 000 Guardmen in the city ,
but fatigue, l ack of tr aining , and the haste w i th which they
h ad had to be dep loyed reduced thei r effectiveness. Some of
29 rbid. , pp. 95 -96.
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the Guardsmen traveled 200 miles and then were on duty for 30
hours straight. Some had never received riot training and were
given on-the-spot instructions on mob control--only to discover
that there were no mobs, and that the situation they faced on
the darkened streets was one for which they were unprepared. . • •
Lessons learned by the California National Guard two years
earlier in Watts regarding the danger of overreaction and the
necessity of great restraint in using weapons had not, apparently,
been passed on to the Michigan National Guard. The younger
troopers could not be expected to know what a danger they were
creating by the lack of fire discipline, not only to the
civilian population but to themselves. 3 0
There were numerous episodes of troops accidently firing upon
· one another.

There were also nany instances where accidental dis

charges of weapons would result in return fire from other Guardsmen
in the area.

Many of the supposed sniping reports turned out to be

false ; however, many times the troops would fire upon suspected
positions without waiting f9r veri fication.

At best this lack of

restraint would unnecessarily d amage property and at its worst it
resulted in the accidental slaying of innocent bystanders.

As the

number of instances o f shootings increased it was decided that the
National Guard would be replaced by regular Army in the areas where
the greatest amount of heavy firing was occurring .

The shortcomings

of the Guardsmen were most apparent to the commanders of the regular
Army units:
According to Lt. Gen . Throckmorton and Colonel Bolling, the
city, at this time, was saturated with fear. The National Guards
men were afraid, the residents were afraid, and the police were
30 rbid. , p. 97.
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afraid. Numerous persons, the majority of them Negroes were
being injured by gunshots of undetermined origin. The general
_
and his staff felt that the major task of the troops was to
reduce fear and restore the air of normalcy. 3 1
In order to accomplish this task, regular Army personne l were

asked to establish rapport with the local residents.

They helped

clean the streets, locate missing persons and general ly assisted the
neighborhood to re-est ablish order.

Within hours after arriving,

the area was enjoying a calmness unknown since the start of the riot.
The deliberateness and professionalism that were shown by the Army
units were a great contrast to the chaos that was exhibited by the
National G uard uni ts.

The Nationa l Guardsmen seemed to operate at

cross-purposes to those of the Army.

The commanding general of the

paratroopers had requested the city to relight the streets, but at
the same time National Guardsmen continued to shoot-out street lights
because of fear of sniping.

When the weapons of all military personnel

were ordered unloaded, it failed to reach all National Guard personnel
or else they chose to ignore it.

At a time when Army troopers ,;·1ere

attempting to establish communication with residents and break down
the street barricades, the National Guardsmen were ordering people off

the streets and away from the windows. 32

The mass confusion and chaos that resulted from the over-reaction
of the National Guard contingents had damaging results for almost
3 1 rbid . , p. 99.

32 rbid. , p. 100.
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everyone involved in the riot:
With persons of every description arming themselves, and guns
being fired accidentally or on the vaguest pretext all over the
city, it became more and more impossible to tel l who was shooting
at whom. Some firemen began carrying guns . One accidentally
shot and wounded a fellow fireman. Another injured himsel f. 33
Most of the 43 deaths that marked the riot occurred during this
period o f anomie and great fear.

Very few o f the deaths were the

result of looting or sniping, but instead were innocent persons who
were accidently s lain by firing bullets or who were mistaken for riot
participants.

The leve l o f violence by control agents remained

extremely high despite the very abrupt drop in the number o f looting
and fire-bombing incidents.

By Tuesday evening the riot violence

appeared to h ave been a lmost completely one-sided. 3 4

Whereas, the

Army units were occupied with the restoration of o rder, the police
and National Guard personne l continued to answer the increased number
o f sniping reports, the vast majority of which were actually p recipi
tated by the police and Guardsmen themselves.

During the d aylight

and evening hours o f Wednesday there were over 700 reports o f sniping:
As they pro liferated, the pressure on law enforcement o fficers
to uncover the snipers became intense. Homes were broken into .
Searches were made on the flimsiest of tips . A Detroit newspaper
aptly proclaimed: " Everyone's Suspect in No Man's Land. 1 1 35
3 3 rbid. , p. 10 1 .

34 rbid . , p. 106.
35 rbid.
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The hysteria wh ich accompanied the search for snipers was
almost entirely futile.

The Kerner Commission demonstrated that the

vast majority of reported snipings were l.ies or honest mista1<.e s.
Only in a very few instances were any arrests made.

Of the 27 persons

arrested for sniping only two were even brought to trial.
were dismissed for lack of evidence. 3 6

•r;1.e rest

The indiscri minate sea rch

for snipe rs and the resulting violence had a highly negative 8ffect
upon area residents.

The very practices which had caused the riot

were ful ly i n evidence in t.he attempts to quell +-.he rioting .
Anger and indignation were expressed by both elements (black and
white ) of the community.

Under public pressures, more restraints

were place<l upon the actions of both police and National Guardsmen.
This policy change was instituted at approximately the same time as
the rioting itself was largely dying out in intensity.

By Thurs day

most of the rioting, except for isolated incidents, had ceased .

The

federal paratroopers were withdrawn on Saturday and the riot was
officially designated as over when the National Gua rd units ·were
withdrawn on Tuesday, August 1, 1967.
The Return to Normality
The return of the pace of pre-riot life was quickly achieved
during the immediate aftermath of the disorder.

However, Detroit

has experienced many positive gains in its efforts to better achieve

36

rbid.

18 5
inter-racial unde rstanding.

A fter the riot many efforts were made

to hear and discuss the grievances of ghetto residents but the success
of these p rograms has been mixed. 37

And more recently extremist

groups of both the white and black communities appear to be g aining

in membership and influence over their respective g roups. 38

Immediate successes undertaken included the hiring of an
additional 5 5, 000 persons by some of the major employers in the are a .
These new jobs were l argely fi lled by individu als f rom the ghetto.
More blacks have been hired by the Detroit school system in super
visory positions .

These successes are, however, greatly overshadowed

and offset by the increasing distrust: shown by both communities.
Despite the impressive and massive plans and proposed programs toward

betterment, little has been done . 39

In fact, in some areas relations

appea r to have deteriorated :
There appears to be a g rowing division between the b l ack and
white communities as well as within the black community itself .
Some p awnshops and gun stores have been robbed o f fi rearms , and
gun s ales reportedly have tripled since the riot. In late 1967
there was a rent strike, reports of some fire bombing , and a new
junior high school was seriously damaged by its p redomin antly
Negro student body. Many Negroes interviewed rej ected the theory
that the 1967 riot immunized Detroit ag ainst further disorders .
Some believed that a new disturbance may well be high ly organized
and therefore much more serious. 4 0
37 rbid. , p . 1 5 2.

38 rbid .

39 Mayo r ' s Deve lopment Team , Report to Mayor Jerome P. Cavanagh ,
( Detroit: Mayor's Office, October, 1967).
40The Kerner CoITLmission, op. ci�. , P · 1 5 3 .
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It seems as though the major impetus of post-riot activity
centers on the preven tion of possible future riots not through the
elimination of discrimination, but rather by increasing the amount
of social control in the city, especially the ghetto areas.

New and

more sophisticated riot control weapons were ordered by the poli ce
department.

New courses in crowd control were instituted as a part

of on-going police education.

There were also plans to improve the

administration of justice in the event of future riots by identifi
cation of potential detention facilities and the assigning of ·
experienced clerks to process those persons who might be arrested

in the next disturbance. 4 1

With these "reforms " occupying most of

the curative efforts , it seems as if public officials have accepted
with fatalistic resignation the likelihood of future riots occurring.
They concentrate on improving the control of riot behavior rather
than the elimination o f the underlying causes.

Unfortunately, this

type of thinking may result in a "self-fulfilling prophecy. "
As was true in the other cities selected for analysis in this
dissertation, there does not appear to have been a change toward
selective inter -racial violence.

The failure of the riot to bring

forth positive action designed to eliminate discrimination has
brought more frustration to the black community, but this has not
resulted in direct aggression against members of the police force in
excess of that which was present during the pre-riot period.
4 1 rbid. , p. 157 ·

CHAPTER IX
SUMJ:1.ARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
SUMMARY
In general, the typology received supporting evidence from
each of the narrative accounts of the three selected d isorders.
All of the stages that were hypothesized have been supported by the
evidence with a few m inor exceptions which will be noted as each
stage is discussed.
The existence of a discrepancy between the real and ideal
cultures is almost a foregone conclusion for the occurrence of a
demonstration of any magnitude.

This "gap" has been well documented

in each of the three cities prior to the occurrence of the r iot.
Perhaps more important than simply the existence of this "gap, " is
the perception among minor ity group members that the "gap " may be
increasing in size.

Whether this is true or false is irrelevant ;

the ghetto residents believe that it is true and their actions are
based accordingly.

Equally important to the phenomenon of r ising

expectations is the existence of exacerbating local conditions,
especially in relations with the police.

In the eyes of the local

residents, the treatment they receive on the part of the police
focal izes and symbolizes this perceived gap between the real and
ideal cultures.

If police-community relationships are strained
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( this h as been documented to h ave been present in
the likelihood of experiencing

a

a ll

three cit i es)

riot is gre atly in c reased. l

The discrepancy between the real and ide a l cu ltures w i ll
rem a in in the back of the minds of community residents unti l it is
brought to the surf ace by the con certed efforts of
groups

and

c ivil

more milit a nt org aniz a tions within the b lack

rights
community.

The extrem ist groups {especi a l ly the Bl ack Muslims) were qu i te

a ctive

in each of the three cities during the period of t ime th at pre ceded
the outbreak of hostilities.
b l ack

aw areness "

were very suc cessful among the younger b l a ck males

in e ach of the cities.
their misery

and

Their efforts to bring about a " new

They suc ceeded in shifting the b l ame for

life conditions from the " colle ctive b la ck self " to

the oppressive white community power structure.

The previous feelings

of lost dignity and self-respect were subl im ated into a

c ampa i gn

of

reverse racism wh i ch was des i gned to affix bla�e for the ghetto
cond i tions on the whi te

commun i ty

and the ir symbols of oppress i on--

the pol i ce.
The o c curren ce of

a

pre c ip i tat i ng

e ach of the cities; moreover, it
lo c a l community res i dent.

a lw ays

i ncident

w as present in

involved the pol i ce and a

Th i s portion of the typology is best

exp l ained with the use of psychologi c a l rather th an so c iolog i c al or
1 stanley Li eberson and Arnold R. Silverman, "The Pre c i pitan ts
and underlying conditions of Race Riots, " Amer i can So ciological Review
Vol. 3 0, De cember, 196 5 � pp. 887- 89 8.
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political explanations.

This type of incident unc;loubtedly occurs

many times throu�hout the normal day ' s activities in each cf thes e
cities, but yet only one of these served as an igni tion spark for
the riot that was to follow.

Each of these incidents was almost a

mirror- i mage of one another.

A casual crowd was present to originally

witness the event and after the occurrence of the individualized
vio lence spiral it changed to an action crowd .

This change was

facilitated by the dif fusion of rumors largely as a result of selec
tively perceiving the actions of each of the paLticipants in the
precipitating event.

The police were successful in their efforts to

apprehend the sus pects in each of the events, but as they lef t the
scene tLere was the feeling among mern.bers of the crowd that the police
were retreating because of fear.
Probably the most crucial determinant of the riot occurred
early in the rioting stage.

This involved the perception that there

existed a breakdown in the power of the control agencies.

The

commissions which studied the riots in each of the cities singled
out this factor as being the most important feature in contributing
to the riot.

Initial police permissiveness toward looting was a

great factor in the recruitment of additi onal riot personnel.

The

enlargement of the original number changed a crowd scene into a full
fledged riot involving many thousands of persons.

In all three

cities, the burning and looting went largely unchecked during the
early phases of the riot and by the time the police attempted to
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re-gain con trol of the situation they were so greatly out-n umbered
that it was now an impossible task.

This necessitated the recruitment

o f additional re-in forcements in the form of National Guardsmen and .
in one instance, Federal t roops.
The reaction by control agencies introduced a new escalatj on
in personal violence.
to quell the riots.

This is only natural in vi ew of their mission
Howeve r, there is evidence ..... lted in the nar ratives

of all three insurrections that thes e control agencies over- reacted
to the violence of the riote rs and were in tu rn a causative factor in
the maintenance and continuance o f a new level o f violence.

The

deliberate and indiscriminate use of unnecess ary violence has been
documented in all th�ee cities.

The attacks on alleged snipers seem

to have been mistakes in most instances, with the pos s ible exception
of Watts where evidenc e indicates that there was a siz able numbe r of
actual snipings throughout the course of the riot.

Ever!t.ually the

riots in all three cities were suppressed and the routine of p re-riot
life was quickly res tored.
The return to normality occurred in all three cities with fe� ,
if any, meaning ful C:1ange:s to eliminate the original causative factors.
Most o f the changes centered around police retraining prog rams in
crowd control and the purchasing of more sophisticated riot control
equipment by local municipal governments.

Rather than s e rving as a

new bas is for the improvement of race relations the riots seem to have
resulted in a furth er polarization of the races .

One hypothesized

feature of the typo logy--that o f a change fro:n colle ctivized violence
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to personal select i ve v i o lence against contr o l agency pers onnel-
cannot be supported by any evidence

in

the aftermath cond it i ons

of

On a nat ional scale there has been pre

ea ch of the three cities.

sented evidence that pol i ce are becoming selected victims

of

certain

extremist gro ups within the black community , but there is no evi dence
that can attr ibute th i s phenomenon to post-ri ot condi tions within
the selected c ities.
In conclusion the revised vers i on
of

an urban
1.

insurrection

of

the co nstructed typol ogy

would be as f ollows:

Discrepance between real and ideal cult ures
A.

Dispr oporti o nate

B.

Ris i ng expectat ions and unresponsive institutionalized

o ccupation o f

degrading statuses

pr ocedures
c.
2.

3.

Exacerbat i ng l o cal c onditions

Identificati on

of

vague, causative factors

A.

Diffus i on

B.

c onsensus among respondents (acceptance)

of

the general ized belief (proselytizing)

The precip i tati ng inc i dent
A.

Ex i s tence of a casual crowd

B.

Occurrence

c.

violence-counter violence spiral (individualized

of

a seemingly innocuous incident

leve l )
D.

Mood shift acco mpanied by mil ling, contag i o n, and
selective per ception

E.

Distortion

of

the incident and di ffusi on of rumors
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4.

The rioting stage
A.

Initial collective action based on rioters ' conception
of the precipitating incident

B.

Perception of the breakdown of official cont rol

c.

Recruitment of additional personnel

D.

Selective burning and loo ting

E.

Identification of the most easily accessib le and
readily identifiab le of the causative factors

5.

Reaction by control agencies
A.

Violence- reactive violence spi ral ( co llectivized
level)

B.
6.

Suppression of riot

Return to normality
A.

Re latively unchanged conditions
CONCLUSIONS

One of the important features of a constructed typology l ies
in its " •. . attempt to advance concept formation in the socia l sciences
from the stage of description and empirical generalization to the

construction of theoretical systerns. 11 2

Because of this responsibility

of al l research and particularly that of constructed typologies, an
attempt wil l be undertaken to re-integrate the findings back into the
2

McKinney, op. cit . , p. 39.

19 3
theoretical hiatus described earlier in the dissertation.

It seems

plausible that these findings should be able to fill in some of the
gaps that exist at the present time between theories of collective
behavior and social movements.

One possible method of pursuing this goal could be a comparison
of the three types of s ocial action by examining differences which
exist according to a selected fr ame of reference for the analysis o f
social action.

One of the most widely accepted models i n sociology

at the present time is Talcott Parsons ' list of pattern variab les. 3

These pattern variables repres ent a " • • . series of major di lemmas o f
orientation, a series o f choices that the actor must make before the
situation has a determinate meaning for him. 11 4

These pattern variables

represent choices that are available to the actor with respect to a
situation, object, or another actor.
When the three types of collective social behaviors mentioned
in this dissertation are compared to one another by using the list o f
pattern variables as comparison point s , the bas ic dif ferences b etween
them become evident.
of explanation:

Each of the pattern variables has three dimensions

the cultural aspect, the personality aspect, and the

social system aspect.

While each of these three dimensions is not

3Talcott Parsons and Edward A . Shi ls, "Categor i es o f the
Orientation and Organization of Act ion," in Toward a General Theory of
Action , Talcott Parsons and Edward A . Shils, (eds. ) , (New York: Harper
and Row, 195 1), pp. 76-84.
4 rbid . , p. 76.

19 4
applicable to each of the examples of collPctive soci al behavior,
a general definition of each pattern variable will s uffice to illustrate
the differences between episodic collective behaviors (e . g. , lynch mobs
and panic scenes) , urban insurrections, and revolutions.
The pattern variables in the Parsonsian model are as follows:
1.

Affectivi ty---Affective Neutrality.

This choice re.presents

the dilemma of gratification of impulse versus dis cipline.
I t represents emotional feelings toward others and whether
there is control over t.hos 8 feelings .
A.

Episodic collective behaviors--Affectivity is almost
always prese.n t and so is a loss of control over those
feelings.

Hatred characterizes the lynch mob and great

fear is present in panic situations.
B.

Urban Insurrections ·- -Heightened effect is present
agains t the police and shop owners and in some st-3.ges
there may be a temporary loss of control over these
feelings.

However, some aspects of the riot included

deliberate , planned, and rational behaviors which
can ' t be explained by the "blind rage" e:x-planation.

c.

Revolutions--Strong emotional feelings toward the ruling
class are present, but these are very minor as a
motivating factor for the total revolution ' s activity
centers upon deliberately planned and executed activity ,
whi ch implies that emotions are under control.
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2.

Self-o rientation--·Collcct i vi ty 0rienta.tion.

This repre

sents the dilem.1.tta o f private versus collective int e res ts .
A.

Epi sodic collective behaviors--need dispositions o f
the actors are the primary concern.

The need to s cape

�oat in a lynch mo!:, or achieving safety in a panic
scene.
B.

Urban Insurrections - -need disposi tim1S o f the actors
may serve as motivating facto rs for looting, but there
was also present a ger.eralizea. be .1 ie f in the worth o f

this behavior a s an avenue fer social redress from the

white community.

Ri ot behavior was also designed to

shock the white community and educate them of the
conditi ons present in the ghetto.
C.

Revolutions--need dispositions of the individual actors
a re usually o f secondary importance to the needs o f the
entire revolutionary movement.

The welfare o f the

entire society is viewed as a cause that is well worth
the sacrifice of the individual actors ' needs.
3.

Universalism--Particularism.

This represents the dilemma

o f transcendence versus immanence.

The actors in this

situation are jud ged according to universal standards or
rather because o f their particular qualities.
A.

Episodic collective behaviors--actors are jud ged almost
exclusively i n · ternIB of universally_ appli cable ·standards ;
there is l i ttle, if any , division o f l abor.

196

B.

Urban insurrections--actors o n both sides are j udged
somewhat universalistic ally (i . e. , all b l acks are
looters, and all police are pigs), but there is some
di fferenti ation of judgment on both sides.

There is

a lso present a rudimentary form of division of l abor.
C.

Revolut ions--actors are more likely to be j udged in
terms of parti cularistic qualities, especi a l ly in the
later stages of the movement when a we ll-defined
division of labor has arisen.

4.

Ascription--Achievement.

The di lemma of object modalities.

The actor is faced with the di lemma of treating an object,
situation, or another actor in terms of what he is or in
terms of past per formances and outcomes o f the behaviors.
A.

Episodic Col lective Behaviors--actors responses are
usually instantaneous and based upon the specif ics of
the situation.

For excu�ple, fleeing a burning bui ld

ing or having no regard for the consequences o f a
lynching.
B.

Urban Insurrections--looting and burning m ay be
immediate response situations simply because the
bui ldings happened to be present or i t may have been
because of the past e xploitation hab its and practices
of the stores ' owners.
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C.

Revolutions--responses to the others (the ruling class)
are almost exclus ively based upon their past or present
performances which were perceived as being oppress ive
in nature.

5.

Speci ficity--Diffusness.

The di lemma of the scope of

s ignificance of the object.

The dilemma cons ists in

whether the actor should respond for a specif i c purpose
or general purposes .
A.

Episodic col lect ive behaviors--the actor ' s purposes
are very specific in this type of behavior.

For

example, to get clear of a burning bui lding.
B.

Urban Insurrections- - the actor ' s purposes may be some
what specific in the form of looting for monetary
reasons but there also exists a general diffuse purpose
in the form of a protest against discrimination .

c.

Revolutions--the purpos es and activities are very
diffuse--to change the basic value structure of the
present society us ing many diverse strategies.

6.

Short-lived--Long- livea. 5

This represents the d ilemma of

pursuing short range , emotiona l goals or long range, usef ul
goals for the sake of the entire collectivity.
5This pattern v ariab le was added in later writings of Talcott
Parsons , but was not included in the orig inal l ist.
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A.

Episodic col lective behavior--primary emphasis is on
short range emotional grati fication without t aking
into consideration the long range goals of the
col lectivity.

B.

Urban Insurrections--there is some short range emotional
gratification in the form of looting and burning, but
most participants a lso have in mind the long range goal
o f equality.

C.

Revolutions--the activities of the actors are almost
exclusively directed toward long range intrumenta l
goals o f the collectivity.

It is the contention o f the writer that the use of the pattern
variables model has accomplished the final task of this dissertation- 
re-integration of the findings back into the body of theory from which
it was origina l ly derived.

This procedure does point out that the

phenomenon, urban insurrections, does fall somewhere in the middle o f
theoretical explanations o f collective behavior incidents and that o f
social movements.

While the findings contained in this dissertation

cannot be he ld as final, they can at least be useful in future
explorations in this area.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
The major limitation of this study lies with its possible lack
o f generalizability from the three selected case studies.

This group

of disorders in no way cons titutes a randomly selected sample from
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the total population of race riots which occurred during the last
decade.

In fact , these three race riots could be regarded as con

stituting a population in and of th emselves.

This interpretation

is based upon the fact that the sheer magnitude of these disorders
is much greater than the others that occurred during approximately
the same period of time.

The lack of information about the

disturbances that occurred in either Atlanta, Tampa, Cleveland, or
Plainfield, New Jersey makes it impossible to dete rmine with any
degree of certainty whether the differences between these two types
are quantitative, qualitative, or a combination of both.

Previous

works on revolutions suggest that typologies developed from the
study of large revolutions (Russian, French, English, and American )

are also app licable to the analyses of smaller-sca le revolutions. 6

With this acting as a precedent, it appears likely that the findings
of this investigation might be generalized to include the other
urban insurrections that occurred during the 1960 ' s and about which
not enough information is available .

In fact, it might be possible

to generalize from this typology to some of the major communal race
riots which occurred in this country during the last century .

This

procedure, however, would be even more tenuous and unsubstantiated
and is probably best considered as a topic for further research
which could employ the findings of this study as a benchmark.
6For examp le, see Bernard J.
Garrow, "The Mexican Social
Upheaval of 1910 : A Comparative Study of Theories of Revolution,"
an unpublished Ph. D. dissertation, Un iversity of Nebraska, Lincoln,
1 9 5 1.
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The very nature of the data also points to another limitation
that is inherent with this type of investigation.

In field studies

or in ex post f acto historical research there always exists a
discrepancy between what actually happened and what was described as
actually happening.

This discrepancy may be large or small depending

upon the care that was exercised by the researcher .

This situation

is beyond the control of this student, but as stated earlier the
documentation used in this dissertation represents the most accurate
that was available.

The major factor responsible for this gap was

simply the loss of data that occurs between the actual event and the
time when the narratives of the event were written.

Once again this

has been minimized by the prompt investigation and public ation of
the findings of the di fferent commissions.
Another f actor that could compound the dif ficulties in this
type of research results from the peculiarities exhibited by each of
the cities that has been selected for study.

Each city has its own

particular ethos or life style and this tends to complicate and
obfuscate any ef forts to extract some general patterns of any social
phenomena which occurred in all of them.

The attempt to find common

themes m ay also c ause the investigator to become oblivious to
important and unique features of each of the respective cities .

This

process of selective perception could result in the publication of
invalid findings if caution was not exercised in the interpretation
of the data .
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Other factors which are actually beyond the control of the
researcher but which nonetheless play an important role in this
dissertation revolve around the dual processes of modeling and
labeling as a result of the first major disorder that occurred in
Watts.

Rather than measuring p atterns which happened "spontaneously"

in three different cities at three different times, what the
researcher might actually have measured was the degree to which the
Watts disorder served as a model for the disturbances that followed
in either Detroit or Newark.

Instead of establishing the existence

of independent sequential patterns or stages the research could have
measured simply the degree of conformity th at characterized both the
riot participants and social control agency personnel in their efforts
to model themselves after the social behaviors of their respective
counterparts in the earlier Watts disturbance.
Another form of contamination from the Watts episode could
have been the extent to which ghetto residents in other urban centers
labeled themselves and were in turn labeled by control agencies as
potential rioters.

The other racial d isorders could in this fashion

be seen as the results of self-fulfil ling prophecies r ather than
distinct and spontaneous episodes.

If this was partially true, then

the Watts disorder or rather simply the fact that it happened could
be considered as one of the maj or causative factors for the riots
that occurred afterw ard.

This could invalidate a part of the typology
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because the first stage was assumed to have been the major causative
factor and no consideration is given to the fact that other riots had
occurred before.
Unfortunately there is no way of measuring the influence o f
these compounding factors on the interpretations contained in this
dissertation.

The inability to control and measure extraneous

variables is one of the major drawbacks of this type of research;
however, this situation does not preclude the possibility o f discov
ering valid findings.

The researcher was aware of these complicating

factors and they were taken into consideration during the analysis.
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